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Part I
Introduction
Starting in the 1970s, a second era of financial globalization is now in progress.1
Figure I.1 illustrates this development for di↵erent country groups by depict-
ing the widely used measure of de facto financial globalization of Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007), namely the ratio of total foreign liabilities and assets
to GDP.2 Between 1970 and 2007, this ratio massively increased in high-
income countries. This development has been less impressive for emerging
and developing countries (captured here by middle- and low-income coun-
tries), although for this country group, the same indicator has doubled its
value. The rise in cross-border capital flows was accelerated by a massive
wave of deregulation of capital controls in the early 1990s (Chinn and Ito,
2008; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009). These liberalization policies were un-
derpinned by the theoretical predictions of standard neoclassical economic
models according to which, financial integration allows for an e cient allo-
cation of capital (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo↵, 1996, Chapter 7).3 Enhanc-
ing capital flows from (capital-rich) industrial to (capital-scarce) developing
economies, financial globalization should increase investments and thereby
stimulate economic growth in the latter group of countries. Yet, the real
development benefits of financial integration have proved to be sobering.
Comprehensively reviewing the empirical literature on the influence of finan-
cial integration on economic development, Kose et al. (2009b) conclude that
the vast majority of the relevant studies do not find robust evidence for a
1The first era of financial globalization is dated between 1870 and 1914. See, e.g.,
Schularick (2006) for similarities and di↵erences in the pattern of international capital
mobility in both of these eras.
2In contrast to a de facto indicator, a de jure measure of financial integration refers to
the degree of legal constraints which regulate international capital transactions.
3Basically, the concept of “financial integration” refers to an improved access of a coun-
try to international capital markets, while ‘financial globalization” refers to international
capital mobility worldwide. In the literature, both terms are often used synonymously.
In a very recent study, Nicolo and Juvenal (2012) explicitly distinguish between both
concepts. According to their definition, financial integration captures the equalization of
asset prices, while financial globalization means an increase in cross-border capital flows.
With this distinction, financial globalization becomes a necessary precondition if financial
integration is to occur.
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positive e↵ect of financial integration on growth for developing countries.4
However, Kose et al. (2009b) put forward the idea that, in addition to direct
neoclassical e↵ects, financial integration may influence economic development
via indirect channels which are mostly not captured in the relevant empiri-
cal studies. According to their arguments, financial integration may impose
macroeconomic discipline on policy makers, promote the development of a
sound domestic financial market, and improve institutional quality. These
processes may, in turn, lead to long-run economic prosperity and therefore
result in “collateral benefits” of financial integration (see Dell’Ariccia et al.,
2008; Obstfeld, 2009, for similar arguments).
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Figure I.1: Financial Integration Relative to GDP (in %)5
4Kose et al. (2009b) provide an overview of 25 studies that empirically investigate
the relationship between financial integration and growth. Only two of them find a clear
positive e↵ect.
5Financial integration is measured as a ratio of sum of total foreign assets and liabilities
to GDP. The data stems from the updated and extended version of the dataset constructed
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Luxembourg is excluded from the dataset. The
division of countries into income groups is done according to the World Bank classification
and is based on a country’s GNI per capita in 2010. Note that illustrating the development
of financial integration, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) distinguish between advanced
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Although the role of institutions in attracting foreign capital and reaping
the benefits of financial integration is well investigated (see, among others,
Alfaro et al., 2008), the literature has largely omitted to provide evidence on
how the mechanism could work the other way round. To elaborate on the
mechanisms, through which financial integration may influence institutional
quality in developing countries, is therefore the aim and the main contribu-
tion of this thesis. In particular, this thesis comprises four individual essays.
While the first three provide theoretical models of di↵erent channels, through
which financial integration may a↵ect institutional quality, the last work is
an empirical investigation into the influence of liberalization of the financial
account on institutional development.
For two reasons, I focus on institutional quality as one indirect link
between financial integration and economic development. First, the liter-
ature on economic development has highlighted the crucial role of institu-
tional quality in determining a country’s long-run socio-economic perspec-
tives. Institutions matter for development, as they constrain individuals’
socio-economic activities and thereby shape economic incentives. As “the
rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990, p. 3), “institutions deter-
mine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills,
and firms accumulate capital and produce output” (Hall and Jones, 1999,
p. 84). In a broader sense, institutions provide the framework for the mar-
kets to work e ciently by protecting property rights, guaranteeing contract
enforcement, preventing anti-competetive behavior, ensuring macroeconomic
stability, and managing social conflicts (see Rodrik, 2000). Thus, as argued
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2010, p. 1), while “di↵erences in human capital,
physical capital and technology are only proximate causes” for various devel-
opment paths, institutions provide “fundamental causes” of economic growth
di↵erences across countries. In fact, there is vast empirical evidence that in-
dicators on rule of law, bureaucratic quality, expropriation risks, and level of
corruption account to a large degree for cross-country per-capita di↵erences
in income levels and growth rates (see, among others, Knack and Keefer,
1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001). Therefore, analyzing the
influence of financial integration on institutions entails important implica-
tions for the long-run economic development.6 Second, despite the academic
OECD countries and the remaining countries (see Figure 3 in their paper). Therefore the
increase in the level of financial integration for high-income countries, as shown in Figure
I.1, is higher than the increase of the corresponding indicator in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007), while the overall trend is very similar between both country groups.
6It is worth noting that institutional quality, in addition to influencing the economic
e↵ects of financial integration, operates as a catalyst also in other dimensions. It plays,
for example, an important role in shaping the e↵ects of trade liberalization (see, e.g.,
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acceptance of the importance of institutions in economic development, the
literature on the endogenous development of institutions is relatively new,
though fast growing. Thus, this thesis also contributes to the existing re-
search on the determinants of institutional quality.
Given the importance of institutions, what explains cross-country dif-
ferences in institutional outcomes, and which factors determine the devel-
opment of the institutional quality? Summarizing the existing theories on
institutional changes, Acemoglu (2003) distinguishes between three general
categories: the first one, which he refers to as “the political Coase theo-
rem”, assumes that individuals agree on those institutional arrangements
that best match their di↵erent needs and requirements. According to the
second approach, di↵erent institutional outcomes reflect di↵erences in indi-
viduals’ (or their leaders’) beliefs about the “correct” forms of institutions.
Acemoglu (2003) characterizes this strand of theories as “theory of beliefs”.
Finally, the third category of theories, “theories of social conflict”, proceeds
on the assumption that institutions are the outcomes of social choices made
by individuals or groups with conflicting interests. Accordingly, decisions on
institutions are made in order to maximize individual payo↵s and not so-
cial welfare.7 Acemoglu (2003) argues that the first two strands of theories
cannot account for the real-world observations on the existence of ine cient
and malfunctioning institutions. Instead, according to his argument, histori-
cal experiences and cross-country studies suggest that ine cient institutions
mainly arise due to the discrepancy in the economic interests between a
politically powerful social group and the rest of the society. Theoretical ap-
proaches that concern institutional changes should therefore be consistent
with “theories of social conflict”.
Building on a series of previous works, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)
have proposed such an approach and developed a conceptual framework on
the dynamic institutional development. The following chart, taken from Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2010), visually summarizes their concept (see also Ace-
moglu et al., 2005): This concept comprises four main pillars: 1) economic
institutions, 2) political power, 3) political institutions, and 4) economic per-
formance ( i.e., development) and resources, respectively. Economic institu-
Levchenko, 2007); it also increases the e↵ectiveness of foreign aid (see, e.g., Dollar and
Levin, 2005).
7Applying a di↵erent terminology, Caballero and Kingston (2009) o↵er a similar catego-
rization of the related theories. For example, they refer to the “transaction cost approach”
in analogy to “the political Coase theorem”; the role of beliefs and social conflicts are il-
lustrated as “hierarchies of rules”. In addition, Caballero and Kingston (2009) also review
the literature which distinguishes between formal and informal institutions, such as social
norms and cultural peculiarities.
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Figure I.2: Endogenous Institutional Development Source: Acemoglu and
Robinson (2008b)
tions at time t determine economic performance in t, as already explained,
but also the future distribution of resources and thereby also the economic
gains and losses of di↵erent social groups. Accordingly, various groups of
individuals have di↵erent preferences over the form of economic institutions,
which results in a conflict of interests over choosing these institutions. Who-
ever has more political power in this conflict is likely to secure the set of
economic institutions that he or she prefers. The distribution of political
power is in turn the outcome of political institutions and the available re-
sources. In particular, political power has two sources: While de jure political
power is the immediate outcome of the existing political institutions, such
as the form of government, de facto political power results from the abil-
ity of a social group to withstand a government’s decisions and to push its
own interests. Putting it together, we obtain a dynamic system describing
the evolution of institutions in the course of time: Political institutions and
distribution of resources today determine the allocation of political power,
which in turn determines economic institutions in the same period, with the
latter a↵ecting again current and future economic outcome.
Modeling the e↵ect of financial integration on institutional quality, I draw
on the above concept, and more generally on the “theories of social conflict”.
In particular, political institutions are considered as given in all three theo-
retical papers of this thesis because my focus is on the quality of economic
institutions.8 More precisely, the model economies are assumed to be ruled
8Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also theoretically analyze endogenous changes in po-
litical institutions. More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) extensively discuss the
importance of political institutions in shaping the economic institutional environment and
provide detailed historical evidence for their argument. In addition, consequences of regime
changes for economic development have been also intensively analyzed: For example, Pers-
son and Tabellini (2003, 2006, 2008) provide empirical evidence on the positive influence
9
by an autocratic elite. This assumption is motivated by the fact that, ac-
cording to the Polity IV project, almost 1/3 of the existing governments
worldwide are non-democratic regimes. Moreover, more than 50% of the au-
tocratic regimes are classified as low and low-middle income (i.e, as develop-
ing) countries, respectively.9 However, even if assuming political institutions
to be exogenous, according to Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) concept, dis-
tribution of economic resources a↵ects the quality of the prevailing economic
institutions by influencing the general population’s de facto political power.
In this thesis, theoretical papers therefore analyze the consequences of finan-
cial integration for the incomes of the general population and for the reaction
of the ruling elite to the resulting changes in income distribution. That is,
the three papers commonly analyze the elite’s behavior with respect to its
choice of economic institutions.
Although in each theoretical framework of this thesis a self-interested rul-
ing elite uses its political power to set the institutional environment in order
to maximize its own utility, the elite’s incentives may vary depending on
the economic environment of the country under consideration. Similarly, the
elite’s decision on economic institutions is constrained by costs which also
depend on the general environment. Therefore, each of the theoretical pa-
pers assumes a specific economic framework and deals thereby with di↵erent
aspects of the elite’s decision making process. Consequently, the implication
of financial integration for the quality of economic institutions will also be
subject to the underlying economic framework.
In the following models, economic institutions basically refer to the se-
curity of property rights of the non-elite members of the society. In reality,
institutional dimensions, such as rule of law and e↵ective and non-corrupt
bureaucracy, determine the degree to which the property rights are protected.
In the models of this thesis, the rate of expropriation, which is set by the
ruling elite, stands for the quality of economic institutions. That is, the
ability of the elite to appropriate parts of the general population’s income
or assets captures all potential channels through which the elite infringes on
the property rights of other social groups.
In the following, I overview each paper in detail and highlight its individ-
ual contribution.
of democratization on growth. See also Acemoglu et al. (2012) for a related contribution.
9Polity IV classifies regimes according to the Polity II index which is based on the
assessment of a country’s electoral process, constraints on the executive power, and the
degree of civil liberties. The index is ranged between -10 and + 10, and authors of
the project adopt the following categorization of the regimes: ”autocracies” (-10 to -6),
”anocracies” (-5 to +5), and ”democracies” (+6 to +10). See Marshall et al. (2010).
However, the figures above refer to all countries with a negative Polity II score.
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Financial Integration in Autocracies: Greasing the Wheel or More to Steal?
In the first paper, jointly written with Philipp Harms and Oliver Lorz, we de-
velop a dynamic model to analyze the short- and long-run e↵ects of financial
integration on institutional quality. As already noted, the model economy
is governed by a ruling elite, who uses its political power to expropriate the
general population’s income and thereby to transfer resources from the rest
of the society to itself. However, the ability of the general population to
withstand expropriation, i.e, its de facto political power, constrains the elite
from implementing its expropriatory policy. Following Acemoglu and Robin-
son’s (2006) concept, we link the de facto power of the general population
to its material wealth. The general population consists of workers and en-
trepreneurs. While workers use their labor endowment to be productive in a
traditional sector, entrepreneurs additionally need capital investments to run
their firms in a modern sector. Assuming that these investments have to be
financed by borrowing abroad, we model financial integration as an exoge-
nous decline in costs of capital. That is, financial integration is interpreted in
this framework as a liberalization policy which aims to remove impediments
on foreign capital transactions and reflects thus the deregulation policies in
developing countries in the early 1990s.
Since in the occupational choice equilibrium, activities from both the tra-
ditional and the modern sector have to generate identical incomes, financial
integration results in income gains for the entire general population. This,
in turn, creates an incentive for the ruling elite to increase the expropriation
rate. However, by improving its economic situation, financial integration also
increases the de facto power of the general population in the following period
raising thereby the future costs of expropriation. To analyze the net e↵ect
of financial integration on the equilibrium expropriation rate, we distinguish
two types of the ruling elite. In the first case, the elite behaves myopically in
the sense that it neglects the e↵ect of the expropriation on the accumulation
of wealth by the general population in the following periods and thereby on
its future political power. In the second case, the elite is assumed to be
forward-looking : by deciding on the current expropriation rate, the elite –
in contrast to a myopic scenario – takes into account its e↵ect on the fu-
ture political power of the general population. As a consequence, financial
integration leads to a more aggressive expropriatory policy with a forward-
looking elite than with a myopic elite. Yet, we show that in both cases the
net e↵ect of financial integration on the institutional quality is negative: a
rise in the rate of expropriation, induced by the immediate reaction of the
elite to the improved access to foreign capital, dominates the indirect e↵ect of
financial integration on the de facto political power of the general population.
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Autocracies, Structure of the Economy, and Expropriation
The model framework in the second paper is closely related to the previous
one. The ruling elite uses its political power and expropriates the general
population’s income for its own interests. However, here I consider a static
environment and neglect thereby a political motive for expropriation. In ad-
dition, a novel pillar is the introduction of an economically active elite. In
particular, employing input factors, which are supplied by the general popula-
tion, the ruling elite is engaged in the production of a final good. As before,
the general population consists of two groups: workers and entrepreneurs.
While workers supply labor, entrepreneurs produce an intermediate produc-
tion input. Both production factors are assumed to be imperfect substitutes.
Furthermore, only the entrepreneurs, but not the workers, are targeted by
the elite’s expropriatory policy. As a result, expropriation distorts the occu-
pational choice of the general population and a↵ects the composition of the
production factors. That is, if the rate of expropriation rises, the number of
workers (entrepreneurs) increases (decreases). In such a set up, expropria-
tion provides the elite with means not only to extract rents from other social
groups, as previously, but also to influence the factor prices and thereby its
own economic profits. Thus, by deciding on the expropriation rate, the elite
trades o↵ its benefits from rent extraction and factor price manipulation with
costs resulting from the distortion in the occupational choice of the general
population. These costs, however, depend on the degree of substitutabil-
ity between labor and entrepreneurial input. If the production technology
allows the elite a relatively easier substitution of the entrepreneurial input
by labor force, expropriation of entrepreneurs is less costly for the elite. As
a consequence, the equilibrium rate of expropriation increases with the de-
gree of substitutability between labor and entrepreneurial input. Financial
integration is not explicitly modeled in this framework. Instead, I generally
analyze the consequence of an exogenous increase in the productivity of the
entrepreneurs for the rate of expropriation which may result from financial
integration.10 Similar to the previous findings, productivity gains result in a
higher expropriation by the ruling elite. However, I also show that the in-
crease in the equilibrium rate of expropriation is lower for economies with a
lower degree of substitutability between the production factors, i.e, in those
economies in which an economically active elite is more dependent on the
entrepreneurial activity.
10In the model of the first paper, decline in the costs of borrowing abroad, which re-
sults from financial integration, has a similar e↵ect on the general population’s income
and accordingly on the elite’s reaction to it as an exogenous rise in the productivity of
entrepreneurs.
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In sum, the first and the second papers theoretically analyze di↵erent
incentives of an autocratic elite to react to exogenous changes in income dis-
tribution in the society which may result from financial integration. These
frameworks highlight thereby the role of the time horizon faced by the elite as
well as its economic and political motivation in implementing expropriation
policies. In doing so, each paper captures some important characteristics of
the “real-world” examples of autocratic regimes: The framework of the first
paper may help to explain the behavior of regimes with a relatively short
life-span (e.g., countries in Latin America before the democratization waves
in the last century) and regimes with long lasting dynasties (e.g, in Africa);
the framework of the second paper may, in turn, be related to regimes which
dominate a country’s economic activities (e.g., in Central Asia). According
to the prediction of these models, financial integration, in general, results in
a deterioration of the quality of economic institutions, although the extent
of this deterioration varies, depending on the specific case. This model pre-
diction supports some empirical observations, according to which, there is
a negative correlation between financial integration and the quality of eco-
nomic institutions in autocratic regimes (see Figure II.1). This finding also
implies that the “collateral benefits” hypothesis of Kose et al. (2009b) –
according to which, financial integration may improve institutional quality –
does not necessarily hold in autocratic states.
Mode of International Investment and Exogenous Risk of Expropriation
The frameworks described so far treat financial integration as an exogenous
decline in the costs of foreign external financing or, more generally, as an
exogenous productivity shock. While there is empirical evidence supporting
these modeling choices, these models do not allow for the distinction of the
di↵erent forms of international investment.11 However, reviewing the litera-
ture, Kose et al. (2009b) stress that the composition of foreign capital flows
is crucial for the growth e↵ects of financial integration. In particular, they
conclude that foreign direct investment (FDI) is more beneficial for economic
development than other forms of investment, especially debt flows. FDI tends
to be less volatile and, in addition to augmenting capital in receiving coun-
tries, it positively influences domestic productivity. This possibly explains
why FDI is the dominant type of investment in developing and emerging
countries. For example, according to the World Economic Outlook by IMF
11Henry (2003, 2007), e.g., provides empirical evidence that financial integration reduces
the costs of borrowing abroad. For the e↵ect of financial integration on productivity and
entrepreneurial activity, see, e.g, Bekaert et al. (2011), Bonfiglioli (2008), Kose et al.
(2009a), Alfaro and Charlton (2007).
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(2011), in 2010 FDI accounted for more than 2/3 of total net foreign capital
inflows to these countries. For 2011 and 2012, this share is projected to be
almost 75 % (see Table A13 in this report).
Exploring the mutual relationship between the forms of international in-
vestments and institutional quality is therefore the aim of the third paper,
jointly written with Oliver Lorz. In doing so, we incorporate the so-called
property right approach to the organizational structure of international firms
into a framework of an autocratically ruled economy. The property rights
approach to the organization of firms builds on the works by Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) and has been extended, in particu-
lar, by Antras (2003, 2005) and Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008) to explain
internalization of multinationally active firms. According to this approach,
ownership of production assets in a joint relationship is a source of bargain-
ing power when it comes to surplus sharing between partners. Consider the
decision of a foreign investor to provide capital to a domestic producer, who
is endowed with a specific asset, as is the case in our framework. Capital
and the specific asset are then jointly used to produce a final good. In a
world of incomplete contracts, this investment decision is subject to a hold-
up problem. That is, the partners cannot specify a contract which perfectly
determines the level of investments ex ante, i.e., before the production takes
place.12 Anticipating that the investment’s returns can be seized by the asset
owner ex post, the foreign investor supplies an ine ciently low level of capi-
tal. According to the property right literature, acquisition of the asset by the
investor, i.e, transfer of the ownership to the investor, however, raises the in-
dividual claim over the joint surplus and therefore provides the investor with
higher incentives to invest. Yet, this mechanism can only work adequately if
the property rights of asset owners are su ciently protected against possible
expropriation by third parties, especially by self-interest governments of the
domestic country.
We distinguish between two alternative modes of investment: In the first
mode, foreign investor and domestic producer form a joint venture in which
the investor simply provides capital and the domestic producer remains the
owner of the asset. In the second mode, they choose an integrated form of
production in which the foreign investor acquires the asset. The latter case
can be referred to as FDI. With perfectly secure property rights, the foreign
investor would always prefer the second mode of investment since as an asset
owner the investor receives a larger share of the joint revenue than within a
12The ideas on incomplete contracts and the resulting hold-up problem due to asset
specificity and opportunistic behavior of the agents were first discussed by Williamson
(1971).
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joint venture. However, this decision on capital investments is distorted since
the investor faces the risk of expropriation by the ruling elite. Note that this
approach thus also allows for expropriation of foreign investors and thereby
takes into account the importance of institutions in attracting foreign capital.
Our theoretical analysis yields two main results. First, an exogenous
increase in the risk of expropriation – i.e., a deterioration of economic insti-
tutions – leads to a shift in the mode of investment from FDI towards more
joint ventures. This result can be empirically verified by the studies of, for
example, Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) and Henisz (2000). Second, financial
integration, reflected in a decline in investment costs, has an asymmetric
e↵ect on the expropriation risk: A decline in the costs of forming a joint
venture raises the risk of expropriation, whereas a decline in the costs of for-
eign direct investments lowers it. Thus, according to our model predictions,
policy measures that improve the environment for FDI should also lead to
better institutional quality in domestic countries.
Financial Liberalization and Institutional Development
The fourth and the last paper of this thesis, co-authored with Markus Alzer,
empirically investigates the influence of de jure financial integration on the
quality of institutions. Specifically, we address two questions: First, in how
far has a gradual abolishment of capital controls influenced the quality of
institutions in the same period? And second, in how far has a single liberal-
ization reform, which targets the constraints of financial account transactions,
influenced the subsequent development of institutional quality? To capture
the degree of financial openness, we use an indicator developed by Chinn and
Ito (2008). Our measure of institutional quality is an average of four indica-
tors on di↵erent institutional dimensions, namely, rule of law, expropriation
risks, bureaucratic quality, and level of corruption, respectively.
According to our findings, financial liberalization, in general, improves
institutional quality. When testing the influence of a single financial liberal-
ization reform, we also show that if this reform is accompanied by political
liberalization, i.e., democratization, the beneficial e↵ects of financial liber-
alization on institutional quality are even larger. However, the influence of
financial liberalization di↵ers with respect to institutional dimensions. In
particular, while financial liberalization mainly reduces expropriation risks,
its influence on corruption is negative. These results suggest that financial
liberalization is associated with better protection of property rights. At the
same time, it tends to lay the ground for rent-seeking activities, increasing
thereby the level of corruption.
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This paper analyzes the influence of financial integration on institu-
tional quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an
autocracy in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate
the general population. Although financial integration reduces capital
costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private
sector, the elite may counteract this e↵ect by increasing the rate of
expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic
resources, financial integration also has long run consequences for the
distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class.
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1 Introduction
For more than three decades now, we have been observing substantial in-
creases in cross-border capital flows. Between 1970 and 2004 the ratio of
total foreign assets and liabilities to GDP increased in the industrial coun-
tries by a factor of six, and in the emerging and developing nations by a
factor of three (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). This process accelerated
in the 1990s, when international organizations, in particular the IMF, be-
gan promoting liberalization of the financial accounts in developing countries
(Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009).1
Against this background, it is not surprising that a broad literature deals
with the impact of financial integration on economic performance. Several
authors point out that capital mobility may not only have direct economic
e↵ects – due to a more e cient international allocation of capital – but that it
may also bring further indirect, “collateral” benefits. These indirect channels
may work through improving the institutional quality and governance in
the host countries, the development of domestic financial markets, or the
maintenance of macroeconomic discipline (see Kose et al. 2009b; Dell’Ariccia
et al. 2008; Obstfeld 2009). Casual inspection of the evidence, however,
suggests that one should not be too optimistic with regard to the benefits of
financial integration in this respect. In fact, financial integration has gone
along with a deterioration of the institutional quality in a large number of
emerging and developing countries. Figure II.1 illustrates this by depicting
the change in the World Bank’s indicator of the control of corruption between
1996 and 2008 against the change in net foreign capital inflows. As we see
from this figure, the relationship between both variables is slightly negative
– and stronger if the focus is on autocratic countries.2
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework that can be used to an-
alyze the e↵ects of financial integration on institutional quality. Considering
countries which are ruled by non-democratic regimes, we argue that financial
1Chinn and Ito (2008) show that the industrialized countries have steadily liberalized
their financial markets since the 1970s, whereas in the less developed and emerging coun-
tries a massive deregulation took place from the 1990s onwards.
2The country sample consists of middle and low income countries according to the
World Bank classification. A country is considered as being autocratic if its averaged
Polity IV index within the observation span is less than zero (see Marshall et al. 2010
for a categorization of political regimes according to the Polity IV project). Data on
capital flows (foreign direct investments and portfolio investments) stem from the World
Development Indicators provided by World Bank (2011), while the data on corruption are
taken from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) of Kaufmann et al. (2010). Using
the WGI indicator for the rule of law yields a similar picture as Figure II.1. Considering
net FDI inflows only, the correlation becomes even stronger.
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Figure II.1: Capital Inflows and Corruption between 1996 and 2008
integration gives the ruling elite additional incentives to implement ine -
cient expropriatory policies, which we interpret as a worsening of economic
institutions. This outcome holds even though financial integration may have
a positive long run impact on the de facto political power of the general
population.
Our understanding of the determinants of institutional quality is based on
ideas by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) and Acemoglu et al. (2005),
who consider the interplay between political and economic institutions.3 For-
mally, our framework builds on Acemoglu (2006a,b), who develops a closed
economy model in which the ruling elite extracts rents from the general pop-
ulation and is, at the same time, concerned with securing its political power.
We consider a capital-importing country with a political system that can be
described as a dictatorship by the elite. The general population consists of
entrepreneurs and workers while the ruling elite is economically passive. In
every period, the elite decides on the rate at which it expropriates the general
population. In addition to economic costs, expropriation is associated with
political costs for the elite, which result from the general population’s ability
3See also recent contributions by Laguno↵ (2009) and Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) on
the dynamics of political institutions.
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to oppose the elite’s rent extraction. The size of these political costs can be
interpreted as a measure of the general population’s de facto political power.
Using this framework, we analyze the consequences of financial integra-
tion for both the rate of expropriation and the political power of the non-elite.
Financial integration – interpreted as an improved access to foreign capital
– works like a positive technology shock and raises profits of entrepreneurs
who borrow abroad to finance the capital used in production.4 For a given
political power of the general population this creates an incentive for the
elite to raise the rate of expropriation. To analyze the dynamic e↵ects of
capital market integration, we first assume that the elite behaves myopically.
Whereas the rate of expropriation still increases as a result of financial inte-
gration, the long run e↵ects are now weaker, because the political power of
the general population grows over time. Hence, the rate of expropriation ini-
tially overshoots above its new long-run equilibrium level. A forward-looking
elite additionally takes into account the influence of the current income on
the future political power of the general population, and therefore expro-
priates more aggressively than a myopic elite. The expropriation e↵ect of
financial liberalization may dominate the decline in the capital costs in this
case, such that the political influence of the general population may decrease
after financial integration. Finally, we extend our model by distinguishing
the political power of entrepreneurs from that of workers. More precisely,
we consider the case in which only entrepreneurs have political power, while
workers are politically inactive. In such a setting, financial integration in-
fluences political power not only through its e↵ects on the aggregate income
in the private sector but also by changing the size of the politically active
entrepreneurial class.
Our paper is related to a growing literature on the institutional e↵ects of
financial globalization. In Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), capital imports
may reduce income inequality between workers and capital owners, making
the rise of a democratic society more likely. Moreover, since capital as a tax
base can react more elastically, redistributive taxes are lower in an open econ-
omy. According to Bourguignon and Verdier (2005), international financial
integration reduces the incentives for ruling capitalists to subsidize education,
which results in a decline in the political power of the poor. Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2005) distinguish two types of equilibria with capital mobility: A
“good” equilibrium with capital inflows and productivity-enhancing political
4Henry (2003, 2007) provides empirical evidence that financial liberalization results in
a decline of capital costs. In addition, Bekaert et al. (2011), Bonfiglioli (2008), Kose et al.
(2009a) show that financial integration has a direct positive e↵ect on productivity. See
also Alfaro and Charlton (2007), who find empirical evidence for a rise of entrepreneurial
activity as a result of a better access to foreign capital markets.
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reforms and an equilibrium in which bad institutions are in place and capital
stays away from the country. Rajan and Zingales (2003) focus on the inter-
est group influence of industrial incumbents on the development of financial
institutions. They argue that these incumbents view financial development
more favorably if countries open up for both trade and capital flows.5
Furthermore, the basic mechanism of our model, through which finan-
cial integration may cause more expropriation, can be applied to a broader
context in which income gains result in more distortionary policies in an en-
vironment with weak institutions. In particular, there is a strong link of our
framework to the literature on the “political resource curse”. Comparable
to the access to foreign capital, a better endowment with natural resources
may create an incentive for the ruling elite to increase the rate of expropria-
tion.6 In our paper, financial integration di↵ers from a resource boom insofar
as the improved access to foreign capital also changes the political costs of
expropriation by directly influencing the income of the non-elite.
Finally, our paper is related to several political-economical studies on the
behavior of dictatorships. For example Olson and McGuire (1996) provide
a theoretical model, in which the autocratic ruler faces a general trade-o↵
between ine cient rent extraction and productivity-enhancing policies.7 As
in our framework, a rational ruler raises the distortive tax rate as a result of
an exogenous productivity gain in the private sector. In contrast to Olson
and McGuire (1996), we additionally analyze the determinants and dynamics
of the political costs of ine cient policies.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
the economic framework and derives comparative static results on the e↵ects
of financial liberalization in a static environment. In section 3 we analyze the
5See also Rajan and Zingales (2004) for a more extensive elaboration of this argu-
ment. Albornoz et al. (2012) analyze the incentives to expropriate foreign investors in
a Heckscher-Ohlin-framework, in which foreign capital facilitates international trade. In
their model, the expropriation risk depends – among other things – on sectoral factor
intensities. Aizenman and Yi (1998) analyze the incentives for an autocratic regime to lib-
eralize financial markets. They show that the ruling elite chooses a regime which enables
it to control the inflows of foreign capital and thus its income gains from the taxation of
the private sector.
6Besley and Ghatak (2009) present a formal exposition of this argument. Guriev et al.
(2011) theoretically explain and empirically verify that expropriations in the oil industry
are more likely to occur in periods with a high oil price. See also Robinson et al. (2006);
Bulte and Damania (2008); Myerson (2010) or the rent seeking models of Lane and Tornell
(1999); Baland and Francois (2000); Mehlum et al. (2006).
7This approach has been extended to analyze various dimensions of autocratically ruled
economies, such as di↵erent types of dictators (Shen 2007), information asymmetries con-
cerning the beliefs of citizens about the type of government (Azam et al. 2009), or time
horizons of the rulers (Acemoglu 2005).
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dynamics of political power with a myopic elite, and in section 4 we extend
our framework to consider a forward-looking elite. Section 5 modifies the
dynamic setup by distinguishing between the political power of entrepreneurs
and workers. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
We consider a small open economy that is populated by two groups of in-
dividuals, a small ruling elite and the general population. Without loss of
generality, we normalize the size of the general population to one. The elite
does not participate in the production process and earns rents by expropri-
ating the general population.8 Members of the general population may work
in a traditional sector (T ) or become entrepreneurs, who operate their own
firms in a modern sector (M). The sectors produce quantities QT and QM
of the same good, which can be sold on the world market for a given price of
one.9 In period t, the output of the traditional sector is given by
QT (t) = L(t)  , (1)
where L(t) represents the number of workers at time t and 0 <   < 1. We
assume that each worker in the traditional sector o↵ers one unit of labor, and
that revenues in this sector are shared equally among all employees.10 Hence,
the income of a representative worker in the traditional sector is given by
yT (t) =
L(t) 
L(t)
(2)
In each period, members of the general population decide to either work
in the traditional sector or to become an entrepreneur, operating a firm in
8Unlike in Acemoglu (2006a,b) or Parente and Prescott (1999), the elite is not directly
involved in the production process. Hence, it has no interest in the expansion or con-
traction of a given sector for the purpose of raising the returns from its own economic
activities. While this framework may fail to capture some historical cases in which the
elite was defined by the ownership of specific factors – e.g., land ownership in Argentina –
it appropriately describes a situation in which the elite achieves and sustains its political
dominance mainly by controlling an oppressive apparatus.
9As we consider a small open economy for which goods prices are determined by world
markets, distinguishing between goods produced in the traditional and the modern sector
would blur our key argument without yielding additional insights.
10This assumption implies that the traditional sector does not generate any profit or
capital income.
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the modern sector. The production function in the modern sector is given
by
QM(t) =
(
0 if KM(t) < 1
↵ if KM(t)   1 . (3)
KM(t) is the capital used in the production process of a modern-sector firm,
and ↵ denotes the productivity of the entrepreneurs for KM(t)   1. We as-
sume that capital depreciates completely within a given period. Since extend-
ing the capital stock beyond one unit does not raise output, entrepreneurs
make an investment of IM(t) = KM(t) = 1 in every period. We assume that
this investment has to be financed by borrowing abroad at exogenous costs
of capital R. These costs comprise the given world interest rate, denoted
hereafter by ⇢, and additional transaction costs, which are assumed to be
exogenous and constant.11 Financial integration, interpreted as the removal
of frictions that impede capital inflows from abroad, lowers these transac-
tion costs and thereby causes a decline of R. In other words, the wedge
between the capital costs in the importing country and the world interest
rate declines.12
For the time being, we assume that agents only care about current con-
sumption. This implies that neither the elite nor the general population has
an incentive to save and lend, and that the only reason to borrow is to finance
entrepreneurial activity. As a consequence, the economy’s net foreign bor-
rowing in each period coincides with its current account deficit and mirrors
the number of entrepreneurs.
Given the production function in the modern sector according to (3), the
income of a representative entrepreneur in the modern sector is given by
yM(t) = ↵ R . (4)
Note that a reduction of the cost of capital R has the same e↵ect on profits
as an increase in the productivity term ↵. Thus, for a given institutional
quality, financial integration entails e ciency gains for the entire economy.
In what follows, we will use the short-hand notation A ⌘ ↵ R and assume
A > 1.
11For an alternative framework with convex costs of trading capital goods, see, e.g.,
Castro et al. (2009) or Sˇevcˇ´ık (2012).
12In principle, the decision to liberalize the financial market is a policy choice made
by the domestic elite and should, therefore, be also treated as endogenous. Yet, as men-
tioned in the introduction, most liberalizations in developing countries took place under
strong pressure from international organizations like the IMF. They were hardly avoid-
able for most developing countries, such that our choice to treat financial liberalization as
exogenous appears to be more appropriate for these situations.
22
In our paper, we model expropriation in a stylized way by introducing
a single variable ⌧(t), the “rate of expropriation”. This variable measures
the number of expropriatory acts in the economy at time t, given that a
single expropriation results in taking away the total income of a worker or
an entrepreneur.13 We consider the following two-stage sequence of events:
in the first stage, the elite decides on the rate of expropriation ⌧(t). In the
second stage, members of the general population choose between alternative
occupations (employment in the traditional sector vs. entrepreneurship), and
production takes place. We assume that ⌧ cannot be changed ex post, i.e.,
the elite can credibly commit to the value of ⌧(t) that has been chosen at
the beginning of period t. When making his occupational choice, a member
of the general population knows ⌧ but does not know who exactly will be
expropriated ex post. From an individual’s perspective, the rate of expro-
priation thus measures the likelihood of being expropriated, and we assume
that this likelihood is the same for workers and for entrepreneurs.14
In equilibrium, both occupations have to yield identical expected incomes,
i.e., the following condition has to be satisfied:
(1  ⌧)yT = (1  ⌧)yM ,
L(t) = A
1
  1 . (5)
Our assumption that A > 1 is su cient for an interior solution with
L(t) < 1.15 The relationship between A and the number of workers in the
traditional sector is negative, since raising A raises entrepreneurs’ profits.
Hence, for a given rate of expropriation ⌧ , financial integration – i.e., a
decline of R – raises entrepreneurial activity and enhances capital inflows in
our model.
We assume that the ruling elite uses a bureaucratic apparatus to expro-
priate the general population. However, sustaining this apparatus is associ-
ated with economic costs, which are increasing in ⌧ . Specifically, the costs
per expropriation are given by c(i) = c · i where the continuous index vari-
able i 2 [0; 1] measures the number of expropriations that take place in a
13For expositional convenience, and without loss of generality we set the subsistence level
of a member of the general population equal to zero such that a confiscatory expropriation
of this kind is feasible.
14An alternative interpretation of ⌧ would be that of an ”expropriation tax” that reduces
expected incomes.
15Note that A > 1 implies ↵ > 1, which indicates that, if the total general population
were employed in the modern sector, it would produce a greater quantity of output than
if it were employed in the traditional sector. Nevertheless, L(t) > 0 in equilibrium, since
output per worker in the traditional sector is decreasing in employment and exceeds ↵ at
low levels of L(t).
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given period. The increasing marginal costs of expropriation reflect the fact
that extracting more rents requires to sustain an increasingly expensive bu-
reaucracy, while the linear specification is chosen for tractability reasons.16
Aggregating over all i yields the total economic costs associated with a given
rate of expropriation:
R ⌧
0 c · idi = c2⌧ 2. As a consequence, the income of the
ruling elite is given by
yE(t) = A⌧(t)  c
2
⌧(t)2 , (6)
where we have used the fact that incomes of the general population are
identical across occupations, and where c > 0 reflects the severity of the
economic costs of expropriation. Note that we are assuming that the marginal
costs of expropriation are increasing in ⌧ . This is meant to reflect the fact that
extracting more rents requires an increasingly expensive apparatus, which –
both from the elite’s and the total society’s point of view – represents a pure
waste.
In what follows, we make the parametric assumption that setting ⌧ = 1
would be associated with economic costs high enough to erase the elite’s
revenues:
Assumption 1 A < c/2 .
This assumption rules out the uninteresting and implausible case in which
the elite completely expropriates the general population.
2.2 The Rate of Expropriation in a Static Equilibrium
We assume that the ruling elite dominates the political process and chooses
the rate of expropriation ⌧ to maximize its utility. An elite member’s utility
is a linear function of its income less the political costs of expropriation C(⌧),
which are given by
C(⌧) =  ⌧ . (7)
These political costs result from the resistance of the general population to
expropriatory policies by the elite. Even in an autocratic regime citizens have
ways to oppose the ruling elite by staging strikes, demonstrations etc. We
treat C(⌧) as reflecting the costs of countering such an opposition. However,
16We assume that the state bureaucracy is sta↵ed with members of the ruling elite. The
term c reflects the costs for the facilities and the equipment that are used to monitor and
enforce rent extraction, and that are assumed to be purchased on the world market. Note
that Besley and Persson (2009, 2010) endogenize the decisions of the incumbent to invest
in fiscal capacity, which determines the amount of the collected tax revenues. The costs
of these investments are also assumed to be increasing and convex.
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these costs can also be interpreted as representing the disutility associated
with the prospect of being ousted by an impoverished and angry population.
The parameter     0 measures the marginal political costs of expropriation
for the ruling elite and thus reflects the general population’s de facto political
power. While we assume, for the time being, that   is constant, we will later
focus on the evolution of this parameter over time and its interaction with ⌧ .
The distinction between de jure and de facto political power is an im-
portant pillar in Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) concept of endogenous
development of institutions. According to their framework, the distribution
of political power in a society is crucial not only for current economic institu-
tions but also of future political institutions, i.e., the form of government. In
Acemoglu (2006a,b), for example, when deciding on the expropriation rate,
the elite takes into account its e↵ect on the probability of power shifting.
Although we do not explicitly consider a scenario of a regime change in our
model, the political costs term   causes similar e↵ects on the elite’s behavior,
restricting its ability to expropriate.17
With elite’s income given by (6), its optimization problem can therefore
be written as
max
⌧
UE = A⌧   c
2
⌧ 2    ⌧ . (8)
By maximizing (8), we obtain the following interior solution for the rate of
expropriation:
⌧ ⇤ =
A   
c
. (9)
Assumption 1 implies that ⌧ ⇤ is always smaller than one. For high values
of  , the elite could, however, set ⌧ ⇤ = 0, that is, it could choose not to
expropriate at all. To exclude this outcome, which would leave members of
the elite without any income, and to have su cient scope for meaningful
comparative statics, we make the following parametric assumption:
Assumption 2   < A .
Figure II.2 illustrates the intuition behind equation (9): the horizontal
line at A reflects the elite’s marginal benefit from increasing ⌧ . The upward-
sloping line depicts the elite’s marginal costs of expropriation. This line
becomes steeper if the parameter c (determining the size of economic costs)
17See also Besley and Kudamatsu (2008) for a framework in which an autocratic leader,
in addition to policies for own private interests, also implements benevolent policies in
order to stay in power.
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increases, and it has a high intercept if the parameter   (reflecting the po-
litical costs) is high. The intersection of both lines determines the optimal
rate of expropriation ⌧ ⇤.
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Figure II.2: Optimal Expropriation Rate
With (9), we can easily analyze how the rate of expropriation reacts to
changes of the exogenous parameters. Most importantly, ⌧ ⇤ declines in R,
i.e.,
@⌧ ⇤
@R
=  1
c
< 0 . (10)
Financial integration raises entrepreneurs’ profits and thus the marginal ben-
efit of expropriation. As a result, the horizontal line in Figure II.2 shifts
upward (as illustrated by the dashed line), and ⌧ ⇤ increases.
To compute the impact of financial integration on the aggregate income
of the general population, we need to take into account both direct and
indirect e↵ects: On the one hand, lowering R acts like a positive productivity
shock and thereby raises incomes. On the other hand, the increased rate of
expropriation chosen by the elite has a negative influence on net incomes.
Substituting (9) into (4), we obtain the following equations for the general
population’s aggregate net income in equilibrium:18
18Note that workers and entrepreneurs get the same income in equilibrium, such that
we can drop the index M and T , and interpret y as the per-capita income of the general
population.
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(1  ⌧ ⇤)y = (c+     A)A
c
. (11)
Taking the derivative of (11) with respect to R yields
@(1  ⌧ ⇤)y
@R
=
2A  c   
c
< 0 .
Financial integration – interpreted as a decline of R – unambiguously raises
entrepreneurs’ incomes: while the rate of expropriation also increases, the
direct “e ciency-enhancing” influence of easier access to foreign capital dom-
inates. These insights are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In a static environment, financial integration raises the rate
of expropriation ⌧ . Nevertheless, both the income of the elite and the income
of the general population increase.
It is worthwhile to note that this result implies that the ruling elite ben-
efits from financial integration. Hence, while we keep treating financial in-
tegration as an exogenous process – imposed, e.g., by international organi-
zations – Proposition 1 indicates that such a process would be welcomed by
both the elite and the general population.
3 Dynamic Equilibrium with a Myopic Elite
So far we have employed a static model to analyze the e↵ect of an exogenous
drop in the costs of external borrowing on the quality of institutions, i.e.,
the rate of expropriation chosen by a ruling elite. In that setting, financial
integration influenced individuals’ absolute and relative incomes, but the de
facto political power of the general population (represented by the parameter
 ) was fixed.
It is likely, however, that a change in the distribution of incomes between
the ruling elite and the general population also a↵ects the distribution of
power in a society. If financial integration raises the disposable income of
the general population, one should expect that this also increases its political
power.19 To incorporate this idea into our model, we now switch to a dynamic
analysis and determine how a permanent reduction of R a↵ects the non-elite’s
19The literature has suggested di↵erent ways to link political power to economic re-
sources. Here we follow Acemoglu (2006a,b) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), who
model political power as a function of the absolute income level. We also analyzed the
case in which a change in relative incomes a↵ects the de facto power of the general popu-
lation. Our qualitative results did not change fundamentally.
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de facto political power   and the rate of expropriation ⌧ ⇤ in the short and
in the long run. Specifically, we assume that the following process describes
the evolution of   over time:
 ˙(t) =  [1  ⌧(t)] y(t)    (t) , (12)
with    0 and 0     1. According to equation (12), de facto political
power accumulates over time, comparable to physical capital in a neoclassical
growth model. The parameter  determines the speed at which a higher
aggregate income of the population transforms into increased political power,
while   is the rate of depreciation.20
Building on this dynamic equation, we first analyze the equilibrium for
the case in which the ruling elite is myopic – i.e., its members do not take into
account that their decision on ⌧ in a certain period influences the accumu-
lation of political power in the following periods. The case of a myopic elite
represents a setting in which members of the elite live for only one period
and maximize their utility in this period.
A myopic elite sets the expropriation rate in each period according to (9)
as in the static model, and (11) determines the net profit of the entrepreneurs.
Recall that, due to Assumption 1, it is never optimal for the ruling elite to
choose ⌧ = 1, i.e., the remaining income of the general population is always
strictly positive. In the static analysis of the previous section, Assumption
2 made sure that the elite never sets ⌧ = 0 either. However, in the current
context,   is an endogenous variable whose value is determined by the me-
chanics of the model. As we will see, the following assumption is su cient
for a positive value of ⌧ ⇤ in all periods:
Assumption 3  (0) < A, and  <   .
The following Proposition 2 summarizes the short- and long run behavior
of  :
Proposition 2 With a myopic elite, the political power of the non-elite and
the rate of expropriation monotonically converge to the following steady state
values:
 SS =
 A (c  A)
c     A and ⌧
SS =
A (     )
c     A . (13)
20Note that we neglect the collective action problem among the general population
and that we concentrate only on material resources as the driving force that determines
political power (a similar assumption is made in Acemoglu et al. 2005). In section 5, we
consider a setting in which only the group of entrepreneurs can exert political pressure.
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Proof. For   < A, the evolution of   can be determined by substituting
(11) into (12). This yields
 ˙(t) =
 A
c
(c  A) 
✓
     A
c
◆
 (t) .
This di↵erential equation is represented by the phase line in Figure II.3.
Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that this phase line is downward-sloping, implying
convergence to the steady state. The assumption  (0) < A together with the
downward sloping phase-line guarantee that  (t) < A for all t   0. Inserting
 SS into (9) yields ⌧SS.
The evolution of the expropriation rate is inherently linked to the evolu-
tion of  . Whether it increases or decreases over time depends on the initial
value of  : If  (0) <  SS, then the de facto political power increases over
time, and the rate of expropriation decreases. If  (0) >  SS, the politi-
cal power of the general population decreases, and the rate of expropriation
increases.
Note that abandoning Assumption 3 and allowing for      is not com-
patible with a strictly positive rate of expropriation in the long run: Accord-
ing to the law of motion for   as given by (12),  ˙ > 0 for all   in [0, A]
if  >  . For     A, we have ⌧ = 0, and the law of motion is given by
 ˙ =  A     , which is strictly positive for   <  A/ . Hence, regardless
of its initial value,   converges to a steady state that is incompatible with
⌧ ⇤ > 0 if     .
To determine how financial integration a↵ects the general population’s
political power and the rate of expropriation in the long run, we take the
derivative of the steady-state value from Proposition 2 with respect to R
(bearing in mind that A ⌘ ↵ R). This yields the following result:
d SS
dR
=
 [(2A  c) (c     A)   A(c  A)]
(c     A)2 . (14)
Given Assumptions (1) and (3), this expression is strictly negative. Hence,
financial integration improves the de facto political power of the general pop-
ulation in the steady state. The dashed line in Figure II.3 illustrates this
e↵ect. A drop in R shifts the  ˙-line to the right, also reducing the absolute
value of its slope. As a result, the new steady state  SS exceeds the previous
one. Note that since (1  ⌧ ⇤)yss = ( / ) ss, financial integration also raises
the net income of the general population.
The impact on the steady-state rate of expropriation ⌧SS can be written
as
d⌧SS
dR
=  1
c
✓
1  d 
SS
dR
◆
.
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Figure II.3: Evolution of   and Steady State with a Myopic Elite
Inserting (14) yields
d⌧SS
dR
=   c (     )
(c     A)2 , (15)
which is negative. Thus, the long run rate of expropriation increases as the
costs of capital fall, comparable to the static setting of the previous section.
However, the influence of financial integration is weakened by the increase in
the political power of the general population, which dampens expropriation
by the elite.
Interestingly, the adjustment path of ⌧ to the new steady state after
financial liberalization is characterized by overshooting. An increase of A
induces the elite to raise ⌧ according to (9). In subsequent periods, however,
the general population’s incomes and its de facto political power increase,
which reduces ⌧ . In the long run, the rate of expropriation converges to a
value that is higher than in the old steady state, but lower than in the period
immediately after the onset of financial integration.
4 A Forward-Looking Elite
The analysis in the preceding section was based on the assumption that,
when setting the rate of expropriation in period t, the ruling elite does not
take into account how this decision a↵ects the general population’s de facto
political power and the scope for expropriation in subsequent periods. If we
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replace this assumption by the notion of a forward-looking elite, the elite has
now an additional motivation to expropriate the general population, namely,
to avoid a future rise in the political costs of expropriation.21
Facing an infinite time horizon and a given world market interest rate of
⇢ > 0, the elite chooses the time path of ⌧(t) to maximize its lifetime utility
V E0 =
Z 1
0
e ⇢tUE[⌧(t),  (t)]dt , (16)
where instantaneous utility UE is specified by (8).22 By assuming that the
subjective discount rate coincides with the world interest rate ⇢, we make
sure that an interior solution for the elite’s consumption path exists.23
When maximizing the expression in (16), the elite considers the evolution
of the general population’s political power, as represented by
 ˙(t) =  A[1  ⌧(t)]    (t) and  (0) given .
The present value Hamiltonian function takes the following form:
H = e ⇢t[A⌧(t)   (t)⌧(t)  c
2
⌧(t)2] +  (t)[ A[1  ⌧(t)]    (t)] , (17)
where the costate variable  (t) denotes the elite’s marginal disutility from
political resistance.
Combining the first-order conditions for the optimal time path of ⌧ , we
obtain the following di↵erential equation that characterizes the evolution of
⌧ :
⌧˙(t) = (  + ⇢)⌧(t) +
(2  + ⇢)
c
 (t)  A(  +  + ⇢)
c
. (18)
Equations (12) and (18) constitute a system of two linear di↵erential
equations which describe the evolution of the expropriation rate and the
non-elite’s political power in this economy. Before starting to analyze the
dynamics of the system, we first determine the steady state levels ⌧SS and
 SS. Setting ⌧˙ = 0 and  ˙ = 0, we obtain
21While we allow the elite to save and to choose an optimal time path for ⌧ , we keep
assuming that there is no saving and lending by the general population.
22If the political costs of expropriation are purely monetary, we can interpret UE as the
elite’s income in period t. In this case, the elite maximizes the present value of its income.
23Given the linear utility specification, this solution is not unique – which, however,
does not a↵ect the elite’s choice of the rate of expropriation. Note furthermore that our
specification assumes away transaction costs associated with international borrowing and
lending by the elite. In a framework that also accounts for this type of capital market
imperfection, the e↵ects of financial integration on expropriation would be comparable to
an exogenous change in ⇢.
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Proposition 3 With a forward-looking elite, the steady state values for the
political power of the non-elite and the rate of expropriation are given by
⌧SS =
A(     )(  + ⇢)
c (  + ⇢)   A(2  + ⇢) and
 SS =
 A [c(  + ⇢)  A(  +  + ⇢)]
c (  + ⇢)   A(2  + ⇢) . (19)
Assumptions 1 and 3 are su cient for 0 < ⌧SS < 1 and  SS > 0. For a
further interpretation of the steady state, we use (12) and (18) to derive the
following expression:
⌧SS =
A   SS
c
+
⌧SS A
c(  + ⇢)
.
Compared to a myopic elite, a forward-looking elite has an additional in-
centive to expropriate as it thereby reduces the political power of the general
population. This e↵ect is reflected by the second term in the above equation.
Consequently, the long-run rate of expropriation is higher and the de facto
political power is lower than in the case of a myopic elite.
To analyze the dynamic properties of the model, we rewrite (12) and (18)
in matrix form as:✓
⌧˙
 ˙
◆
=
✓
  + ⇢ 2 +⇢c  A   
◆✓
⌧
 
◆
+
✓  A( + +⇢)c
 A
◆
.
Denoting by J the Jacobian matrix, we compute its determinant and trace
as
det |J | =   (  + ⇢) +  A(2  + ⇢)
c
< 0 and tr(J) = ⇢ > 0 .
Thus, the system is saddle-path stable such that a unique adjustment path
determines its dynamics. The elite chooses the value of ⌧(0) that puts it on
the system’s saddle path, as only this path guarantees convergence to the
steady state (⌧SS,  SS). For any other choice of ⌧(0), the system’s dynamics
would either drive the expropriation rate down to zero or to one. In both
cases, the elite would be without any income. Since the elite has an interest
in avoiding this outcome, it rationally chooses a point on the saddle path.
The phase diagram in Figure II.4 illustrates these findings and confirms
our analytical results. The corresponding zero-motion lines are given by
 ˙ = 0 :   =
 A
 
   A
 
⌧ and
⌧˙ = 0 :   =
A(  +  + ⇢)
2  + ⇢
  c(  + ⇢)
2  + ⇢
⌧ .
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Note that the line representing  ˙ = 0 is flatter than the line representing
⌧˙ = 0.
 A
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Figure II.4: Adjustment Path with a Forward-Looking Elite
To analyze the consequences of financial integration in this setting, we
start by deriving the impact of a decline of R on the expropriation rate and
the non-elite’s political power in the steady state. Taking the derivatives of
(19) yields:
d⌧SS
dR
=
c (    )(  + ⇢)2
[c (  + ⇢)   A(2  + ⇢)]2 and (20)
d SS
dR
=
 A(  +  + ⇢) [c (  + ⇢)   A(2  + ⇢)]
[c (  + ⇢)   A(2  + ⇢)]2
   c (  + ⇢) [c(  + ⇢)  A(  +  + ⇢)]
[c (  + ⇢)   A(2  + ⇢)]2 . (21)
Since  <  , equation (20) implies that d⌧SS/dR < 0. Similar to our
previous result in the myopic case, the elite expropriates additional incomes
caused by a decline in capital costs. Yet, the marginal influence on the ex-
propriation rate is now stronger, since the elite also takes into account the
potential increase in the general population’s political power.24 Hence, ⌧SS
increases as R declines. By contrast, the sign of d SS/dR is ambiguous.
24This follows from comparing (15) with (20).
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Depending on the model parameters, the e↵ect of the increased expropri-
ation can dominate the e↵ect of the reduced capital costs such that the
entrepreneurs’ net profits and thereby   may even decrease after financial
liberalization.
In the following we analyze the relation between  SS and R in more detail.
For  !   we can write (21) as d SS/dR| !  =  1. Note that, in this case,
⌧SS approaches zero, such that we are left with a positive e↵ect of a decline
of R on  SS. Conversely, for  ! 0, we get d SS/dR| !0 =  (2A  c)/(c ).
This term approaches zero from below. Thus, for very high and very low
levels of  , a decline in R raises the general population’s political power in the
steady state. If  takes intermediate values, however, the outcome depends
on the size of economic costs of expropriation c. If c is rather small, there
is an interval [ , ] for which the expropriation e↵ect is stronger than the
positive direct e↵ect of liberalization on private incomes and consequently,
d SS/dR > 0. The size of this interval increases in A, such that a negative
influence of a decline in R on  ss is more likely if the initial cost of capital
R is comparatively low.25 This outcome is illustrated in Figure II.5, which
depicts the numerator of (21), denoted by F ( ), that determines the sign of
this expression.26 For a relative low value of c, the function F ( ) intersects
the zero line twice (solid line), generating an interval in which F ( ) > 0
and thereby d ss/dR > 0. On this interval, the impact of current income
on future political pressure ( ) is large enough to evoke a rather aggressive
reaction of the ruling elite, but too small to result in a permanent shift of
the de facto political power towards the general population. At the same
time, low costs of expropriation (c) make it easier for the ruling elite to
expropriate entrepreneurs and workers. By contrast, if c is relatively high,
the function F ( ) – and thereby d ss/dR – takes only negative values. With
high economic costs of expropriation, the elite shies away from excessively
expropriating the general population, such that the direct e↵ect of the better
25Setting the numerator of (21) equal to zero, we obtain the following critical values of
 and  :
 , =
(  + ⇢)(2c   A(2  + ⇢))
2A(2  + ⇢)
+ / p
[(  + ⇢)(2c   A(2  + ⇢))]2 + 4Ac (  + ⇢)2(2  cA )(2  + ⇢)
2A(2  + ⇢)
.
Taking the derivatives of the di↵erence     with respect to A and rearranging terms
shows that
@(   )
@A > 0.
26For this numerical exercise, we have chosen the following parameter values: ⇢ = 0.11,
  = 0.9, A = 1, clow = 2.2, chigh = 2.6.
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access to the international capital markets dominates.
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Figure II.5: F ( ) in Dependence on  
The impact of financial integration on the steady-state levels of expropri-
ation and the non-elite’s political power can also be illustrated in a phase-
diagram. An increase in A shifts the ⌧˙ = 0 and the  ˙ = 0 lines rightwards
and also raises the slope of  ˙ = 0. Whereas the new level of ⌧SS definitely
exceeds the old one, the level of  SS might be lower (Figure II.6) or higher
(Figure II.7) than before.
We summarize the above findings as follows: With a forward-looking elite,
financial integration leads to a higher rate of expropriation in the steady state,
whereas the general population’s de facto political power may rise or decline.
The di↵erent outcomes related to the long run behavior of   also have
implications for the adjustment path of ⌧ . If financial integration reduces
the general population’s political power in the long run, ⌧ increases over
time until a new steady state is reached. By contrast, if financial integration
raises  , the rate of expropriation overshoots. As in the case with a myopic
elite, ⌧ increases as a reaction to a reduced R, but then gradually declines
as the general population accumulates political power.
In the static as well as in the dynamic setting with a myopic elite, we have
shown that, despite a higher rate of expropriation, the general population’s
net income increases after financial integration. In a dynamic setting with
a forward-looking elite, the impact of financial integration on the general
population’s net income is ambiguous. Since  SS increases in (1   ⌧ ⇤)ySS,
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Figure II.6: Financial Integration:  ss Decreases
the non elite’s net income in the steady state may actually decline as a
consequence of financial integration.
5 Political Power of Entrepreneurs
In the previous sections, the political costs of expropriation were entirely
determined by the aggregate income of the non-elite. The composition of
the general population, consisting of workers and entrepreneurs, did not play
any role in this respect. However, there are good reasons to believe that
the group of entrepreneurs is more influential than the working class. For
example, entrepreneurs may represent a smaller group and therefore be easier
to organize politically. Financial integration may then have an additional
influence on the political equilibrium by raising the size of the entrepreneurial
class.
In this section, we consider the case in which workers are politically inac-
tive such that only the income of the entrepreneurs matters for the political
36
 ⌧
-
6
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
r r
⌧ ssold
 ssold
⌧ ssnew
 ssnew
1
 ˙ = 0new
⌧˙ = 0new
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
BB
Figure II.7: Financial Integration:  ss Increases
costs of expropriation. Given this assumption, equation (12) takes the fol-
lowing form:
 ˙(t) =  [1  ⌧(t)] yM(t) [1  L(t)]    (t) , (22)
where L(t) = A1/(  1) according to (5). In what follows, we limit the dynamic
analysis to the case in which the elite is myopic. The results obtained for
this case enable us to discuss possible outcomes for a forward-looking elite
without explicitly deriving them. Inserting (11) into (22) and rearranging
terms yields
 ˙(t) =
 A
c
(c  A) (1  L) 

     A
c
(1  L)
 
 (t) .
Again, Assumptions 1 and 3 guarantee convergence to the steady state which
is now given by:
 SSn =
 A (c  A) (1  L)
c     A (1  L) and ⌧
SS
n =
A [     (1  L)]
c     A (1  L) , (23)
where the index ”n” indicates that political power of the general population
now hinges on the income and the size of the entrepreneurial class. The
new steady state levels of   and ⌧ are similar to their counterparts in (13).
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However, since we only use the entrepreneurs’ income as a driving force of
the political costs of expropriation,  ssn is now lower and, accordingly, ⌧
ss
n is
higher than in the basic setup. The long run impact of financial integration
also di↵ers from our previous results. By taking the derivatives of (23) with
respect to R, we obtain:
d⌧SSn
dR
=  c  [     (1  L)] +   L(c  A)(    1)
 1
[c     A (1  L)]2 and (24)
d SSn
dR
=
 (1  L)(2A  c) [c     A(1  L)]
[c     A (1  L)]2
   (c  A) [ A(1  L)
2 + c L(1   ) 1]
[c     A (1  L)]2 . (25)
The derivative (25) is strictly negative, as in section 3. A decline in R
not only increases entrepreneurs’ net profits, but also their number, such
that we have an additional positive e↵ect of financial integration on  . By
contrast, the influence of financial integration on the expropriation rate, as
shown in (24), is now ambiguous. Due to the stronger rise in the endogenous
costs of expropriation, the elite is not able to expropriate the population as
aggressively as before, such that ⌧SSn may even decrease as a result of financial
integration.
The expansionary e↵ect of financial integration on the number of en-
trepreneurs is also valid in a situation with a forward-looking elite. The key
reason is that expropriation does not influence the occupational choice of the
general population. The elite therefore cannot eliminate this e↵ect by raising
⌧ , and the long run rate of expropriation may decrease as a result of financial
integration.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to present a theoretical framework that can be used
to analyze the influence of financial integration on the quality of economic
institutions. Setting up a model of a small capital-importing country with an
autocratic regime, we were able to identify two di↵erent forces that determine
the e↵ects of liberalization: On the one hand, a better access to foreign
capital raises the income earned in the private sector and thereby gives the
ruling elite higher incentives to expropriate the general population. On the
other hand, due to its improved economic situation, the population may
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become more powerful to oppose such an expropriation. In most of the
cases we have considered in this paper, the rate of expropriation rises after
financial liberalization, implying a worsening of economic institutions. Along
the adjustment path, an overshooting of the rate of expropriation could be
identified as a reaction to a decline in capital costs. That is, the long run
level of the rate of expropriation is lower than that in the period immediately
after the onset of financial integration.
The e↵ects on net incomes and the de facto political power of the general
population depend on the time horizon of the elite. With a myopic elite,
the net income increases despite a higher rate of expropriation, whereas in
the case of a forward-looking elite, the influence of financial liberalization is
ambiguous. If the economic costs of expropriation are relatively high or if
the general population has either a very high or a very low ability to trans-
form its income into political costs of expropriation, the general population
benefits from a better access to foreign capital. Conversely, if economic pros-
perity has a moderate impact on political influence and if the elite’s appetite
for expropriation is not constrained by large economic costs, the reaction to
financial integration may be particularly aggressive and actually result in a
decline of the general population’s de-facto political power. We have fur-
thermore shown that in situations in which only the group of entrepreneurs
can exert political pressure on the ruling elite, financial integration causes an
additional group size e↵ect, which raises the political costs of expropriation.
These theoretical findings provide us with a set of hypotheses which can,
in principle, be tested empirically: First, financial integration should pro-
voke a particularly aggressive reaction in countries where the ruling elite has
a long-time horizon – due to, e.g., a firmly entrenched party or dynasty.
Conversely, frequent changes of power within the elite should be associated
with a lower appetite for expropriation. Second, especially in the latter case,
our model predicts that financial integration triggers an overshooting rate
of expropriation and results in a long-run pressure towards more democracy.
Finally, societies with a politically active entrepreneurial class should benefit
from financial integration both in terms of a lower rate of expropriation and
in terms of greater political participation. These predictions can be con-
fronted with data on financial integration and the evolution of economic and
political institutions.
There are, however, some caveats, which we need to take into account
when taking the model to the data: First, by assuming that the general
population does not save, we abstracted from the possibility that the accu-
mulation of financial wealth influences the political costs of expropriation in
the short and the long run. Given that the de facto political power of the
general population increases in its income, the political costs of expropriation
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would increase as the private sector accumulates capital.
Our second caveat refers to the fact that, in our framework, the ruling elite
can only expropriate domestic residents but not foreign creditors or investors.
Allowing for default and expropriation towards foreign investors would add
a further channel through which financial integration a↵ects institutional
quality.
Finally, a more general model would allow the elite to set di↵erent ex-
propriation rates for workers and entrepreneurs. This would influence the
general population’s occupational choice and the volume of rents that could
be extracted from the di↵erent groups. Specifically, imposing a higher rate
of expropriation on workers in the traditional sector could mitigate an ine -
ciency with respect to the sectoral allocation of the labor force in our model.27
However, if we introduced di↵erent rates of expropriation, we would have to
consider how political power of di↵erent groups in the general population
evolves over time. While we refrained from such an extension in the current
model, we believe that it provides ample scope for future research.
27Since workers in the traditional sector are paid their average product instead of the
marginal product, the modern sector is ine ciently small.
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Part III
Autocracies, Structure of the
Economy, and Expropriation
Ramin Dadasˇov
Abstract
This paper develops a simple model on elites behavior in autocratically
ruled economies. The ruling elites impose a distortive tax on the
entrepreneurial income in order to i) extract rents and ii) to influence
the factor prices increasing thereby their own economic profits. The
structure of the economy is captured by the degree of complementarity
between the production inputs provided by the general population.
The less dependent the elites are on the entrepreneurial activity, the
higher is the equilibrium rate of expropriation. I also show that a rise
in the entrepreneurs’ productivity raises the expropriation rate, this
e↵ect being stronger for lower values of the complementary parameter.
JEL classification: O17, P48
Keywords: Elites, political economy, economic institutions
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1 Introduction
Autocratic regimes di↵er significantly from each other with respect to the
level of economic development and to the quality of institutions. For example,
according to the Polity IV project, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were both
classified as autocratic states in 2010. However, Kazakhstan had almost
a 6 time higher GNI per capita and was ranked higher according to the
World Governance Indicators in the same year.1 Furthermore, although both
countries are highly dependent on natural resources, Uzbekistan’s economic
activity is strongly based on commodity production and agriculture, whereas
Kazakhstan relies very strongly on its oil and gas production.2
In this paper, I construct a simple model that helps to explain these dif-
ferences in institutional quality and economic development from a politico-
economic perspective. In particular, assuming an elite-controlled economy,
I analyze the incentives of the ruling elite to implement distortive policies
and I thereby focus on the economic structure as a key determinant of the
outcome of these decisions. In this framework, the general population con-
sists of workers and “entrepreneurs”. Members of the elite use their own
assets as well as labor input and intermediate goods, that are produced by
the entrepreneurs, to produce a final good. The degree of substitutability (or
complementarity) between both input factors that are supplied by the mem-
bers of the general population, is assumed to capture the structure of the
model economy. To stick to the example illustrated above, a higher degree
of substitutability may be associated with a more agrarian-oriented economy
1According to the World Bank Atlas method, Uzbekistan’s GNI per capita was 1,280 US
$ in 2010, while for Kazakhstan this figure was 7,590 US $ (World Bank 2011). The Polity
IV project assigns country scores on a scale from -10 to +10 according to their authority
characteristics and adopts the following categorization of political regimes: “autocracies”
(-10 to -6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5), and “democracies” (+6 to +10) (see Marshall et al.,
2010). In 2010, Uzbekistan had a score of -10 and Kazakhstan a score of -6. World Gover-
nance Indicators measure di↵erent institutional dimensions, such as control on corruption,
rule of law, e↵ectiveness of the government authorities, etc. in an interval [-2.5, 2.5] with
a low value indicating a bad institutional quality (see Kaufmann et al., 2010). In 2010,
the corruption and rule of law indicators for Uzbekistan had the values of -1.32 and -1.37,
respectively. The same indicators for Kazakhstan, in contrast, had the values of -1.00 and
-0.62. Moreover, in Kazakhstan, both indicators have improved since 2000, whereas these
institutions have deteriorated in Uzbekistan during the same period.
2International Crisis Group (2007b) suggests that, in Uzbekistan, revenues earned from
key exports, especially cotton, gold, corn, and increasingly gas, are distributed among a
very small circle of the ruling elite, with little or no benefit for the populace at large.
According to International Crisis Group (2007a), Kazakhstan’s oil and gas reserves are
eleventh in the world. It is also a significant producer of natural gas liquids. Additionally,
this report states that the country’s political and business elites mainly consist of members
of the president’s family.
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(e.g., Uzbekistan) and the intermediate goods could then be referred to as
simple equipment used in the cultivation of land. Accordingly, the elite may
be associated with land owners in this case. By contrast, exploiting natural
resources by the elite (as in the case of, e.g., Kazakhstan) requires input fac-
tors, such as di↵erent types of services, which cannot be as easily substituted
for labor. Besides acquiring the rents from the final good production, the
elite extracts rents by imposing a tax on the entrepreneurs’ income. The
level of this expropriation rate captures the security of property rights of
the entrepreneurs and stands for the quality of economic institutions in the
model.3 Additionally to income extraction, expropriation enables the elite to
influence factor prices and thereby its own production profits. However, the
extent of expropriation and the resulting distortion in the economic activity
depend on the degree of substitutability between the input factors. For a
relatively low degree of substitutability, expropriation results in a relatively
larger extent of distortion and therefore larger decline in GDP. This mech-
anism finds a theoretical support in the framework by Jones (2011). In his
growth model, potential ine cient allocation of resources is amplified by the
extent of linkages between di↵erent sectors (captured by the number of the
intermediate goods) as well as the degree of complementarity between these
goods.
Determining the equilibrium expropriation rate, the ruling elite has to
trade o↵ the benefits of income extraction and factor price manipulation
against the costs of economic distortions. As a result, the equilibrium ex-
propriation rate increases, i.e., institutional quality deteriorates, with the
degree of substitutability between labor and entrepreneurial input: Since the
intermediate goods provided by the entrepreneurs become less important for
the production of a final good, extracting rents and influencing the general
population’s occupational choice become less costly for the elite. I also ana-
lyze how exogenous changes in entrepreneurial productivity a↵ect the elite’s
behavior. Here I show that productivity gains result in a more aggressive
expropriation by the elite.4 However, since expropriation costs are sensitive
to the economic structure, in economies with a higher degree of substitutabil-
ity between production factors, the elite raises the equilibrium expropriation
rate to a larger extent as a reaction to a positive productivity shock.
3This is a common assumption in the related literature, which is discussed below.
4This mechanism is similar to the e↵ect of windfall gains caused by natural resources
on institutional quality. E.g., Besley and Ghatak (2009) present a formal exposition of the
argument that the ruling elite raise the rate of expropriation due to an increase in resource
rents. See also Robinson et al. (2006); Bulte and Damania (2008). In Dadasov et al.
(2010), financial integration leads to a reduction in capital costs for domestic entrepreneurs,
thereby provoking higher rent extraction by the ruling elite.
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This paper is in the spirit of the politico-economical contributions on en-
dogenous institutional change.In particular, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000,
2006, 2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) develop a dynamic framework, which
incorporates the interplay between economic and political institutions (i.e.
government regimes), and analyze how the distribution of economic resources
might shape this interdependency. Acemoglu (2006a,b) focuses more exten-
sively on the incentives of the ruling elite to implement distortive policies. In
these models, the incumbents extract rents from the general population and
are at the same time concerned with securing political power. Besley and
Persson (2009, 2010) elaborate further on these ideas, devoting themselves
to the determinants of state capacity : The idea here is that the ability of the
ruling elite to implement policies (such as collection of taxes, provision of
public goods, protection of property rights) is constrained by the size of the
state apparatus. The ruling elite thus decides not only on the tax rate or on
the degree to which property rights are protected but also on the investments
in the state capacity. Following similar arguments, Bourguignon and Verdier
(2009, 2010) analyze how the economic structure a↵ects these decisions. In
their models, the structure of the economy is captured by two concepts: the
first one distinguishes between the elite which is directly involved in the
production process (“business elite”) and the group that only controls the
political system (“political elite”). Considering the case of the “business
elite”, this concept distinguishes further between the degree of complemen-
tarity (or substitutability) of the productive asset owned by the elite and the
productive assets owned by the general population.5 My framework di↵ers
from these contributions insofar that I neglect the case in which the ruling
elite has political motivation to implement ine cient policies, i.e., they are
not concerned with securing political power. I also abstract from interde-
pendencies of these policies with fiscal constraints, such as state capacity.
Instead, the present model focuses more extensively on the tension between
the elite’s motive to extract rents and its profit maximization interests.
Theoretical approaches of Bourguignon and Verdier (2009, 2010) are clos-
est to my analysis. However, assuming a general production technology,
Bourguignon and Verdier (2009, 2010) focus only on the extreme outcomes
of the elite’s decisions having as a result that the elite imposes either a zero
tax or a tax rate equal to one on the general population’s income.6 By con-
5Verdier (2011) extends this analysis to open economies, focusing on the interaction
between trade policy and investments in state capacity.
6In the framework by Bourguignon and Verdier (2009, 2010), there are three di↵erent
agent groups, elite and two non-elite classes, each of them owning a specific asset. A
general neoclassical production function combines these assets into a final good. Di↵er-
entiating with respect to the sign of the cross derivates between the assets, Bourguignon
44
trast, having specified the production technology, my model allows for an
interior equilibrium taxation (expropriation) and its continues relationship
with the variables of my interests. This enables me a more detailed anal-
ysis of the influence of the complementarity parameter on the elite’s policy
choice. In addition, I also analyze the impact of other economic factors, like a
change in the entrepreneurial productivity, on the equilibrium expropriation
rate. Analysis of the consequences for economic development, i.e. changes in
GDP, is also an important contribution of the present framework and is not
treated in Bourguignon and Verdier (2009, 2010).
2 The Model
Consider an economy populated by two di↵erent groups of individuals: rul-
ing elite and general population. Without loss of generality, the size of each
group is normalized to 1. The elite not only controls the political system
but also the economic activity of the country under consideration. In par-
ticular, each member of the elite earns rents from producing a final good
Y and from expropriating incomes from the general population. Each of
them is endowed with an asset R. Depending on the characteristics of the
country, an asset, for example, might be land or a license to exploit natural
resources. Each agent i from the general population is endowed with one
unit of labor and exogenous productivity A   1. The agents decide either
between supplying their labor force for the production of a final good or to
become entrepreneurs.7 Each entrepreneur produces an intermediate good x
with a similar technology x(i) = A. Thus, it is assumed that with being an
entrepreneur an individual is at least as productive as being a worker. For
simplicity, I furthermore assume that production of x does not involve any
explicit costs. The share of workers in general population is denoted by L
and correspondingly, the share of the entrepreneurs is given by 1  L.
A final good Y is sold for a given price of 1 and is produced according to
and Verdier (2009, 2010) distinguish between three typologies which might characterize an
economic structure: i) all three assets are complements, ii) the two assets of the non-elite
are substitutes, while each of them is a complement to the elite’s asset, and iii) the elite’s
asset is a complement to one factor and substitute to the other, while the two other factors
are complementary to each other. The authors show then that the elite imposes a zero
tax on that group which owns an asset complementary to its own production factor.
7See, e.g, Acemoglu (2008) for a similar assumption. However, in his model the en-
trepreneurs’ productivity is stochastic.
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the following technology:
Y = R↵

L⇢ +
Z 1
L
x(i)⇢di
  1 ↵
⇢
, (1)
where 0 < ↵ < 1 and   ⌘ 11 ⇢ denotes the elasticity of substitution between
labor and the entrepreneurial inputs: the higher   is, the easier can the elite
substitutes L for x or vice versa. By contrast, a lower value of   implies
a higher degree of complementarity between these two input factors. This
parameter also captures the structure of the economy with a more complex
economic structure exhibiting a relatively higher degree of complementarity.
I assume that 0 < ⇢ < 1, i.e.,   > 1. That is, I rule out the possibility of
perfect substitutability, the case where ⇢ = 1. The special case of a Cobb-
Douglas technology, where ⇢ = 0, is neglected for reasons of tractability of
the results, especially, to avoid the analysis of possible corner solutions.8 For
the further procedure and illustration of the analytical results, it is helpful
to define
X ⌘ L⇢ +
Z 1
L
x(i)⇢di
as the quantity of the production input which is provided by the total mass
of the general population. Determining the marginal product of X, which is
defined hereafter by Z, yields:
@Y
@X
⌘ Z = (1  ↵)R
↵
⇢
✓
Y
R↵
◆ 1 ↵ ⇢
1 ↵
> 0 and (2)
@2Y
@2X
=
@Z
@X
=
(1  ↵)(1  ↵  ⇢)R↵
⇢2
✓
Y
R↵
◆ 1 ↵ 2⇢
1 ↵
.
That is, for a given ↵,X exhibits decreasing marginal returns – i.e., 1 ↵ ⇢ <
0 – if ⇢ is su ciently large. Otherwise, for relatively low values of ⇢, marginal
returns of X are increasing. This distinction will be important in analyzing
the consequences of expropriation.
Holding the political power in the society, the elite imposes a proportional
tax (0  ⌧  1) on all entrepreneurs’ income and distributes the revenues
8Instead of using a Cobb-Douglas technology, a CES production function is a more
realistic generalization of the aggregate production function. E.g., Caselli and Coleman
(2006) empirically show that introducing imperfect substitutability among di↵erent types
of labor better explains the cross-country di↵erences in technology and accordingly in per-
capita income. This distinction can also be applied to the present framework, in which
entrepreneurs and labor, though stemming from one homogenous group of individuals,
provide two di↵erent production inputs, each with specific productivity.
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among itself. The variable ⌧ captures the security of the entrepreneurs’ prop-
erty rights. For example, one may assume that the elite indiscriminately
imposes restrictions on the entrepreneurs’ firms or it is even able to confis-
cate them. This is also the reason why the labor income is not targeted by
taxation.9
I consider the following three-stage sequence of events: In the first stage,
the elite determines the rate of expropriation ⌧ , in the second stage, members
of the general population choose between alternative occupations, and in the
third stage, production takes place. I assume that ⌧ cannot be changed ex
post, i.e., the elite can credibly commit to the value of ⌧ .
3 Entrepreneurial Activity and its Determi-
nants
I proceed by solving the model backwards. That is, I start by deriving the de-
mand functions for labor and the entrepreneurial goods from the perspective
of the elite. Assuming a competitive market for labor and entrepreneurial
goods, the factor prices for L and x, which are denoted by w (wage per
worker) and p (price of an entrepreneurial input), are given by the marginal
productivity of the respective factor10:
w = ⇢ZL⇢ 1 and (3)
p = ⇢Zx⇢ 1 . (4)
Note that for given Z, @w@L < 0 and
@p
@x < 0 hold for all ⇢ 2 (0, 1).
With (3) and (4), the profit from the production for an elite’s member is
given by:
⇡E = ↵Y, (5)
which corresponds to the individual rent from owning the asset R. Bearing
in mind that x = A, the income accruing to a representative entrepreneur is
then expressed as:
⇡ = (1  ⌧)pA, (6)
9Note that in this setting, there is no distinction between expropriation and taxation
since I assume that there are no other instruments in the hands of the ruling elite to
redistribute resources from entrepreneurs to itself, especially there is not a lump-sum tax
on the entrepreneurial income. As noted in the introduction, this is a common assumption
in the literature, when it comes to model ine cient institutions. Alternatively, ⌧ can also
be interpreted as an individual probability of expropriation of an entrepreneurial input.
10Note that index i is omitted in the following terms because of the symmetry between
the entrepreneurial inputs.
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where p is given by (4).
Turning to the second stage of the model, I characterize the general popu-
lation’s occupational choice. In equilibrium, both activities have to generate
identical net incomes. That is, the following condition has to be satisfied:
w = ⇡. Using (3) and (6), the equilibrium number of workers is then given
by:
L⇤ = [A⇢(1  ⌧)] 1⇢ 1 . (7)
The following assumption postulates the necessary condition for an interior
solution L⇤ < 1:
Assumption 4 A⇢(1  ⌧) > 1
Assumption 1 implies that A must be larger than 1. Moreover, the highest
possible expropriation rate, that is consistent with L⇤  1, is given by:
⌧¯ = 1  1A⇢ . That is, Assumption 1 also rules out a confiscatory expropriation
rate, where ⌧ = 1, thereby excluding that entrepreneurial activity can be
totally disabled. However, since by assumption intermediate goods cannot
be perfectly substituted for labor, the elite has no incentive completely to
expropriate the entrepreneurs.
Figure III.1 shows the graphical determination of the equilibrium number
of workers. The solid horizontal line depicts the normalized profit function:
⇡˜ ⌘ ⇡⇢Z = (1   ⌧)A⇢. The downward sloping curve depicts the normalized
wage: w˜ ⌘ w⇢Z = L⇢ 1. The intersection of both curves determines the
equilibrium number of workers L⇤.
In the following, I illustrate the relation between the equilibrium num-
ber of workers and its determinants in more detail, starting with the en-
trepreneurial productivity and institutional quality. Taking the derivatives
of (7) with respect to A and ⌧ , respectively, yields:
@L⇤
@A
=   ⇢L
⇤
(1  ⇢)A < 0 and
@L⇤
@⌧
=
L⇤
(1  ⇢)(1  ⌧) > 0 . (8)
Intuitively, a change in ⌧ a↵ects the equilibrium number of workers in the
opposite way to how a change in A does. Increasing the expropriation rate
lowers the profits of the entrepreneurs. In order to hold the occupational
choice condition, L⇤ has to increase, thereby reducing the equilibrium wage
rate. That is, a rise in ⌧ distorts the occupational choice of the general popu-
lation. By contrast, an increase in the productivity raises the entrepreneurial
profits. Their equilibrium number, therefore, increases as well. Figure III.1
also illustrates these results: While a rise in the productivity A shifts the
profit line upwards, implying a decline in L and higher wages in the equilib-
rium, a rise in ⌧ creates the opposite e↵ect.
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Figure III.1: Equilibrium Number of Workers
The equations in (8) show that the degree of complementarity between L
and x influences the extent of a change in entrepreneurial activity. Di↵eren-
tiating (8) with respect to ⇢, yields:
@2L⇤
@A@⇢
=   L
⇤
(1  ⇢)2A
✓
1  ⇢
1  ⇢ log [A(1  ⌧)]
◆
and
@2L⇤
@⌧@⇢
=
L⇤
(1  ⌧)(1  ⇢)2
✓
1  1
1  ⇢ log [A(1  ⌧)]
◆
. (9)
The signs of the relationships in (9) are not clear-cut. I can show, however,
that the impact of ⇢ on the relative changes in L⇤ due to variations in A
and ⌧ is unambiguous 8 ⌧ 2 [0, 1).11 With (8) the elasticity of the equilib-
rium number of workers with respect to productivity, ⌘L,A, and institutional
11The ambiguity in the signs of the equations in (9) is the result of the negative relation-
ship between L⇤ and ⇢: Di↵erentiating (7) with respect to ⇢ and according to Assumption
1, yields: @L
⇤
@⇢ =   1(1 ⇢)2 log [A(1  ⌧)]L⇤ < 0. Hence, considering relative changes in L⇤
allows us to abstract from the level of L⇤ leading to a more general result.
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quality, ⌘L,⌧ , respectively, are given by:
⌘L,A =   ⇢
1  ⇢ and ⌘L,⌧ =
⌧
(1  ⇢)(1  ⌧) . (10)
Accordingly, partial derivates of (10) with respect to ⇢ results in:
@⌘L,A
@⇢
=   1
(1  ⇢)2 < 0 and
@⌘L,⌧
@⇢
=
⌘L,⌧
1  ⇢   0 . (11)
The inequalities in (11) show that a relative change in the equilibrium number
of workers - due to variation in either institutional quality or productivity -
increases in absolute terms with the degree of substitutability. Since a higher
⇢ implies a higher elasticity of the factor demand functions given in (3) and
(4), a rise in ⇢ amplifies the impact of a change in ⌧ or A on the occupational
choice condition and thereby positively a↵ects the magnitude of the resulting
relative change in L⇤.
How do exogenous changes in the entrepreneurial productivity and in
the rate of expropriation a↵ect the equilibrium GDP, i.e., Y ?12 GDP in
equilibrium is given by:
Y ⇤ = R↵ [L⇤⇢ + (1  L⇤)A⇢] 1 ↵⇢ , (12)
where L⇤ is given by (7). Di↵erentiating (12) with respect to A, yields:
@Y ⇤
@A
= Z

⇢L⇤⇢ 1
@L⇤
@A
  A⇢@L
⇤
@A
+ ⇢(1  L⇤)A⇢ 1
 
. (13)
The first term in the squared brackets is negative, resulting from the decline
in the number of workers, while the second and the third terms are positive,
reflecting the rise in the total number of entrepreneurs as well as the rise
in their individual productivity. The total e↵ect turns out to be positive as
shown below:
@Y ⇤
@A
=
⇢ [1  ⇢(1  ⌧L⇤)]A⇢Z
(1  ⇢)A > 0 . (14)
By contrast, a deterioration in institutional quality is harmful for the aggre-
gate economy:
@Y ⇤
@⌧
= Z

⇢L⇤⇢ 1
@L⇤
@⌧
  A⇢@L
⇤
@⌧
 
=   [1  ⇢(1  ⌧)]A
⇢L⇤Z
(1  ⇢)(1  ⌧) < 0 . (15)
12Since there are no international factor payments in this model and expropriation
distributes income from the entrepreneurs to the elite, the level of GDP also corresponds
to GNI.
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Obviously, the distortive impact of an increase in ⌧ on the occupational choice
of the general population negatively influences the production level. Since
an entrepreneur is more productive than a worker, the negative e↵ect of a
reduction in entrepreneurial activity dominates the positive one of the rise
in the labor force.
These changes in GDP may vary depending on the economic structure.
In the following, I therefore illustrate how the e↵ects, which are derived in
equations (14) and (15), are a↵ected by the degree of substitutability between
labor and the entrepreneurial good x. In order to have a lucid illustration of
the corresponding results, I thereby focus on the e↵ect of a marginal change
in ⇢ on the respective relative change in GDP. Using equations (14) and (15),
the elasticity of GDP with respect to A, ⌘Y,A, and ⌧ , ⌘Y,⌧ , respectively, can
be written as:13
⌘Y,A =
(1  ↵)[1  ⇢(1  ⌧L⇤)]
(1  ⇢)(1  ⌧L⇤) > 0 and (16)
⌘Y,⌧ =   (1  ↵)[1  ⇢(1  ⌧)]⌧L
⇤
⇢(1  ⇢)(1  ⌧)(1  ⌧L⇤) < 0 . (17)
Di↵erentiating now (16) and (17) with respect to ⇢, results in (see the Ap-
pendix)
Proposition 4 For logA > 1, the elasticity of GDP with respect to A de-
creases in ⇢: @⌘Y,A@⇢ < 0. The elasticity of GDP with respect to ⌧ increases in
⌧ : @⌘Y,⌧@⇢ > 0.
Proposition 1 indicates that, for a su ciently high level of given A, a
marginal increase in entrepreneurial productivity has a smaller positive ef-
fect on the relative change in GDP if both input factors are substitutable
compared to the case in which both input factors are rather complemen-
tary. Analogically, the negative impact of a marginal rise in ⌧ on the relative
change in GDP becomes increasingly smaller as ⇢ increases. Thus, a dete-
rioration in institutional quality is more harmful for an economy in which
entrepreneurial goods and labor input are complementary. As ⇢ increases,
a reduction (or a rise) in entrepreneurial activity – due to a rise in ⌧ (or in
A) – becomes increasingly negligible for aggregate output, thereby resulting
in a relatively lower change in GDP. However for (very) low initial levels of
A, a positive productivity shock may be more beneficial for the aggregate
economy if ⇢ rises. In this case, a direct e↵ect of a marginal increase in A
on GDP is stronger than the change in the composition of the joint input
provided by the general population.
13Note that with (2), (7), and (12), ZY =
1 ↵
⇢A⇢(1 ⌧L⇤) .
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4 Equilibrium Institutional Quality
Coming to the last stage of the model, I determine the equilibrium expropri-
ation rate by maximizing the total income of representative elite’s member.
This income, denoted by U , is composed of the sum of the total expropriation
revenues and the elite’s profits from its economic activity - given by (5).14
The elite’s maximization problem can then be written as:
max
⌧
U = ↵Y (L) + ⇢⌧A⇢Z(L)(1  L), (18)
where L = L⇤(⌧) as given by (7).
Solving (18), we obtain the following first order condition:✓
↵ + ⇢⌧A⇢(1  L) @Z
@Y (L)
◆
@Y
@⌧
+ ⇢A⇢Z
✓
1  L  ⌧ @L
@⌧
◆
= 0 . (19)
According to (19), the elite – deciding on ⌧ – has to take into account
the following e↵ects of expropriation: First, it influences the level of GDP
(Y ). As it has been shown in (15), @Y@⌧ < 0. Through its negative im-
pact on production, expropriation directly lowers the elite’s profits, but it
also changes its marginal shares from entrepreneurial profits for given num-
ber of entrepreneurs. The latter e↵ect is captured by the second summand
in the first bracket. Here, two cases have to be distinguieshed: Note that
@Z
@Y =
(1 ↵ ⇢)
⇢
 
Y
R↵
  ⇢
↵ 1 . That is, if ⇢ is su ciently large, then @Z@Y < 0. In this
case, lowering the output level raises the elite’s marginal expropriation rents
(for given number of entrepreneurs). By contrast, if ⇢ is su ciently low,
@Z
@Y > 0 holds. In this case, the elite’s marginal expropriation rents decrease.
Remember, the first case corresponds to a production technology in which
the joint input factor of the general population exhibits decreasing marginal
returns, whereas in the second case, the marginal returns of this factor are
increasing. Due to these e↵ects, a relatively lower degree of substitutabil-
ity between L and x thus implies relatively higher costs of expropriation for
the ruling elite. Second, analogical to a La↵er curve e↵ect, expropriating
the entrepreneurial profits reduces the number of entrepreneurs, such that
expropriation rents (for given Z) increase less than proportionally to the ex-
propriation rate. These costs of expropriation – captured by ⌧ @L@⌧ – are, on
the contrary, higher, the larger the degree of substitutability between L and
14I did not introduce any explicit costs of expropriation since this would not a↵ect the
qualitative results. However, the literature has emphasized that implementing ine cient
policies is costly for the elite. See, e.g., Dadasov et al. (2010) on possible economic and
political costs of expropriation.
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x. (As shown in section 3, the relative change in L⇤ due to a variation in ⌧
increases with ⇢.)
With (8) and (15), the first order condition simplifies to:
⇢(1  ⇢)(1  ⌧)  [1  ⇢(1  ⌧)]L(⌧) (⌧) = 0 , where
 (⌧) ⌘ ↵ + ⇢+ ⌧A⇢(1  ↵  ⇢)(1  L(⌧))
✓
Y (⌧)
R↵
◆ ⇢
↵ 1
. (20)
The equilibrium level of expropriation ⌧ ⇤ solves (20). Note that according
to (20),  (⌧) > 0 must hold in equilibrium. I assume that the second order
condition @2U(⌧ ⇤)/@⌧ 2 < 0 is satisfied (see the Appendix for its derivation).
Inspecting (20) reveals also that for ⌧ = 1, @U@⌧ < 0. Assuming ⌧ = 0
yields @U@⌧ = ⇢(1  ⇢)  (1  ⇢)(↵ + ⇢)A
⇢
⇢ 1 . That is, the following necessary
condition has to be satisfied to ensure the existence of the interior equilibrium
expropriation rate ⌧ ⇤: A
⇢
1 ⇢ > ↵+⇢⇢ .
Given the equilibrium expropriation rate, I analyze how ⌧ ⇤ reacts to ex-
ogenous changes in the economic structure (captured by ⇢) and entrepreneurial
productivity (A). Figure III.2 presents the relationship between ⌧ ⇤ and ⇢ in
the valid interval for given values of ↵, A, and R. Varying the other param-
eters, ceteris paribus, does not change this picture, such that the numerical
solution results in the following conclusion: The equilibrium expropri-
ation rate increases with the degree of substitutability between
labor and the entrepreneurial input.15 As argued above, expropriation
costs are sensitive to the degree of substitutability. On the one hand, ex-
propriation becomes less costly if ⇢ is relatively high since in this case the
distortive e↵ect of expropriation on the elite’s rents is relatively low. On the
other hand, the expropriation costs due to the La↵er curve e↵ect are higher,
the higher ⇢ is. Obviously, the first e↵ect dominates the second one such that
⌧ ⇤ increases with ⇢. Hence, institutional quality declines as the elite becomes
less economically dependent on the entrepreneurial activity.
Calculating analytically the impact of a change in the entrepreneurial
productivity on the institutional quality, yields an ambiguous result (see the
Appendix). One might expect a clear negative relationship between A and
⌧ ⇤: A rise in the productivity increases the total output as well as the number
15Equation 20 is numerically solved using the MATLAB command ezplot, which solves
implicitly defined functions for a given interval of the corresponding variables. If a param-
eter constellation was consistent with L⇤ < 1 as well as the second order condition, the
numerical exercise has always yielded the monotonic positive relationship illustrated in
Figure III.2. I iterated (ceteris paribus) the values of ↵ in 0.1 steps in the [0,1] – interval
and changed the values of A and R respectively more than 10 times. The result was only
a shift in the valid range of ⇢, whereas its length – of approximately 0.3 – did not change.
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Figure III.2: Relationship between ⌧ ⇤ and ⇢
of the entrepreneurs (remember, @Y ⇤/@A > 0 and @L⇤/@A < 0). The elite’s
marginal income should therefore rise, evoking a more aggressive expropria-
tion. Yet, as previously argued, the expropriation costs vary depending on
the value of ⇢, which explains the ambiguity of the elite’s reaction to an
increase in the level of A. However, the repetition of the above numerical ex-
ercise with corresponding sensitivity checks – now for a given value of ⇢ and
a corresponding interval for A which satisfies (20) – results in a positive rela-
tionship between A and ⌧ ⇤ as demonstrated by Figure III.3. Thus, confirming
the intuition, the equilibrium expropriation rate increases with the
entrepreneurial productivity. Moreover, Figure III.3 also illustrates that
for a higher level of ⇢, the impact of A on ⌧ ⇤ is larger.16That is, the elite
expropriates additional gains, caused by the increased entrepreneurial pro-
ductivity, more intensively the higher the degree of substitutability between
the input factors is. This is consistent with the result of a positive relation-
ship between the equilibrium level of ⌧ and ⇢. Since, in total, expropriation
is less costly if ⇢ is relatively high, the elite raises ⌧ ⇤ to a relatively larger
extent.
I also analyze the impact of a change in the value of the asset (R) on the
institutional quality. As the calculation shows (see the Appendix), d⌧
⇤
dR = 0,
implying that ⌧ ⇤ does not react to a variation in R. A change in R a↵ects the
level of GDP and thereby proportionally influences the elite’s profits from the
production as well as the entrepreneurs’ profits. That is, it does not distort
16The following parameters are chosen when constructing Figure III.3: R = 1, ↵ = 0.7,
A 2 [30, 100]; high ⇢ = 0.7, in this case ⌧ 2 [0.7, 0.9]; for low ⇢ = 0.6, ⌧ 2 [0.6, 0.8].
54
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
A
⌧
⇤
high ρ
low ρ
Figure III.3: Relationship between ⌧ ⇤ and A
the elite’s trade-o↵ in determining the institutional framework. As a result,
the optimal level of ⌧ remains unchanged. This finding might be interpreted
as being contradictory to the Political Resource Curse literature, according to
which, abundance of natural resources causes a deterioration in institutional
quality.17 However, the exploration of the reaction of the expropriation rate
to a variation in the entrepreneurial productivity suggests that an analogical
mechanism is also in place in this model: Exogenous income gains for the
general population lead to more aggressive distortionary policies by the ruling
elite.
5 Conclusion
Autocratically ruled societies di↵er with respect to the level of economic de-
velopment and the quality of economic institutions. The aim of this work was
to present a simple theoretical model which can account for these di↵erences,
focusing thereby on the economic structure as an important determinant of
the elite’s behavior. In my framework, the elite controls the production
process of a final good, using thereby input factors provided by the gen-
eral population, namely labor and entrepreneurial intermediate goods. The
degree of substitutability (complementarity) between these two factors has
been assumed to capture the economic structure in the model. In addition
to the profits from its economic activity, the elite earns rents by expropri-
ating the entrepreneurial class. Determining the equilibrium expropriation
17See footnote 4 for the respective references.
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rate, the elite has therefore to take into account its negative e↵ect on the
entrepreneurial activity and thereby on the aggregate level of production.
However, these costs of expropriation are sensitive to the economic struc-
ture: A higher level of substitutability between input factors makes the elite
economically less dependent on the entrepreneurial good and therefore gives
it a stronger incentive for expropriation. As a consequence, the equilibrium
expropriation rate increases with the degree of substitutability. I have ad-
ditionally shown that exogenous productivity gains in the entrepreneurial
sector results in a more aggressive expropriation. However, an economy with
a relatively lower degree of complementarity between the input factors su↵ers
to a larger extent from this deterioration in institutional quality.
According to the model predictions, thus, autocratically dominated econo-
mies, in which entrepreneurial activity is less important for the aggregate
production, e.g., in agrarian-oriented economies, are characterized with rel-
atively bad institutions, which, in turn, results in a relatively low level of
economic development, i.e., GDP. By contrast, economies in which inter-
mediate inputs provided by entrepreneurs exhibit a relative higher degree
of complementary to labor input (e.g., economies with stronger dependency
on di↵erent types of services), perform relatively better with respect to in-
stitutional quality and accordingly with respect to economic development.
Although these findings support some anecdotal evidence on institutional
and economic development of di↵erent types of autocratic economies, they
o↵er interesting hypotheses for a systematic empirical exploration of the de-
terminants of institutional quality.
The framework of this paper also o↵ers possibilities for further extensions.
For example, allowing for heterogeneity between the agents may introduce
additional mechanisms through which institutional quality is shaped: Het-
erogeneity with respect to skills and productivity will then determine the
occupational choice of the general population and thereby a↵ect the rul-
ing elite’s policy. Additionally, the members of the ruling class are in general
not homogenous with respect to their economic and political interests. In my
model, each member of the elite produces a final good according to the same
technology and competes with others in a perfect market for the necessary
input factors. Introducing variety in production and allowing for imperfect
forms of competition may provide additional valuable insights into the elite’s
behavior.
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A Appendix
In this Appendix, I formally analyze how a change in the elasticity of GDP
with respect to ⌧ and A is a↵ected by the degree of substitutability and
thereby verify the results which are discussed in section 3. I also derive the
second order condition of the elite’s optimization problem and the e↵ect of
a change in A on ⌧ ⇤.
Di↵erentiating (16) with respect to ⇢ and rearranging terms, yields:
@⌘Y,A
@⇢
= (1  ⇢)(1  ⌧L)  log[A(1  ⌧)] < 0 . (21)
Assuming logA > 1 is su cient for the inequality in (21) to hold. To see
this, define LHS ⌘ (1   ⇢)(1   ⌧L) and RHS ⌘ log[A(1   ⌧)]. Both terms
are monotonically decreasing in ⌧ . Moreover, |@RHS@⌧ | > |@LHS@⌧ | since 11 ⌧ >
(1 ⇢+⇢⌧)L
1 ⌧ . If ⌧ = 0, LHS = 1  ⇢ and RHS = logA and thus LHS < RHS
holds. If ⌧ = ⌧¯ = 1  1A⇢ , i.e.,⌧ takes its highest possible value, the inequality
LHS < RHS holds again since 1A⇢ < logA. That is, the inequality in (21)
holds for logA > 1 and all ⌧ 2 [0, ⌧¯ ].
Determining the e↵ect of ⇢ on ⌘Y,⌧ given by (17), we obtain:
@⌘Y,⌧
@⇢
= ⇢[1 ⇢(1 ⌧)] log[A(1 ⌧)]+(1 ⇢)[1+⇢(⇢(1 ⌧) 2)](1 ⌧L⇤) > 0 .
(22)
Inequality (22) implies that LHS ⌘ ⇢[1   ⇢(1   ⌧)] log[A(1   ⌧)] >  (1  
⇢)[1 + ⇢(⇢(1   ⌧)   2)](1   ⌧L⇤) ⌘ RHS. Inserting ⌧ = ⌧¯ in log[A(1   ⌧)],
implies: LHS   (1   ⇢)⇢[1   ⇢(1   ⌧)] logA. In turn, for ⌧ = 0, we obtain:
RHS  |(1 ⇢)[1+⇢(⇢(1 ⌧) 2)]|. For the inequality in (22) to hold, is thus
su cient to show that (1 ⇢)⇢[1 ⇢(1 ⌧)] logA+(1 ⇢)[1+⇢(⇢(1 ⌧) 2)] > 0.
Assuming logA   1 is su cient for this inequality to be satisfied since with
logA = 1, it simplifies to: 1  ⇢ > 0.
Inequalities (21) and (22) prove Proposition 1.
The second order condition of the elite’s maximization problem is obtained
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by di↵erentiating (20) with respect to ⌧ :
SOC =  ⇢(1  ⇢)  L(⌧
⇤)
(1  ⇢)(1  ⌧ ⇤)
 ⇥
1  ⇢2(1  ⌧ ⇤)⇤ (⌧ ⇤) +
(1  ↵  ⇢) [1  ⇢(1  ⌧ ⇤)]A⇢
✓
Y (⌧ ⇤)
R↵
◆ ⇢
↵ 1
"
(1  ⌧ ⇤)(1  ⇢) +
[1  ⇢(1  ⌧ ⇤)]L(⌧ ⇤)
 
⌧A⇢(1  L(⌧ ⇤))
✓
Y (⌧ ⇤)
R↵
◆ ⇢
↵ 1
  1
!#!
.
I assume that SOC < 0 holds. By totally di↵erentiating (20), we then ob-
tain: d⌧ ⇤/dA =  ⌦/SOC, where
⌦ ⌘⇢ [1  ⇢(1  ⌧
⇤)]L(⌧ ⇤)
(1  ⇢)A
"
 (⌧ ⇤) + ⌧ ⇤(1  ↵  ⇢)A⇢
✓
Y (⌧ ⇤)
R↵
◆ ⇢
↵ 1
· 
(1  L(⌧ ⇤))
 
[1  ⇢(1  ⌧ ⇤)]A⇢
✓
Y (⌧ ⇤)
R↵
◆ ⇢
↵ 1
+ ⇢
!
  1
!#
.
The sign of this term cannot be clearly determined.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between the mode of interna-
tional investment and institutional quality. Foreign investors from a
capital-rich North can either purchase productive assets in a capital-
poor South and transfer their capital within integrated multinational
firms or they can form joint ventures with local asset owners. The
South is ruled by an autocratic elite that may use its political power
to expropriate productive assets. The expropriation risk lowers the
incentive to provide specific capital in an integrated firm and distorts
the decision between joint ventures and integrated production. We
determine the equilibrium risk of expropriation in this framework and
the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze
as to how globalization, which is reflected in a decline in investment
costs, influences institutional quality.
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1 Introduction
Recent literature on the organization of international firms emphasizes the
role of property rights in a world with incomplete contracts and opportunis-
tic behavior. The key insight from the property rights approach is that
ownership matters as it improves the incentives to undertake specific invest-
ments. In a joint relationship that is characterized by incomplete contracts
and hold-up, ownership of a production asset entails a better outside option
and thereby raises the bargaining power when it comes to surplus sharing.1
The property rights mechanism can only work adequately if asset own-
ers are protected against interventions by third parties, most notably the
government of the host country. However, many countries in the South are
plagued by insu cient institutions, poorly protected property rights, and
sizable expropriation risks. For example, the average scores of Sub-Saharan
Africa and Central Asia in the Legal and Political Environment Index of the
International Property Rights Index Report stand out as lowest in compar-
ison with other regions in the world (see Strokova, 2010). Notably, a large
part of the countries with weak economic institutions can be characterized
as non-democratic. According to a study by Li (2010), more than four of five
expropriatory acts towards foreign investors occur in autocratic regimes.2
Ownership provides far weaker residual control rights and investment
incentives in countries with weakly protected property rights compared to
other locations with better institutions. Obviously, this has consequences for
the organizational form of international production. The institutional quality
in a country, in turn, is not exogenously given. Instead, as has been argued by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) and Acemoglu et al. (2005), the quality
of domestic institutions is the outcome of a political process. To elaborate
the mutual relationship between institutional quality and the activities of
international investors, this paper integrates the property rights approach
into a politico-economic model that endogenizes institutional quality. In line
with the prevalence of non-democratic regimes mentioned above, we consider
a setting in which the political power rests with a small elite in the society.
Our economic model is that of a small capital importing economy in the
1The property rights literature builds on the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). For applications to the case of international firms,
see, in particular, Antras (2003, 2005) and Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008). Levchenko
(2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2007) employ the approach to explain how the quality of
institutions may a↵ect international trade patterns. Nunn (2007) and Nicolini (2007)
find empirical evidence on the importance of the contractual environment for o↵shoring
decisions of multinational firms.
2In addition, Jensen (2008) shows that the political risk for multinational investors in
non-democratic regimes exceeds the risk in democratic countries.
60
South with heterogeneous local producers. Each local agent is endowed with
a specific asset – for example, a production plant, a piece of land, or access
to natural resources – and specific skills that are necessary to utilize the
asset. Asset and skills jointly produce a local intermediate input whose ex-
ogenous productivity di↵ers between agents. To start up production, a local
producer needs foreign capital that is provided by potential investors of the
North. Producer and investor may choose between two organizational forms
to transfer capital and to produce in the South: The first arrangement is in-
tegrated production (foreign direct investment), i.e., the investor purchases
the asset in the South and transfers capital internally within the resulting
multinational firm. Second, both partners can form a joint venture in which
ownership of the local asset rests with the producer in the South and the
foreign investor only supplies capital.
The ruling elite in the South determines the institutional framework un-
der which production can take place. Specifically, we assume that the elite
sets the institutional quality that in turn determines the expropriation risk,
i.e., the degree to which property rights are protected in the country. In
our baseline model, we consider the expropriation of local assets.3 In a joint
venture, the domestic agent bears risk of losing the local asset due to ex-
propriation, whereas this risk is directed towards the foreign investor in the
case of an integrated firm. As a consequence, the expropriation risk lowers
the incentive to invest capital in an integrated firm and makes integration
less attractive as an organizational form. Thereby, the expropriation risk not
only reduces capital transfers at the intensive margin (i.e., within a single
integrated firm) but also at the extensive margin (by lowering the number of
integrated firms). These results find empirical support in the literature: Ac-
cording to Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), US multinationals are more likely to
choose complete ownership for their foreign investment projects if the country
risk of expropriation declines. Similarly, Henisz (2000) shows empirically that
political hazards, which cover regulation policies as well as outright expro-
priation, decrease the probability of choosing majority-owned plants relative
to minority owned joint ventures.4 In addition, there is substantial empirical
3Hajzler (2010) documents the distribution of expropriation acts between di↵erent sec-
tors across countries. Between 1990 and 2006, 40% o↵ all expropriations occurred in the
primary sector. The primary sector may serve as a typical example where owners of local
assets (e.g., mining rights) may face substantial expropriation risks.
4Building on these results, Henisz (2000) also analyzes the interplay between political
and contractual hazards in determining the ownership structure. The findings of Javorcik
and Wei (2009) and Straub (2008), who show that an increase in corruption shifts the
ownership structure from FDI towards joint ventures, may also be interpreted as lending
indirect support for our theoretical results. Bloom et al. (2009) show that trust and the
rule of law promote a decentralization of firms.
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evidence on the e↵ects of political risk on international capital inflows or the
volume of FDI. 5
In determining the quality of domestic institutions, the elite faces a trade-
o↵: On the one hand, weakening the protection of property rights raises the
expected share of output that the elite can appropriate. On the other hand,
it distorts international capital flows and thereby lowers the output level.
From this trade-o↵, we derive the equilibrium expropriation risk and its de-
terminants. In particular, we are interested in the e↵ects of economic inte-
gration on the institutional quality in the South. Interpreting globalization
as a change in investments costs, we show that a decline in the fixed costs
of setting up an integrated firm lowers the risk of expropriation, whereas a
decline in the fixed costs of a joint venture raises it. A change in the marginal
costs of capital investments, in turn, does not influence the equilibrium risk
of expropriation. Here, two opposing e↵ects o↵set each other: On the one
hand, the elite is induced to extract more rents, but on the other hand, ex-
propriation become more distortionary. Finally, we extend the analysis by
considering expropriation of foreign capital in addition to expropriation of
the local asset. In this case, the distortionary e↵ects of the expropriation
risk are stronger than in the baseline model, which amplifies the distortion
of investment incentives.
There is a broad theoretical literature on the role of taxation policies con-
nected with foreign investments. A substantial part of this literature deals
with time-consistency issues, i.e., with the incentive for host governments to
harass foreign investors once their investments are sunk. The seminal paper
by Bond and Samuelson (1989) shows that foreign direct investors supply less
capital if the host country’s government does not commit to its future tax pol-
icy. When deciding whether to commit to a certain tax rate, the government
faces a trade-o↵ between high capital investments in the case of commitment
and a high ex post bargaining power in the case without.6 In contrast to
this strand of literature, our paper focuses on the interplay between politi-
cal risk and the mode of investment (foreign direct investment versus joint
5See, e.g., Alfaro et al. (2008); Asiedu et al. (2009); Busse and Hefeker (2007); Gas-
tanaga et al. (1998); Papaioannou (2009).
6Other approaches elucidate the host government’s trade-o↵ between short-run bene-
fits and long-run costs of expropriatory policies in a setting without commitment. Costs
may arise from a lack of future investments, as in Cole and English 1991; Thomas and
Worrall 1994, or from a loss of foreign know-how, as, e.g., in Eaton and Gersovitz 1984;
Albuquerque 2003. See also Janeba (2000, 2002), who argues that the governments’ com-
mitment problem may be weakened by the fact that multinational firms usually operate
in more than one country. For the role of tax holidays, i.e., temporary tax concessions in
order to attract foreign investors despite of the commitment problem, see, e.g., Doyle and
van Wijnbergen (1994); Bond and Samuelson (1986).
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venture). Thus, we consider an additional channel through which political
hazards a↵ect the decision making process of foreign investors. Moreover,
in our framework, political risks do not necessarily target foreign capital di-
rectly. Instead, investment decisions are already distorted from a weakening
of property rights with respect to the ownership of local assets.
Our paper is related to other contributions on the relationship between
the mode of international investments and institutional quality, none of those
considering the mechanism we are focusing on. According to Che and Fac-
chini (2009), a multinational company can choose between three di↵erent
strategies to enter a market, depending on the allocation of authority within
an organization: licensing agreements, joint ventures and wholly owned sub-
sidiaries. The decision on the mode of entry depends on the multinational’s
knowledge of the local market and on the exogenous risk of being expropri-
ated by the local partner. In this framework, the relationship between the
optimal entry strategy and the institutional environment is non-monotonic.
Straub (2008) considers a foreign firm that can either sell its superior technol-
ogy to a developing country or make a greenfield investment. Expropriation
may occur in the form of a default, i.e., the local government refuses to pay
the price for the technology. In this setting, FDIs are preferred over debt
financing in the presence of political risk. Similarly, Albuquerque (2003)
argues that firms prefer FDI over other international capital flows because
it comprises intangible assets and is, therefore, less appropriable by the re-
cipient country. Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010) analyze the question as
to how di↵erent forms of political risk influence the ownership of a foreign
a liate and the capital structure (equity vs. debt) of international invest-
ments. They show that whereas ownership is negatively a↵ected by all types
of political risk, the impact on leverage depends on the type of the political
hazard. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) develop a theoretical model that builds
on the transaction cost approach to explain the determinants of ownership
in multinational firms. The risk of expropriation enters their model only in-
directly, as it is assumed to influence the comparative advantage of the local
partner in the joint project. Finally, several papers analyze expropriation of
foreign investors in the resource extraction sector. For example, Guriev et al.
(2011) set up a dynamic framework to explain the fact that expropriations
in the oil industry are more likely to occur in periods with a high oil price.
They also show empirically that the expropriation risk is higher in countries
with weak political institutions.7
7Similarly, Bohn and Deacon (2000) find a strong negative e↵ect of the ownership
risk on investments in resource extraction. Hajzler (2010) argues that a country with
weak property rights protection may o↵set the expropriation risk for foreign investors by
subsidizing the acquisition of exploitation rights for mineral resources.
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2 The Model
We consider a small open economy in the South that is populated by a ruling
elite and a continuum of heterogeneous local producers with unit mass. Each
producer owns a specific asset. The utilization of this asset requires the fixed
input of specific skills by the producer, such that asset and skills jointly
produce a local intermediate input A. That is, we assume a Leontie↵-type
technology function which combines the specific skill of the local producer
and the respective asset to an intermediate input A. The productivity of
this input di↵ers between producers, which we model by assuming that A
is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function G(A) over
[0,1). The local input can be used productively only in combination with
capital K according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
y =
1
✓
K✓A1 ✓ . (1)
The economy under consideration does not own any domestic capital and
therefore has to rely on foreign capital imports from the North for production.
Output y is sold on the world market for a given price of one.
Building on Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), we
consider a relationship between foreign investor and domestic producer that
is subject to a hold-up problem. Both potential partners are not able to
contract upon the level of investments ex ante or on the returns for this
investment. Instead, they bargain about revenue sharing ex post after the
investment decision has been made. Anticipating that the marginal return
on capital will not fully accrue to her, the international investor sets capi-
tal supply to a sub-optimally low level. To mitigate this ine ciency, both
partners can transfer ownership of the specific asset from the local producer
to the foreign investor. This improves the bargaining position of the inter-
national investor when it comes to sharing the joint surplus. Consequently,
ownership a↵ects the incentives of the foreign investor to provide capital. If
the foreign investor does not own the asset, she will invest less relative to
the situation in which the property right of the asset rests with her. De-
pending on the ownership structure, we distinguish the following two ideal
organizational forms:
• Disintegrated production (joint venture), i.e., the local producer holds
the property right of the asset
• Integrated production (foreign direct investment), i.e., the foreign in-
vestor acquires the asset from the local producer
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In a joint venture, the foreign investor’s claim over the joint surplus solely
results from her ownership of the factor capital. With integration, the foreign
investor purchases the local asset and thereby raises her claim. As mentioned
in the introduction, we consider a country with a weak institutional environ-
ment in the sense that property rights are insecure. This lowers the value of
owning the asset and therefore also influences the choice of the organizational
form of international production.
The institutional quality in the host country is characterized by the pa-
rameter ⌧ 2 [0, 1] that measures the risk of expropriation. The elite of the
host country sets the institutional environment and thereby influences the
expropriation risk. For example, the elite may determine how clearly prop-
erty rights are defined, under which conditions property may be confiscated,
or to which degree independent courts may review expropriation decisions.
In the context of our paper, expropriation of an asset implies that the ruling
elite, instead of the original owner, can claim a part of the revenue. The
elite chooses the economic institutions to maximize its own income, and this
choice determines the risk of expropriation. A convenient and straightfor-
ward way to incorporate this mechanism into our framework is to assume
that the elite directly controls the probability of expropriation.8 The risk of
expropriation is the same for all asset owners, and it does not depend on the
organizational form of production. We assume, for the time being, that this
is the only form of institutional distortion. Particularly, it is not possible for
the elite to expropriate foreign capital or the specific skills supplied by the
local producer. The following sequence of events summarizes the structure
of the model:
1. The elite determines ⌧ to maximize its own expected income
2. Foreign investors and domestic asset owners choose the organizational
form that maximizes their expected joint payo↵
3. Foreign investors decide how much K they invest
4. Expropriation of individual assets occurs with probability ⌧
5. Revenues are realized and shared
8See, e.g., Besley and Ghatak (2009) for a similar approach.
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3 International Investment and Institutional
Quality
To solve the model, we proceed by backward induction, beginning with the
sharing of revenues in the final stage. Following the property rights approach,
bargaining over dividing the joint surplus takes place both in a joint venture
and under integration.9 This is due to the fact that the foreign investor –
though being the asset owner under integration – is still dependent on the
specific skills of the local producer. To simplify the exposition, we refrain
from explicitly modeling the bargaining game. Instead, we consider exoge-
nous shares of the joint revenue that accrue from ownership of the respective
factors of production. In particular, we apply following notation: ↵ denotes
the expected share of the respective asset owner,   is the expected share of
the local producer, which results from his specific skills, and finally   is the
expected share of the capital owner. Note that ↵ +   +   = 1.
Given this outcome of the revenue sharing stage, the international in-
vestor has to decide on the capital stock she will invest. This decision is
characterized by the equality of the marginal return – either from a joint
venture or from an integrated firm – with her opportunity costs. With a
frictionless international capital market, the opportunity costs are given by
the world interest rate R. In a joint venture, denoted by the subscript j, the
investor expects a revenue share of   and maximizes  yj  RKj. This yields
K⇤j =
⇣  
R
⌘ 1
1 ✓
A ⌘  jA (2)
as the investment level in a joint venture.
With integration, denoted by i, the international investor chooses an in-
vestment level to maximize (  + ↵  ↵⌧) yi  RKi, such that
K⇤i (⌧) =
✓
  + ↵  ↵⌧
R
◆ 1
1 ✓
A ⌘  i(⌧)A . (3)
Describing the hold-up problem in the previous section, we have emphasized
the relevance of ownership for the investment decision. The optimal invest-
ment level under integration is higher than in a joint venture since in the first
case the foreign investor has the control rights over the asset and thereby re-
ceives a larger share of the revenue. This mitigates the hold-up problem
9This distinguishes the current set-up from the transaction cost approach according to
which integration completely solves the hold-up problem. For an application of transaction
cost models in the context of the international organization of firms see, e.g., McLaren
(2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002).
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which distorts the investment decision. According to the above equations,
K⇤i (⌧) > K
⇤
j for all ⌧ 2 [0, 1). Taking the derivative of (3) with respect to ⌧ ,
we find @ i/@⌧ < 0. Thus, the investment level in an integrated firm decreases
with the expropriation risk. Figure IV.1 depicts the investment levels under
the two alternative organizational forms. In a perfect institutional environ-
ment – i.e., with no risk of expropriation – investments in an integrated firm
are highest. As the institutional quality deteriorates (⌧ increases), invest-
ments decline. Finally, in the limit case of a definite expropriation (⌧ = 1),
ownership of the asset becomes worthless for the international investor, and
she chooses the same investment level as in a joint venture. The investment
level in a joint venture is not a↵ected by ⌧ .
 i(⌧)1 ✓
⌧
-
6
q
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH 
R
 +↵
R
 1 ✓j
1
Figure IV.1: Institutional Quality and Investment Incentives
Inserting (3) and (2) into (1) yields the following output levels:
yi(⌧) =
 i(⌧)✓
✓
A and yj =
 ✓j
✓
A . (4)
Turning to the choice of organizational form, we assume that the for-
eign investor and the domestic producer jointly choose the mode of foreign
investment that maximizes the expected joint profit from the bilateral rela-
tionship. With a joint venture, the domestic producer is expropriated with
probability ⌧ and sticks with an output share of   in this case. In case of
non-expropriation, he receives a share of ↵ +   of yj. Expropriation does
not target the foreign investor, who receives a share of  . In an integrated
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firm, the domestic producer sticks to a share of  , whereas the international
investor gets ↵ +   in the case of non-expropriation and   if the asset is
expropriated. As in the work of Antras and Helpman (2004), we assume
that international investments give rise to fixed costs that depend on the
organizational form. We denote these fixed costs by fi and fj, respectively.
The expected joint profits in a joint venture and in an integrated firm are
respectively given by
E[⇡j] = (1  ↵⌧)yj  RK⇤j   fj and (5)
E[⇡i] = (1  ↵⌧)yi(⌧) RK⇤i (⌧)  fi . (6)
Because of the fixed costs, minimum supply levels of the local input are
required for the di↵erent modes of production. We now determine these
critical values and thereby obtain the organizational pattern of firms in equi-
librium. The minimum level of A that is needed to establish a joint venture
is obtained from the zero profit condition E[⇡j] = 0. Using (2), (3), and (4)
yields
A⇤j(⌧) =
✓fj
 ✓j (1  ✓    ↵⌧)
. (7)
Accordingly, for an integrated firm to be at least as profitable as a joint
venture, the following inequality has to hold: E[⇡i]   E[⇡j]. This inequality
determines a second critical input level:
A⇤i (⌧) =
✓(fi   fj)
(1  ✓    ↵⌧)( i(⌧)✓    ✓j )  ↵✓ i(⌧)✓(1  ⌧)
. (8)
Note that for ⌧ ! 1, the denominator in (8) approaches zero. Since this
denominator is strictly decreasing in ⌧ , it is positive for all ⌧ 2 [0, 1), which
implies A⇤i > 0. In what follows, we make a parametric assumption that
guarantees A⇤i (⌧) > A
⇤
j(⌧):
10
fi >
✓
↵ +  
 
◆ ✓
1 ✓
fj . (9)
This is equivalent to assuming fi to be su ciently larger than fj. Otherwise,
there would be only integrated firms in equilibrium.
Figure IV.2 illustrates the cut-o↵ levels, depicting the expected profit
levels (5) and (6) for a given value of ⌧ . Note that E[⇡i] is steeper in A than
10A⇤i (⌧) > A⇤j (⌧) if (1   ✓    ↵⌧) ✓j fi > [1   ↵⌧   ✓(  + ↵   ↵⌧)] i(⌧)✓fj . Since
1  ✓  ↵⌧   1 ↵⌧   ✓( +↵ ↵⌧) for all ⌧ 2 [0, 1], we need an assumption that ensures
 ✓j fi >  i(⌧)
✓fj . Using (3) and (2) and taking into account that  i(⌧) takes the highest
values for ⌧ = 0 yields inequality (9).
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E[⇡j]. The intersection of E[⇡j] with the abscissa determines the minimum
input level A⇤j . All domestic asset owners, who can provide a lower input
level than A⇤j , do not take up production and are, therefore, inactive on the
market. The intersection between E[⇡j] and E[⇡i] determines the threshold
input level required for a FDI, A⇤i . In the range between A
⇤
j and A
⇤
i it is not
profitable to form an integrated firm due to the higher fixed costs. Therefore,
this range corresponds to the firms that form joint ventures in the economy.
Finally, expected profits from integration exceed profits from a joint venture
for all productivity values higher than A⇤i .
E[pij]
E[pij´]
E[ ]pii
E[pii´ ]
·
E[ ]pi
Joint Venture
A´i
0
-fj
-fi
AiA´jAj
Exit Integrated Firm
Figure IV.2: Organizational Structure and Expropriation
The institutional quality of the host country a↵ects the critical cut-o↵
levels between the di↵erent organizational forms, as shown by the following
derivatives of (7) and (8):
@A⇤j
@⌧
=
↵
1  ✓    ↵⌧A
⇤
j(⌧) and (10)
@A⇤i
@⌧
=
↵
1  ✓    ↵⌧A
⇤
i (⌧) + ↵ (⌧)A
⇤
i (⌧) , (11)
where  (⌧) ⌘
h
↵(1 ⌧)
1 ✓  ↵⌧ +
 
(1 ✓)( +↵ ↵⌧)
i
A⇤i (⌧) i(⌧)
✓
fi fj > 0.
An increase in ⌧ shifts both cut-o↵ levels to the right, with @A⇤i /@⌧ >
@A⇤j/@⌧ > 0. That is, an increase in ⌧ has a stronger e↵ect on the value of
A⇤i (⌧) than on A
⇤
j(⌧). As a result, the mass of integrated firms declines in
⌧ whereas that of joint ventures increases. Furthermore, since the minimum
input level that is necessary for market entry rises, the total mass of active
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firms in the host country declines, which raises the average A of the remaining
firms. The intuition behind this result is that an increase in ⌧ has two e↵ects:
First, it directly lowers expected joint profits in both organizational forms.
As the size of this e↵ect is proportional to the supplied quantity of the local
input, it has a stronger influence on A⇤i (⌧) than on A
⇤
j(⌧). Second, in an
integrated firm, an increase in ⌧ reduces the quantity of capital supplied
by the foreign investor, which additionally lowers output and expected joint
profits. The term (⌧) in (11) captures this e↵ect. To illustrate the distortion
in capital allocation more clearly, we may also examine the e↵ect of a change
in expropriation risk on joint profits. By di↵erentiating (5) and (6) with
respect to ⌧ , we obtain
@E[⇡j]
@⌧
=  ↵yj < 0 and (12)
@E[⇡i]
@⌧
=  
✓
1 +
 ✓
(1  ✓)(  + ↵  ↵⌧)
◆
↵yi(⌧) < 0 . (13)
Comparing (12) with (13) shows that an increase in the risk of expropriation
reduces joint profits in an integrated firm to a larger extent than in a joint
venture. In addition to a higher direct e↵ect of the expropriation risk, joint
profits in an integrated firm are also lowered by a decline in the capital supply.
Figure IV.2 demonstrates the influence of ⌧ on the cut-o↵ input levels. An
exogenous increase in ⌧ makes the expected income lines flatter (illustrated
by the dashed lines), with a larger absolute change in the slope of E[⇡i]. As a
consequence, A⇤i (⌧) increases more strongly than A
⇤
j(⌧). Hence, a reallocation
of the organizational structure of firms takes place shifting ownership toward
joint ventures.
The influence of the expropriation risk on the critical productivities sug-
gests that a deterioration of the institutional quality harms the economy
in the host country. By deriving the e↵ect of a change in ⌧ on domestic
production (GDP), we analyze this e↵ect more systematically. GDP – de-
noted by Y G – is composed of the aggregate production by joint ventures
and integrated firms11
Y G(⌧) =
 ✓j
✓
Z A⇤i (⌧)
A⇤j (⌧)
Ag(A)dA+
 i(⌧)✓
✓
Z 1
A⇤i (⌧)
Ag(A)dA , (14)
where g(A) denotes the density of the corresponding distribution function
G(A). From now on, we assume that G(A) follows a Pareto distribution:
11GDP does not contain the fixed costs since we assume that the international investor
bears these costs.
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G(A) = 1  (b/A)k, where b denotes the minimum possible value for A, and
k > 2.12 With this specification, GDP can be written as follows:
Y G(⌧) =
kbk
✓(k   1)
⇥
 ✓jA
⇤
j(⌧)
1 k + ( i(⌧)✓    ✓j )A⇤i (⌧)1 k
⇤
. (15)
Di↵erentiating (15) with respect to ⌧ yields
@Y G
@⌧
=
↵(1  k)
1  ✓    ↵⌧ Y
G(⌧) 
↵kbkA⇤i (⌧)
1 k
✓(k   1)

✓ i(⌧)✓
(1  ✓)(  + ↵  ↵⌧) + (k   1)( i(⌧)
✓    ✓j ) (⌧)
 
< 0 .
(16)
Hence, an increase in the risk of expropriation lowers domestic production.
We now turn to the first stage of the game and analyze the choice of the
institutional environment by the ruling elite. That is, we determine the level
of ⌧ that maximizes the elite’s expected income from expropriating the asset
owners. The expected income of the elite can be written as
Y E(⌧) = ⌧↵Y G(⌧) . (17)
The following first order condition determines the optimal institutional qual-
ity ⌧ from the view of the elite:
↵Y G(⌧) + ↵⌧
@Y G(⌧)
@⌧
= 0 , (18)
where @Y G(⌧)/@⌧ is given by equation (16). Determining the optimal in-
stitutional quality, the elite faces a trade-o↵: On the one hand, a higher ⌧
delivers a higher expected share of aggregate output for the elite. On the
other hand, it lowers output because of the distortions (i) with respect to the
capital transfer within integrated firms and (ii) with respect to the decision
between a joint venture and an integrated firm.
Inserting (16) into (18) and rearranging yields
↵(1  ✓    ↵⌧k)
1  ✓    ↵⌧ Y
G(⌧)  ↵
2⌧kbkA⇤i (⌧)
1 k
✓(k   1)
✓ i(⌧)✓
(1  ✓)(  + ↵  ↵⌧) + (k   1)( i(⌧)
✓    ✓j ) (⌧)
 
= 0 . (19)
12Since the work by Helpman et al. (2004), the Pareto distribution has been frequently
employed in the literature on trade with heterogeneous firms. The assumption k > 2
ensures a finite variance of A.
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The equilibrium probability of expropriation ⌧ ⇤ solves (19). We assume that
the second order condition @2Y E(⌧ ⇤)/@⌧ 2 < 0 is satisfied. Inspecting (19)
reveals that ⌧ ⇤ has to satisfy the following necessary condition: 1   ✓   
↵k⌧ ⇤ > 0. This implies that ↵k   1 is a su cient condition to rule out a
confiscatory risk of expropriation (where ⌧ ⇤ = 1). Note further that assuming
⌧ = 0 yields @Y E(⌧)/@⌧ > 0, such that a zero probability of expropriation
can also be ruled out.
4 Globalization and Institutional Quality
Given the equilibrium probability of expropriation, we now analyze the elite’s
reaction to changes in exogenous parameters. In particular, we focus on the
influence of a better integration of the small country into the world economy.
In this respect, we begin with the e↵ects of a decline in the fixed costs of
foreign production on ⌧ ⇤. Taking total derivatives of (19) yields the following
results (see the Appendix):
d⌧ ⇤
dfi
> 0 and
d⌧ ⇤
dfj
< 0 .
Whereas a decline in fi results in a lower probability of expropriation, a
decline in fj raises ⌧ ⇤. We can intuitively explain these di↵erent e↵ects as
follows: For a given institutional quality, a decline in fj lowers the critical
productivity for joint ventures A⇤j and raises the critical productivity for
an integrated firm A⇤i . Since expropriating joint ventures does not distort
foreign capital supply, the elite raises the risk of expropriation such that the
institutional environment changes for the worse. On the contrary, with a
decline in fi and therewith a drop in A⇤i , ⌧
⇤ declines. In this case, economic
integration improves the institutional quality of the host country.
With regard to a simultaneous decline in fi and fj, we can show the
following (see Appendix):
d⌧ ⇤
8<: <=
>
9=; 0 if dfifi
8<: <=
>
9=; dfjfj . (20)
A better integration of the country into the world economy improves institu-
tional quality in the South only if the fixed costs of setting up an integrated
firm decline more strongly (in percentage terms) than the fixed costs of a
joint venture. In the opposite case, the countries’ institutions change for the
worse, and the risk of expropriation increases. According to (7) and (8), a
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simultaneous change in fi and fj yields for a given ⌧ ⇤
dA⇤i
A⇤i
=
dfi
fi
+
✓
dfi
fi
  dfj
fj
◆
fj
fi   fj and
dA⇤j
A⇤j
=
dfj
fj
.
Hence, for dfi/fi = dfj/fj, the relative decline in both cut-o↵s A⇤i and Aj
is the same, and, according to (20), the elite does not change institutional
quality. If the relative decline in fi is higher than in fj, however, equilibrium
expropriation risk decreases.
Globalization may also be reflected in a decline in the cost of capital
R. This, however, does not a↵ect the equilibrium expropriation risk, i.e.,
d⌧ ⇤/dR = 0 (see Appendix). Both threshold productivity levels – A⇤j and A
⇤
i
– decrease by the same relative amount in this case:
dA⇤i
A⇤i
=
dA⇤j
A⇤j
=
✓
1  ✓
dR
R
.
Similar to the previous case of a symmetric change in fixed costs, the elite
does not adjust the expropriation risk to the new constellation. Its motivation
to extract more rents on the one hand and the larger distortion caused by
the expropriation risk on the other hand balance out, such that ⌧ ⇤ remains
unchanged.
5 Extension: Expropriation of Capital
In our baseline model, expropriation targets only the local asset, such that an
international investor engaged in a joint venture does not bear any political
risk. In this section, we extend our analysis to a setting in which the factor
capital may also be expropriated. For this, we assume that the measure of
institutional quality ⌧ describes the expropriation risk for the asset as well
as for capital.
Following the structure of the baseline model, we first determine the op-
timal investment levels under both organizational forms. In a joint venture,
the international investor expects a revenue share   with the probability 1 ⌧ .
In case of expropriation, she is left with a revenue share of zero. The optimal
capital stock invested in a joint venture is therefore given by
K⇤j (⌧) =
✓
(1  ⌧) 
R
◆ 1
1 ✓
A ⌘  ˜j(⌧)A . (21)
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Accordingly, the expected revenue share of the investor in an integrated firm
is (1  ⌧)(↵ +  ). Hence,
K⇤i (⌧) =
✓
(1  ⌧)(↵ +  )
R
◆ 1
1 ✓
A ⌘  ˜i(⌧)A (22)
determines the capital input in an integrated firm. As before, the optimal
level of investment under integration is higher than in a joint venture. A de-
terioration of the institutional quality now also a↵ects investments in a joint
venture, i.e., @ ˜j/@⌧ < 0. However, since @ ˜j/@⌧ > @ ˜i/@⌧ , the distortion in
K⇤i is larger than in K
⇤
j for a given A, similar to the baseline model. Figure
IV.3 illustrates as to how investment incentives are influenced by the new
institutional environment. As in Figure IV.1,  ˜i exceeds  ˜j for all ⌧ < 1.
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Figure IV.3: Expropriation of Capital and Adjusted Investment Incentives
The risk of expropriation now causes a larger distortion than in the baseline
model, as the remaining expected revenue share of the international investor
decreases. In the baseline model, the investor still supplies some capital in
the limit case in which property rights are completely insecure (⌧ = 1). In
the extended framework, however, for the same case, there is no investment
made. Output levels, which are given by
yi(⌧) =
 ˜i(⌧)✓
✓
A and yj(⌧) =
 ˜j(⌧)✓
✓
A , (23)
are also lower than in the baseline specification.
74
To determine the organizational structure of firms, we again formulate
the respective expected joint profits. Naturally, incorporating the risk of
capital expropriation does not influence the expected output share of the
domestic producer. Taking into account the change in output shares of the
international investor, the expected joint profits are now given by
E[⇡j] = [1  ⌧(↵ +  )]yj(⌧) RK⇤j (⌧)  fj and (24)
E[⇡i] = [1  ⌧(↵ +  )]yi(⌧) RK⇤i (⌧)  fi . (25)
As before, the respective threshold levels of A are obtained by the following
two equations: E[⇡j] = 0 and E[⇡j] = E[⇡i]. Inserting (24) and (25) yields
A⇤j(⌧) =
✓fj
 j(⌧)✓[1  ⌧(↵ +  )  ✓ (1  ⌧)] and (26)
A⇤i (⌧) =
✓(fi   fj)
[1  ⌧(↵ +  )  ✓ (1  ⌧)]( i(⌧)✓    j(⌧)✓)  ↵✓ i(⌧)✓(1  ⌧) .
(27)
Given our parametric assumption in (9), A⇤i (⌧) > A
⇤
j(⌧) still holds for all
⌧ 2 [0, 1]. Comparing (7) and (26) reveals that the minimum input level
for taking up production in a joint venture is now higher than in the case
without expropriation of capital. Due to the additional negative impact on
the capital invested in a joint venture, the expected joint profit from this
organizational mode is lower than before. Whether the cut-o↵ for integrated
production A⇤i in (27) is also higher than its counterpart in (8) is not as clear.
A su cient condition for this to be the case is ✓  1/2.13
The influence of the risk of expropriation on the critical levels of A can be
inferred from the influence of ⌧ on the expected joint profits. Di↵erentiating
(24) and (25) yields
@E[⇡j]
@⌧
=  
✓
↵ +   +
✓ [  + ↵(1  ⌧)]
(1  ⌧)(1  ✓)
◆
yj and (28)
@E[⇡i]
@⌧
=  
✓
↵ +   +
 ✓
(1  ⌧)(1  ✓)
◆
yi . (29)
As in the baseline model, a higher risk of expropriation lowers expected joint
profits in both organizational forms. As a consequence, both threshold levels
Ai(⌧) and Aj(⌧) increase in ⌧ , leading to a lower mass of active firms. In
contrast to our previous results, however, it is now not obvious whether E[⇡i]
13For ✓  1/2 the di↵erence  ˜i(⌧)✓   ˜j(⌧)✓ in (27) is not lower than the respective term
in (8).
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declines more strongly than E[⇡j] if the risk of expropriation ⌧ increases. On
the one hand, the multiplier in (29) is smaller than the one in (28), but on
the other hand, the output level yi exceeds yj. This ambiguity arises due to
the additional distortion in capital supply caused by the expropriation risk,
which now also a↵ects joint ventures. In section 3, we have pointed out that
a rise in ⌧ lowers joint profits in an integrated firm through two di↵erent
channels: It directly reduces the expected joint share of the output, and it
diminishes the level of invested capital. As the wedge between the marginal
productivity and the cost of capital is higher for a joint venture than for
an integrated firm, the latter e↵ect has a relatively stronger negative impact
in a joint venture. In the following, we derive a su cient condition that
guarantees @E[⇡j]/@⌧ > @E[⇡i]/@⌧ 8 ⌧ 2 [0, 1]. Using (21), (22), and (23),
the inequality @E[⇡j]/@⌧ > @E[⇡i]/@⌧ holds if
1 +
✓↵(1  ⌧)
(1  ⌧)(1  ✓)(1   ) +  ✓ <
✓
  + ↵
 
◆ ✓
1 ✓
. (30)
The left hand side of the this inequality is strictly decreasing in ⌧ , such that
a su cient condition for @E[⇡j]/@⌧ > @E[⇡i]/@⌧ can be obtained by setting
⌧ = 0:
1 +
✓↵
(1  ✓)(1   ) +  ✓ <
✓
  + ↵
 
◆ ✓
1 ✓
. (31)
Summarizing, we obtain the following two insights from this extension:
First, the fundamental mechanisms of our baseline model are not a↵ected by
incorporating an additional risk of capital expropriation. Investments in in-
tegrated firms are higher than in joint ventures, and they react more sensitive
to a change in institutional quality. Consequently, an increase in ⌧ reduces
the number of integrated firms. Second, introducing capital expropriation
also a↵ects investments in joint ventures and amplifies the distortion in in-
vestments incentives. Hence, the level of investments and aggregate payo↵s
are lower than that in our baseline specification.
6 Conclusion
This paper has taken the property rights view of the firm as a starting point
to analyze the relationship between international investments and the insti-
tutional environment in a non-democratic host country. We have considered
a small open economy in which local producers own specific assets and for-
eign investors provide capital for the production of a final good. In line
with the property rights approach, integration mitigates the hold-up prob-
lem that distorts the incentives to invest capital for production. Political
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risks of expropriation, however, distort this mechanism, such that less capi-
tal is invested in each integrated firm and fewer integrated firms are active
in the country. To determine the expropriation risk in equilibrium, we have
assumed that a ruling elite shapes national institutions to maximize its own
expected income. The institutional quality in this setting results from a
trade-o↵ for the elite: On the one hand, weak institutions provide the elite
with better opportunities to seize productive assets from the private sector
and, thereby, raise the expected share of output that the elite can capture.
On the other hand, an increase in the risk of expropriation lowers the volume
of capital invested in the country and thereby reduces output.
In our model, a better integration of the capital importing country into
the world economy can be reflected by a decline in fixed investment costs.
We have shown that the impact of such a development on the institutional
quality critically depends on which type of fixed costs decreases. If the bar-
riers for setting up an integrated firm in the host country decline, the elite
improves the institutional quality in the host country and more investors
choose the mode of integrated production. If, however, the specific costs of
setting up a joint venture decline, for example, because contracting with lo-
cal firms becomes easier, the institutional quality in the country deteriorates.
This asymmetric e↵ect of a change in investment costs o↵ers an interesting
hypothesis for an empirical analysis. It is also important from a policy point
of view: Measures to improve the institutional quality in certain countries
should therefore focus on supporting FDI instead of joint ventures.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we prove the comparative static results presented in section
4. The first order condition, given by (19), can also be written as
µ(⌧ ⇤) ✓jA
⇤
j(⌧
⇤)1 k +  (⌧ ⇤)A⇤i (⌧
⇤)1 k = 0 , (32)
where
µ(⌧ ⇤) ⌘ 1  ✓    ↵⌧
⇤k
1  ✓    ↵⌧ ⇤ and
 (⌧ ⇤) ⌘ [µ(⌧ ⇤)  ↵⌧ ⇤(k   1) (⌧ ⇤)]   i(⌧ ⇤)✓    ✓j    ↵✓⌧ ⇤ i(⌧ ⇤)✓(1  ✓)(  + ↵  ↵⌧ ⇤) < 0 .
Taking total total derivatives of (32), and provided that the second order
condition (SOC < 0) is satisfied, we obtain the following results:
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(i) The e↵ect of a change in fi on ⌧ ⇤:
d⌧ ⇤
dfi
=
(k   1) (⌧ ⇤)A⇤i (⌧ ⇤)1 k
(fi   fj)SOC > 0 .
(ii) The e↵ect of a change in fj on ⌧ ⇤:
d⌧ ⇤
dfj
=
k   1
SOC
"
µ(⌧ ⇤) ✓jA
⇤
j(⌧
⇤)1 k
fj
   (⌧
⇤)A⇤i (⌧
⇤)1 k
fi   fj
#
< 0 .
(iii) The e↵ect of a simultaneous change in fi and fj on ⌧ ⇤:
d⌧ ⇤ =
k   1
SOC
"
 (⌧ ⇤)A⇤i (⌧
⇤)1 k
fi   fj (dfi   dfj) +
µ(⌧ ⇤) ✓jA
⇤
j(⌧
⇤)1 k
fj
dfj
#
.
Defining fˆi ⌘ dfi/fi and fˆj ⌘ dfj/fj and inserting the first order con-
dition (32), we can write
d⌧ ⇤ =
(k   1) (⌧ ⇤)A⇤i (⌧ ⇤)1 kfi
SOC (fi   fj)
⇣
fˆi   fˆj
⌘
.
The expropriation risk ⌧ ⇤ therefore decreases if and only if fˆi < fˆj.
(iv) The e↵ect of a change in R on ⌧ ⇤:
d⌧ ⇤
dR
=
✓k
R(1  ✓)SOC
⇥
µ(⌧ ⇤) ✓jA
⇤
j(⌧
⇤)1 k +  (⌧ ⇤)A⇤i (⌧
⇤)1 k
⇤
= 0 ,
since the term in squared brackets is equivalent to the first order con-
dition (32).
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Part V
Financial Liberalization and
Institutional Development
Markus Alzera and Ramin Dadasˇov
Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes the e↵ects of de jure financial open-
ness on institutional quality as captured by indicators on investment
risk, corruption level, impartiality of judiciary system as well as the ef-
fectiveness of bureaucratic authorities. Using a panel data set of more
than 110 countries and a time span from 1984 to 2005, we show that
a higher degree of financial openness improves institutional quality in
particular by reducing investment risks. We also study the e↵ect of a
single liberalization reform on the development of institutional quality.
Again, we find evidence for the beneficial impact of financial liberal-
ization with the exception of the level of corruption. We additionally
show that if financial liberalization is supported by simultaneous polit-
ical liberalization, the benign consequences of financial opening for the
institutional performance are even larger, while financial deregulation
in former socialist countries tends to worsen institutional quality.
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1 Introduction
For more than three decades, countries around the world have been undergo-
ing a process of financial liberalization. According to Chinn and Ito (2008),
between 1980 and 2005 the degree of financial openness increased by about
40 % worldwide, while for the emerging countries their indicator has even
doubled its value.1 The consequences of this development for economic per-
formance have been intensively discussed in the academic area and are still
a source of controversial debates. Recently, some authors have put forward
the idea that financial liberalization might lead to better institutions and
governance (see Kose et al. 2009b; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2008; Obstfeld 2009).
Already, Eichengreen (2001) pointed to this argument by writing: “[capital
controls] weaken the market discipline on policymakers. They vest additional
power with bureaucrats who may be even less capable than markets at de-
livering an e cient allocation of resources and open the door to rent seeking
activities and resource dissipation by interest groups seeking privileged ac-
cess to foreign capital.” (p. 342). The abolition of the capital controls may
then promote structural changes in financially liberalized countries towards
more investment and business friendly public governance. Referring to this
argument, in this paper, we empirically investigate the implication of de jure
financial liberalization for the quality of institutions.
By focusing on de jure financial liberalization, our paper di↵ers from other
studies, which analyze the interaction between institutional quality and de
facto financial liberalization, i.e., actual capital flows (the following section
provides an overview of the related literature). However, while actual capital
flows are driven by various factors (among others by institutions themselves),
regulations of financial account transactions are the direct results of political
decisions, and therefore under the control of policy makers. This explains a
rather weak systematic relationship between de jure and de facto financial
integration (see Kose et al. 2009b and the works cited therein). Exploring
the consequences of de jure rather than de facto financial liberalization thus
provides the respective decision makers with immediate policy implications
with regard to the development of institutional quality.
A first glance at the data suggests a positive relationship between de jure
financial liberalization and the quality of institutions, as demonstrated by
Figure V.1. Here, a country’s average degree of financial openness, captured
by the kaopen index of Chinn and Ito (2008), is plotted against its average
institutional quality (institute) for the period between 1984 and 2005 within
1See also Figure V.2 in the Appendix, which depicts the development of financial open-
ness on the basis of the so-called kaopen index constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008).
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two di↵erent country samples. The measure of institutional quality, which
is employed here, is an average of four di↵erent institutional dimensions. It
consists of indicators which respectively measure perceptions of investment
risk, corruption level, impartiality of the judiciary system as well as e↵ective-
ness of the bureaucratic authorities. The corresponding data stems from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provided by Political Risk Ser-
vices Group (2008). In the following, we investigate this relationship more
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Figure V.1: Financial Openness and Institutional Quality
extensively, controlling for other variables which potentially may also influ-
ence this relationship. Using a data set of more than 110 countries and a
period between 1984 and 2005, we first analyze the influence of a gradual
variation in financial openness on institutional development. Here we ap-
ply a standard panel regression method, namely OLS with fixed-e↵ects. We
also use reduced frequency data to control for the argument that changes in
financial regulation may involve long-term processes in order to a↵ect the
institutional quality. We then focus on the institutional development in the
aftermath of a single financial liberalization reform. That is, we define fi-
nancial liberalization as a treatment, which some countries experience and
others do not, and estimate the causal e↵ect of this reform on institutional
outcomes by employing the di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach. When using
an aggregate institutional index, such as institute, we may fail to detect the
actual impact of financial liberalization, because financial openness may op-
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erate through di↵erent channels and thus have its own individual e↵ect on
various institutional dimensions. Therefore, with both approaches, we ad-
ditionally explore the e↵ects of financial liberalization on each institutional
sub-component.
Our results generally confirm the picture suggested by Figure V.1: De
jure financial openness improves institutional performance. However, as sug-
gested above, the e↵ects di↵er with respect to the institutional dimensions.
The aggregate positive influence of financial liberalization is mainly a conse-
quence of a strong benign impact on the investment risk, whereas the corrup-
tion level tends to increase as a result of financial deregulation. We suggest
that on the one hand, investors may interpret decisions to deregulate the
financial account as a signal for a better protection of their property rights,
which results in lower perceived investment risks. On the other hand, fi-
nancial openness may be associated with new business opportunities, which
in turn may intensify rent-seeking, and thereby corruption. Testing the im-
pact of a liberalization reform, we additionally show that a simultaneous
political liberalization, in the form of democratization, amplifies the positive
e↵ects of a financial opening. We also find that financial deregulation in
former socialist countries results in deteriorated institutional quality. These
results support our “signaling-argument” since political liberalization might
make local governments more credible in implementing structural reforms.
By contrast, deregulation in former socialist countries might have gone along
with a lack of confidence in the ability of new democratic governments to
provide deep going structural reforms within an appropriate period.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly overviews
the relevant literature, highlighting related contributions. In Section 3, we
present our data set as well as the results of the fixed-e↵ects estimations.
We then treat financial liberalization as a one-time reform and present the
results of the corresponding di↵erence-in-di↵erence regressions in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Background and Related Literature
In this section, we first briefly review related literature on the interdepen-
dence between economic liberalization and institutional quality. We then de-
scribe relevant contributions which explore the endogeneity of institutional
development. These studies will help us to derive the determinants of in-
stitutional quality which have to be controlled for when doing our empirical
analysis.
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Liberalization and Institutions
As mentioned above, some authors argue that financial liberalization not
only directly influences economic performance, but may also have some col-
lateral e↵ects on the structural development, for instance via improvement of
the institutional quality. However, theoretical and empirical works exploring
these channels are not exhaustive. Bartolini and Drazen (1997), for exam-
ple, provide a model, in which foreign investors interpret the government’s
current decision on capital controls as a signal for future policies. Financial
deregulation is then associated with lower political risks and therefore with
a better investment environment. Note that our findings support this argu-
ment: financial openness improves institutional quality via lowering perceived
investment risks.2 Ali et al. (2011) empirically analyze the influence of FDI
inflows, i.e., of the de facto financial integration, on the quality of property
rights, and identify here a positive relationship. In Ali et al. (2010), the same
authors also empirically show that institutions are an important determinant
of FDI flows. Thus, with both their articles, Ali et al. (2011, 2010) provide
empirical evidence for a positive mutual relationship between FDI flows and
the security of property rights.3 Larrain and Tavares (2004) and Pinto and
Zhu (2008) explore the impact of FDI inflows on the corruption level. While
the first paper shows that FDI flows reduce the level of corruption, the au-
thors of the second article find that this link works in democracies but not
in autocracies.
There is also an increasing body of empirical literature analyzing the rela-
tionship between economic and political liberalization. Milner and Mukherjee
(2009) o↵er a comprehensive survey, which is underlined with their own es-
timations, on the bilateral relationship between trade and financial openness
and democratization. They conclude that while democratization promotes
economic liberalization, evidence for the reversed causality is limited. How-
ever, using a much longer time horizon, which also captures the first wave
of globalization in the 19th century, Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) find
empirical evidence for the e↵ects running in both directions.4
Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2008) and Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005)
2Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue from a perspective of an interest group
theory that (trade and) financial openness foster market competition and thereby weaken
incumbents who may oppose structural reforms. However, Dadasov et al. (2010) theo-
retically show that, in autocracies, e ciency gains caused by financial integration lead to
more distortive policies: In order to increase its rent income, the ruling elite raises the
expropriation rate in the aftermath of a liberalization.
3For the role of institutional quality in attracting foreign capital, see, among others,
Alfaro et al. (2008); Busse and Hefeker (2007); Papaioannou (2009).
4See also Campos and Coricelli (2009) for a non-linear relationship between economic
and political liberalization.
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focus on the consequences of political liberalization for economic perfor-
mance. The novel contribution of these authors is the application of micro-
econometric approaches in this area. Particularly, they define the event of
democratization as a one-time reform (treatment) and thereby analyze the
consequences of this reform for economic development.5 We follow their ap-
proach in the second part of our empirical investigation, in which we explore
the consequence of a financial liberalization reform.
Determinants of Institutions
Since institutions have been widely recognized as a key determinant of eco-
nomic development, researchers have increasingly addressed the question of
the endogeneity of institutions.6 Alonso and Garcimartin (2011) identify
four main drivers of institutional quality: the level of development, trade
openness, education, and income inequality. While the first three variables
are found to positively a↵ect institutional performance, higher inequality in
income distribution has a negative impact. Alonso and Garcimartin (2011)
stress that most of these findings are supported by previous studies, but
they also point out that these e↵ects might be sensitive to political regimes
and/or regional characteristics (see, among others, Islam and Montenegro
2002; Rigobon and Rodrik 2005; Alvarez-Diaz and Caballero Miguez 2008
for later relevant studies). In addition, they do not find any robust evidence
for the claim that historical and geographical conditions as well as ethnic
fragmentation influence institutional performance. However, Hanson (2009),
comparing most of the relevant prominent studies, concludes that a coun-
try’s given characteristics (such as legal and colonial origin, latitude) do play
a role in shaping its institutional quality.7 Thus, in our own estimations,
5In a similar way, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) also analyze the impact of trade and
political liberalization on institutional quality. Using the same approach, Tavares (2007)
explores the e↵ects of these liberalization processes on corruption. Persson and Tabellini
(2008) additionally use a propensity score matching method to increase the similarities
between treated and the control group. See also Nannicini and Ricciuti (2010) for a further
related approach.
6See, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2005) for a literature review on the role of institutions as
an important determinant of long-run growth. Recently, Angeles (2010) and Commander
and Nikoloski (2011) call these findings into question arguing that most of the empirical
studies on this subject su↵er from methodological as well as data weaknesses.
7These empirical findings are also quite consistent with theoretical works on endogenous
development of institutions. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) comprehensively
formalize the evolution of institutions establishing a dynamic link between political and
economic institutions as well as the distribution of economic resources. In Acemoglu
and Robinson (2008), they develop a model which explains the tendency of institutional
outcomes to persist, thereby highlighting the role of historical factors. See also Engerman
and Sokolo↵ (2006) for an argument supporting the long time patterns in institutional
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we will take into account time varying as well as time invariant variables as
potential determinants of institutional development. Finally, several studies
have pointed to a phenomenon which is often referred to as a “political re-
source curse”, a notion that many natural resource-rich countries su↵er from
deteriorated institutional quality (for an empirical work, see, among others,
Easterly and Levine 2003; for theoretical frameworks, see, e.g., Robinson
et al. 2006; Bulte and Damania 2008; Mehlum et al. 2006). We will, there-
fore, also consider resource abundance in our analysis as a further potential
explanatory variable.8
3 Fixed-E↵ects Estimation
In this section, we first construct our measure of institutional quality and
then employ fixed-e↵ects estimations to investigate the influence of financial
openness on this measure. As we will show, a higher degree of financial lib-
eralization leads to a better institutional quality. To identify the drivers of
this relationship, we proceed by estimating the impact of financial openness
on each sub-component of our institutional measure. Here the results sug-
gest that the positive influence of financial openness mainly results from its
mitigating impact on investment risks. To control for potential long lasting
processes, which might be involved in the evolution of institutional qual-
ity, we then use annually averaged data and thereby test the validity of our
findings.
3.1 Specification and Data
Our measure of institutional quality is based on data provided by the In-
ternational Country Risk Guide (ICRG) division of Political Risk Services
Group (2008). It consists of four di↵erent indicators that capture di↵erent in-
stitutional dimensions: “investment profile” (iprof ), assessing the investment
risks resulting from direct or indirect forms of expropriation; “corruption”
(corrupt), capturing not only financial corruption in form of demands for
hidden payments and bribes in business activities but also immaterial forms
of corruption, such as patronage, nepotism etc.; “law and order” (laword),
measuring the strength and impartiality of the legal system; and “bureau-
development.
8Investigating the determinants of expropriation risks, Harms and an de Meulen (2012)
empirically show that a country’s demographic structure also a↵ects this institutional
dimension. See Harms and an de Meulen (2011) for a theoretical exploration of the channel
through which this e↵ect might operate.
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cratic quality” (burqua), assessing the e ciency and the political autonomy
of administrative authorities. Though having a perceptive nature, these in-
dicators are widely used in the empirical literature on institutional quality.
Moreover, we believe that in the context of our work, these parameters are
especially appropriate since they cover a broad variety of risks and impedi-
ments which (foreign) investors have to deal with.9 Each of the institutional
components has a minimum value of 0, but di↵erent upper bounds. In each
case, a higher value implies a better respective institutional dimension, i.e.,
a higher corruption index implies a lower corruption level. To compute our
aggregate institutional index - hereafter denoted by institute -, we rescale
the values of each component to an identical range, namely from 0 to 6, and
calculate an unweighted average of these standardized indicators. These data
are available for 129 countries covering a time span from 1984 to 2005.
To capture the degree of de jure financial openness, we use the so-called
kaopen index developed by Chinn and Ito (2008). This index builds on
data of the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restriction (AREAR), which contains information about the extent of reg-
ulation of external account transactions. The kaopen index is scaled in the
range between  2.5 and 2.5, with higher values standing for larger degrees
of financial openness. For being a continuous variable, this measure provides
information about the intensity of financial openness and thus has an ad-
vantage over other mostly binary indices.10 For almost all the countries, for
which we have data on institutional quality, the kaopen index is available.
Tables V.18 and V.19 present the summary statistics for all variables (which
we use in our analysis), separating the full sample from the group consist-
ing of middle and low income countries only.11 As can be seen, there is a
significant variation in institutional and kaopen data not only between the
countries, but also intertemporally within the considered time span. Addi-
tionally, Table V.20 shows the correlations between the kaopen index and
the institutional indices. It is conspicuous that the relationship between the
9World Governance Indicators (WGI) by Kaufmann et al. (2010) provide an alternative
widely used source of institutional data. Unfortunately, these data are available only from
1996 on (and on an annual basis only from 2000). However, the correlations between the
ICRG indicators and their respective WGI counterparts are quite high, as demonstrated
by Table V.21 in the Appendix.
10Chinn and Ito (2008) use principal component analysis to transform the binary clas-
sifications of AREAR into one single continuous variable. They additionally show that
the correlation between their indicator and other measures, which are based on AREAR,
is very high. See also Brune and Guisinger (2007) for a comparison of di↵erent de jure
measures on financial liberalization.
11The division of countries into di↵erent income groups is done according to the World
Bank classification. See Table V.25 for the list of countries in the respective income group.
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degree of financial openness and institutional quality is weaker for the sample
of middle and low income countries (as has already been suggested by Figure
V.1). This finding emphasizes the necessity of separating the sample in the
following empirical analysis. Moreover, this relationship di↵ers substantially
among di↵erent institutional dimensions. For example, within the middle
and low income group, the correlation between kaopen and “investment pro-
file” is 0.37, but between kaopen and corruption it is -0.03. In the following,
we therefore will investigate not only the influence of financial liberalization
on aggregate institutional quality but also on each institutional indicator
separately.
As we argued in Section 2, it is reasonable to assume that the variation in
institutional development as well as in independent variables might be addi-
tionally driven by some unobserved time invariant factors: Country-specific
parameters, such as political culture and tradition, historical experiences and
so on, might play an important role in the structural development of the re-
spective country. We therefore estimate the following regression equation to
investigate the impact of financial openness on institutional quality:
iqit = ai + bt +  kaopenit +  xit + ✏it, (1)
where the subscript i refers to countries, while the subscript t refers to years.
iqit either stands for our aggregate institutional indicator or for one of its sub-
components, and kaopenit measures the degree of financial openness. Hence,
  is our main coe cient of interest. xit is a set of the control variables,
which are described below. ai and bt denote country and year fixed e↵ects
and ✏it is the usual unobservable error term. The estimation results are
based on robust standard errors, controlling for heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation of errors by clustering over countries.
Estimating the influence of de jure financial integration on institutional
performance, we assume that deregulation of capital controls is not a↵ected
by institutional quality itself. There are many studies examining the factors
behind the use and removal of capital controls. Reviewing the relevant litera-
ture, Eichengreen (2001) identifies macroeconomic drivers, such as exchange
rate regimes, domestic savings, tax revenues, and the degree of central banks’
independence. Ariyoshi et al. (2000) present a detailed descriptive survey of
the implementation and design of capital controls in 14 selected countries.
They conclude that despite cross-country di↵erences, general macroeconomic
characteristics and policies not only influence the decision to liberalize but
also the economic consequences of the financial liberalization. In a more re-
cent study, Brune and Guisinger (2007), on the contrary, argue that capital
account liberalization does not occur independently of the actions of other
87
countries but instead as a reaction to the global adoption of liberal economic
policies.12 These arguments support our view that financial liberalization is
exogenous with respect to the countries’ institutions. To account for the fact
that the e↵ect of financial liberalization potentially involves long-term pro-
cesses, we reduce the data frequency by using four-year averages in subsection
3.3.
Drawing on the insights from the literature presented in Section 2, we
control for the impact of the following variables on the institutional measure:
Institutions, which shape socio-economic interactions, are determined among
other things by the political environment. Therefore, we include two di↵erent
measures of political institutions in our set of control variables: One accounts
for the political regime and measures the level of democracy (demacc); the
other measures the degree of political stability (govstab). Both indicators
are also taken from ICRG. We also use an alternative democracy measure,
namely Polity II (polity) from the Polity IV project by Marshall et al. (2010).
While the ICRG democratic indicator measures the perception of account-
ability and responsiveness of the respective governments towards population,
Polity II is based on the measurement of democratic institutions, capturing
the electoral process, constraints on the executive power, and the degree
of civil liberties. We expect a positive influence from a stable as well as a
democratic political environment on institutions. To control for the influence
of the economic development and performance on the countries’ institutional
quality, xit additionally consists of the real per capita GDP (gdppc) as well as
of its growth rate (growth), both taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT)
provided by Heston et al. (2011). Again, the coe cients of both variables
are supposed to have positive signs. To take into account the obvious prob-
lem of reversed causality, we consider the one-period lagged values of the
respective variables. A further potential channel through which institutional
development might be positively a↵ected, is the accumulation of human cap-
ital. Our main measure here is the gross share of secondary school enroll-
ment in the total number of pupils in the respective year (school). This
data is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by
the World Bank (2011). Alternatively, we use the data by Barro and Lee
(2001) (bl school), which reports the average years of school attendance of
the total population aged over 25 years.13 Economic instability is supposed
12See also Simmons and Elkins (2004) and Chwieroth (2007) for similar arguments and
findings from a political science view. Similarly, Kobrin (2005) empirically shows that
the decision to liberalize in developing countries is primarily the result of competition for
foreign capital.
13Since the Barro and Lee (2001) data are only available every five years, we used
the values from a previous report as indicators for every subsequent year until the next
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to influence the governments’ structural policies and might, thereby, a↵ect
institutional development too. We capture this notion by introducing two
variables: the WDI data on inflation rate (inflat), to account for the conse-
quences of macroeconomic instability, and income inequality (inequal), using
the data of Galbraith and Kum (2005), to account for possible social ten-
sions. For both variables we expect to obtain a negative influence. As the
problem of endogeneity might also arise with respect to inequality as well
as the schooling variables, we use the observation of the preceding period
for the respective measure. Two more regressors are included in equation
(1): The first one is the PWT measure of trade openness (trade) – as a
sum of exports and imports relative to GDP in real terms – to control for
the hypothesis that beside financial openness, trade liberalization might also
influence institutional performance.14 And finally, there is a vast literature
on the (usually negative) impact of natural resources on economic but also
institutional development. Here we also use two alternative measures to cap-
ture this channel: One is the ratio of fuel exports to total exports (fuelex ),
and the second measure reflecting the ratio of agricultural exports (primex )
to total exports. Both measures stem from the WDI data bank. We take
the natural logarithm of all control variables – except for the Barro and
Lee (2001) schooling measure as well as the political indicators – because
of the extreme variation in each of the variables in our sample. Since some
of the data are not available for all countries and for the entire time span,
our sample is unbalanced and the number of observations depends on which
specification we choose in estimating the equation (1). Table V.26 in the
Appendix gives a detailed description of all data used in this paper with the
respective sources.
3.2 Results
Table V.1 presents the estimation results for equation (1), in which our ag-
gregate index of institutional quality is used as a dependent variable. The
results in the first five columns stem from regressions which are run over the
full sample, while columns 6-10 reproduce the previous five regressions for the
sample without high income countries: As has been previously mentioned,
the relationship between financial openness and institutional quality di↵ers
reported value. However, as mentioned, these data serve only to check our results that are
found with the WDI human capital measure.
14One might additionally control for the influence of a de jure measure of trade openness
introducing, e.g., the widely used indicator which is developed by Wacziarg and Welch
(2003). Due to the restricted data availability of this indicator, we stick to the de facto
trade openness measure.
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among di↵erent income groups. Furthermore, since including our measure
of income inequality in the regressions leads to a significant loss of obser-
vations, we run the baseline regressions without inequality, but introduce it
as an additional control variable in the second column. In column (3), we
replace the ICRG democracy measure by the polity index. In column (4),
the share of the primary exports in total exports is used instead of the share
of the fuel exports, while column (5) reproduces our baseline regression with
our alternative schooling measure taken from Barro and Lee (2001).
In all specifications, the coe cient of the kaopen index is significantly
positive, implying that a higher degree of financial openness leads, on aver-
age, to a better domestic institutional quality. Moreover, the statistical as
well as the economic significance of this variable is generally higher within
the sample of the emerging and developing countries. Turning to the influ-
ence of the control variables, most of the coe cients exhibit the expected
signs. A democratic regime as well as government stability has a positive
impact on economic institutions and are highly significant throughout all
specifications. Our baseline estimation results in both samples also confirm
the view that a higher level of economic development tends to improve insti-
tutional performance. The same is true for the influence of economic growth,
at least for emerging and developing countries. Also the notion that natural
resource abundance on average results in deteriorated institutional quality
can be verified by Table V.1. All other control variables do not have any
statistical relevance.
Through which institutional channel does the benign influence of the
financial openness on the institutional quality work? To answer this ques-
tion, in the next step we estimate equation (1) replacing iqit by each sub-
component of our institutional index. When using “investment profile” and
“corruption” as dependent variables, we additionally introduce two other
sub-components of the aggregate institutional index, namely “law and or-
der” and “bureaucratic quality”. The reason for doing this is the assumption
that the perceived expropriation risk as well as the extent of corruption is
a↵ected not only by the government system (which is captured by demacc or
polity), but also by the reliability and independency of the government au-
thorities. Note that, according to Table V.20, laword and burqua are strongly
correlated with iprof as well as with corrupt.
The first three columns of Table V.2 show the regression results with “in-
vestment profile” as a dependent variable. The results in column (1) stem
from our baseline specification. In column (2), laword and burqua are intro-
duced as additional control variables. Column (3) introduces further income
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inequality as an additional regressor.15 In all cases, the coe cient of kaopen
is positively significant, having a much larger value than the corresponding
estimate in Table V.1. Interestingly, the e↵ect of laword on the investment
environment is negatively significant, although all other explanatory variables
have the expected signs.16
In the next two columns, (4) and (5), the explained variable is “law and or-
der”, while in columns (6) and (7), this variable is replaced by “bureaucratic
quality”. In each case, we run the regression with and without the inequality
measure. Whereas there is no impact of financial openness on the quality
of judiciary institutions (“law and oder”), we see its positive significant in-
fluence (at the 90%-level) on the quality of the administrative institutions
(“bureaucratic quality”). Coming to the influence of financial liberalization
on the fourth institutional dimension, “corruption”, we do not obtain a con-
sistent picture. Therefore, we separately report the results of all regressions
with “corruption” as the dependent variable in Table V.3. Although always
negative, the coe cient of kaopen is only significant in column (5), where we
have introduced “law and order” and “bureaucratic quality” as additional
control variables (similar to the specification in Table V.2, column (2)). Fur-
thermore, it should be pointed out that the signs of some control variables
are quite surprising. For example, the coe cients of GDP per capita and
inflation indicate an opposite impact to what one would have expected, im-
plying that countries with less income and higher macroeconomic instability
tend to be less corrupt. However, a higher level of democracy as well as bet-
ter performance in other institutional dimensions tends to reduce the level of
corruption, while resource wealth increases it on average. Both observations
15Note that in all three specifications, the measure of schooling does not enter as a
lagged value into the respective estimation since it is quite unreasonable to believe that
expropriation risk, in its turn, might a↵ect the process of human capital accumulation.
We ran these as well as the following regressions with the specifications which were also
used in Table V.1: We controlled for the alternative measures of democracy, schooling,
and natural resource abundance. We also used a lagged value of the respective schooling
measure. Our qualitative results, in particular with respect to the kaopen index, did not
change.
16One possible explanation for this finding might be that due to high correlation between
laword and some other control variables, including laword in the estimation, its partial
explanatory power of the variation in “investment profile” becomes relatively marginal
but negatively significant. For example, running the regression in column (2) only with
kaopen, demacc, burqua, and laword as regressors led to a positive and significant coe cient
of the latter variable. However, as we additionally controlled for the e↵ect of government
stability, the coe cient of laword became negatively significant. The value of the adjusted
R2 in the specification with xit consisting of kaopen, demacc, burqua, and govstab was
0.46. Adding laword raised this value only to 0.47.
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are in line with our presumptions and other empirical studies as well.17
Certainly, all the results shown in Tables V.2 and V.3 might be driven
by the inclusion of developed countries. Hence, we repeate the estimations
which are described above, considering only middle and low income coun-
tries. Table V.4 presents the corresponding regression results. In the first
two columns “”investment profile” serves as a dependent variable, in columns
(3) and (4) we use “law and order” as iqit, in columns (5)–(7), iqit is replaced
by “bureaucratic quality”, and finally columns (8) and (9) report the esti-
mation results for “corruption” as being the dependent variable. The results
here generally confirm our insights gained from the regressions over the full
sample. Again, the impact of kaopen on “investment profile” is positive and
significant, while its influence on “law and order” cannot be determined.
We get a significant positive impact of financial openness on “bureaucratic
quality” once we use the polity measure for democracy instead of its ICRG
counterpart. This impact remains if we additionally control for income in-
equality. Once we controlled for the influence of the additional institutional
dimensions, “corruption” was negatively a↵ected by kaopen in the full sam-
ple, whereas here this influence disappears in the corresponding estimation.
Before we summarize our results from this section, we present all our
baseline results from estimating equation (1) for two additional subsamples.
First, by excluding high and upper middle income countries, we show that all
our previous results are also valid for developing countries, as demonstrated
by Table V.5. Financial openness positively influences the aggregate insti-
tutional quality. Moreover, we obtain here a higher value of the estimate
of kaopen than in the corresponding regressions with other samples: In this
sample,   = 0.12 and thus more than twice as high as within the full sample
(see column (1), Table V.1). That is, the relatively poorer countries tend
to benefit more from financial openness in terms of better institutional qual-
ity. Second, our results might be influenced by the large wave of political
liberalization which took place in the 1990s. Table V.6 presents therefore
the estimation results for a sample which does not contain former social-
ist countries.18 Again, the e↵ect of kaopen on the institutional quality is
17According to Serra (2006), higher GDP per capita, sound democratic institutions as
well as government stability reduce the level of corruption. Similar results can also be
found in Treisman (2000). However, controlling for country and year-specific fixed-e↵ects,
Tavares (2007) finds a negative relationship between corruption and GDP per capita, as in
our case. Since including fixed-e↵ects reduces the probability of the omitted time invariant
variables, these findings might be more appropriate.
18Table V.24 lists the corresponding countries. To control for the special circumstances
at that time, we also ran our regressions for two di↵erent sample periods: one which covered
the time before 1991, and the other a period after 1991. We could not consistently verify
the results presented in this section. These findings can be explained by the fact that most
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significantly positive. As previously, Tables V.5 and V.6 also show that in
both subsamples, the positive influence of financial openness mainly results
from its positive impact on the investment environment. In Table V.5, we
can also observe a positive impact of financial deregulation on the quality of
bureaucracy, while there is no e↵ect on the level of corruption and “law and
order”.19 Hence, we can summarize that our findings presented in this section
are robust to the selection of countries and alternative model specifications.
3.3 Estimation with Average Data
Although we could observe substantial variation in the institutional data as
well as in the kaopen-index within our time span for many countries (see Ta-
bles V.18 and V.19 for the summary statistics), there are also some countries
in which both indicators exhibit remarkable persistence over time. Moreover,
political changes, such as financial regulation, may need a su cient amount
of time to have an e↵ect on the institutional environment. Therefore, in
this subsection, we use yearly averaged data in order to capture potential
long-term processes. Particularly, for each variable we compute four-year
averages (1986–89, 1990–93, 1994-97, 1998-2001, 2002-05), while the initial
period (1984-85) covers only two years. Note that using yearly averaged data
additionally allows us to mitigate potential endogeneity problems with some
of our control variables more carefully: Having four-year averages and taking
lags of the respective variables from the previous period is a stronger tool to
control for reversed causality instead of operating with annual data in the
same way. In the following, we present our main results from estimating
equation (1) with averaged data, thereby proceeding in a similar way as in
the previous section.
Table V.7 reports our regression results with aggregate institutional qual-
ity as being the dependent variable for di↵erent samples. Particularly in
columns (1)-(3), the regressions are run over the full sample of countries,
while columns (4)-(6) reproduce the previous three regressions without high
income countries, and column (7) presents the baseline results for a sample
consisting only of developing countries. In addition to the estimation, which
of the countries had started to deregulate their financial accounts only since the 1990s and
that our entire time span begins with 1984.
19The results presented in Table V.5 remain stable if we use all alternative specifications
which we have introduced in this section. When excluding former socialist countries, we
also found a significant positive impact of kaopen on “bureaucratic quality” once we used
the polity measure for democracy instead. Moreover, the results in Table V.6 are based on
a sample of middle and low income countries. However, they do not qualitatively change
if we vary the composition of the sample with respect to the income groups.
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includes income inequality as an additional regressor – column (2) –, we also
report the results of a regression in which we use the Barro and Lee (2001)
schooling measure – column (3). This is the only specification in which the
estimate of kaopen is not significant. In all other cases, the results show a
positive significant influence of financial openness on institutional quality.20
Note that using the alternative schooling measure significantly reduces the
number of countries due to a lack of observations for this variable. The same
specification for a sample of middle and lower income countries (as well as for
a sample of low income countries only, which is not reported in Table V.7)
results in a significant coe cient of kaopen. Thus, we can state that even
when considering potential long-term processes, which might be in place in
shaping the institutional environment via financial liberalization, our results
derived from using annual data remain robust.
Can we draw the same conclusion with respect to the impact of financial
openness on the respective institutional dimension? Tables V.8 and V.9
present the corresponding results, verifying our findings from Section 3.2.
First, we estimate equation (1), using each of the four institutional sub-
components as a dependent variable over the full sample (Table V.8). In each
case, the regression is done with and without using the inequality measure as
an additional regressor. The results of other specifications are not reported,
since they do not change the general picture. Again, we can observe a high
statistically as well as economically significant e↵ect of financial openness on
“investment profile”. The coe cient of kaopen is also positively significant
in regressions which investigate the impact on “bureaucratic quality”.21 As
in our analysis with yearly data, there is no statistically significant e↵ect of
financial openness on the judiciary institutions. When having “corruption”
as a dependent variable, we get a significant negative coe cient of kaopen
only in a regression with two other institutional sub-components as additional
regressors and at the same time omitting the inequality variable. Repeating
the same exercise for the sample of emerging and developing countries and
for the developing countries only does not change our results, as shown by
Table V.9.
We can conclude that all our findings previously derived from using yearly
data are confirmed if we operate with annually averaged data instead. The
beneficial e↵ect of financial openness on the institutional environment is the
consequence of its substantial mitigating influence on the expropriation risk
20We ran all other regressions which are described in 3.2 for all samples.
21If we use the ICRG democracy measure instead of polity, the coe cient of kaopen
is also significant at the 90%-level and only significant at the 88%-level if inequality is
additionally introduced as a regressor. Remember, we obtained similar results operating
with yearly data – see Table V.2.
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in the countries under consideration.
4 Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence Estimation
The underlying assumption behind the fixed-e↵ects estimation in the pre-
vious section has been that the selection of the countries into those which
promote financial liberalization and those which do not is based on unob-
servable but fixed (time invariant) country characteristics. In this section,
we treat financial liberalization not as a gradual abolishment of restrictions
on foreign capital flows but as a single liberalization reform, and focus on
the direct consequences for the institutional environment which occur in the
aftermath of a financial liberalization. In particular, we compare the insti-
tutional development in countries which liberalized their financial account
with the institutional development of those countries which did not experi-
ence such liberalization reform. In doing so, we follow the empirical approach
of Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2008), who
implemented this strategy to estimate the causal e↵ect of democratic tran-
sition on economic performance. The basic idea is to define the event of a
reform – here financial liberalization – as a treatment which some countries
implemented during the sample period while some countries did not, and to
estimate the average causal e↵ect of this treatment on the institutional en-
vironment by employing the di↵erence-in-di↵erence methodology. Thus, we
aim to exploit di↵erences in institutional performance before and after the
treatment within the group of treated countries as well as these di↵erences
across the treated and non-treated, i.e., the control, group. Following this
approach allows us to control for additional circumstances which may trigger
liberalization reforms and influence institutional performance, further taking
into account time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity between countries.
4.1 Methodology and Implementation
Implementing the di↵erence-in-di↵erence methodology, we estimate the fol-
lowing regression:
iqit = ai + bt +  finlibit +  xit + ✏it, (2)
where in comparison to equation (1), the variable kaopen is replaced by the
variable finlib that stands for the liberalization reform and hence captures
the treatment. It is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 in the years
after the treatment and 0 otherwise, i.e., in the treated countries before the
95
reform and in the control countries during the entire time span. The coe -
cient   therefore captures the causal e↵ect of our interest: It measures the
e↵ect of financial liberalization by comparing the di↵erence in institutional
quality before and after the treatment in the treated countries to the change
in institutional environment in the control group during the sample period.22
We construct our treatment dummy using the kaopen index for financial
openness from the previous section. Particularly, we consider all countries
as financially liberalized if their kaopen values are positive. Accordingly, a
strictly negative kaopen value indicates that the corresponding country is fi-
nancially closed. Thus, the variable finlib takes the value of 1 if a country be-
comes financially open, given that it was closed in the previous period. Note
that the mean value of the kaopen index is around 0 (see Table V.18). Below
we present some more observations and arguments in support of our treat-
ment choice. However, this specification of the liberalization reform leads to
some di culties. Firstly, some liberalization reforms took place at the very
end of our sample period. Taking into account that the reform requires some
time to have an e↵ect on institutional quality, we consider all liberalization
events as treatments only if we have observations for at least three years in
the post liberalization period. For example, in Brazil the kaopen index be-
comes positive only in 2005, i.e., in the last year of our sample period. This
country is considered as never having liberalized its financial account, i.e., as
a non-treated country. Secondly, some countries, especially in Latin Amer-
ica, experienced reform reversals: they became financially open and then
again restricted foreign capital flows thereby becoming financially closed.23
Argentina is a typical example for this kind of reform pattern. We implement
two di↵erent options when constructing the treatment dummy: In the first
case – denoted by finlibp–, we consider only permanent reforms, i.e., without
any reversal, as a treatment. That is, when running a regression with finlibp
22When using the di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach to estimate the e↵ect of a single
political reform, which has been implemented by a certain group of states at the same
time, observations are collected at two points of time: before and after the treatment.
In this case, the di↵erence-in-di↵erence regression is done by estimating an equation like:
yit = ↵+ Di+ dt+ (Di ·dt)+✏it, where y is an outcome measure, Di is a dummy which
takes the value of 1 in a treated state and dt is a time dummy that takes the value of 1 if
the observation is obtained in the post treatment period.   measures then the causal e↵ect
of the respective reform. If, however, reforms do not take place in all states at the same
time, then the corresponding regression can be written as yit =  i+ t+  Dit+ ✏it, where
Dit indicates treatment states in post treatment periods. This is a general formulation of
the estimation model and is similar to equation (2). See Angrist and Pischke (2009), ↵.
233 and ↵. 315, and Wooldridge (2002), ↵. 254.
23Both issues also arise in the work by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), and are treated
in a similar way.
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Argentina, for example, is used as a control country. In the second option,
a reform is considered as a treatment if there was not a reversal for at least
three years succeeding the reform. We denote the corresponding treatment
variable as finlibt thereby expressing temporary liberalization events. In the
case of Argentina, finlibt takes the value of 1 only from 1993 on to 2001,
the year in which the country’s kaopen index became and remained negative
until the end of the sample period. Ecuador, for example, also experienced
multiple reform events (in 1993, 1998, and 2003), but none lasting more than
three years. Therefore this country, in contrast to Argentina, is considered as
a control country in both options. Table V.22 lists all countries which imple-
mented a liberalization reform at least once, with the corresponding dates.
According to our specification of the financial reform, most of the treatment
dates are concentrated in the mid/end of the 1990s. This is not surprising
against the historical background of the massive liberalization waves, which
had started in most of the emerging and developing countries since 1990
(this is also consistent with the findings by Chinn and Ito 2008). As shown
in Figure V.2 in the Appendix, the mean kaopen index for the full sample
of countries crosses the zero-line in about 1995, while the intercept of this
line for the middle and low income countries lies at the beginning of 2000.
Additionally, Table V.23 presents the list of the non-treated countries, i.e.,
those ones which always remained open or closed during the observation time
span. Treated and control groups are not only quite heterogenous, consisting
of developed as well as developing countries, but relatively similar countries
are also represented in both country groups: We have, for example, the Czech
Republic, Paraguay, and Denmark as treated countries and the Slovak Re-
public, Uruguay, and Sweden as non-treated ones. Note further that most
of the permanently open nations belong to the group of high income coun-
tries, while the group of permanently closed countries consists of relatively
poor economies. All these observations assure us that our specification of the
treatment is an appropriate choice and reflects real historical experiences.
According to Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Persson and Tabellini
(2006, 2008), two key assumptions underly the estimation methodology be-
hind equation (2). The first one requires that without the liberalization
reform the trend in institutional development in treated countries should
have been the same as in the control countries conditional on observable
characteristics (xit). This is violated if, for example, financial liberalization
coincides with other processes – such as political reforms or transformation
of former socialist countries – which may influence the long-run institutional
development. The second assumption states that the division into two groups
– treated and control – occurs randomly, i.e., there are no common factors
which determine the occurrence of the reforms and have causal e↵ects on the
97
performance. Following the literature, we implement di↵erent strategies in
dealing with these assumptions.
We include dummies for di↵erent regions – Asia and Pacific, Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean Islands, Subsaharan Africa, Western Europe and
North America as well as North Africa and the Middle East – and a dummy
for socialist legal origin interacting the respective dummy with year fixed ef-
fects in all our regressions.24 This enables us to capture institutional changes
which might arise due to some time and regional specificities. To control for
the fact that financial liberalization might have been accompanied by other
processes, which in their turn might influence institutional performance, we
introduce two more interaction dummies. First, we interact our respective
treatment dummy with the dummy for socialist legal origin to take into
account the special circumstances of the transformation of former socialist
countries. The corresponding interaction term is denoted by soc · finlibj
j 2 p, t. Second, we create a treatment dummy for political liberalization
in a similar way as we did for financial liberalization, and following Giavazzi
and Tabellini (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2008). In particular, a
country is considered to have experienced a transition towards more democ-
racy if its polity indicator switched from a negative to a positive value in the
sample period. This dummy is then interacted with the respective finlib-
variable to control for the possible influence of democratization processes
which might have taken place during financial liberalization: pollib · finlibj
j 2 p, t. For each specification which includes both these interaction terms,
we calculate the marginal e↵ect of finlibj j 2 p, t by using the sample means
of the dummies indicating political liberalization and socialist legal origin,
respectively. Furthermore, we use for each regression two alternative specifi-
cations of the control group: One consisting of countries which have always
remained either financially open or financially closed, the other consisting of
financially closed countries only.
For each estimation we report the t-statistics, which are calculated with
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors as well as the t-values result-
ing from clustered regressions, which additionally control for possible serial
correlation of errors at the country level. In most of the cases, previously
significant e↵ects of the corresponding treatment variables become statisti-
cally insignificant, once we use clustered regressions. Apparently, our findings
are not robust against possible correlations within country groups and over
time. This is less surprising against the background that the adoption of
24The data on the countries’ judiciary systems stem from La-Porta et al. (1999). This
interaction term is included to capture the peculiarities of the former socialist countries
in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.
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liberal economic policies tends to be clustered both temporally and spatially.
As we mentioned above, most of the liberalization reforms are concentrated
in the 1990s (see also literature review in Section 2). That is, there might not
be su cient variation in the treatment terms within country groups. In that
case, country-clustered regressions would result in too high standard errors
(see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, ↵. 308).25 In the following, we therefore
also address the findings which are not statistically significant with clustered
estimations.
4.2 Results
Table V.10 presents the estimation results of equation (2) with our aggre-
gate institutional index institute as a dependent variable and where only
permanent liberalization is considered as a treatment (finlibp). In the first
three columns, we use the full sample of countries, while in columns (4)-(6),
the same regressions are done for a sample without the countries which have
always been financially open during the sample period. Column (1) reports
the results of our baseline specification, while in column (2) we replace the
polity variable by the interaction dummy, which captures the simultaneity
of the political and financial liberalization (pollib · finlibp) and additionally
introduced the interaction term soc ·finlibp to capture financial deregulation
in former socialist countries. Column (3) introduces the inequality measure
as an additional covariate.26
We observe a significant positive impact of the financial liberalization re-
form on institutional quality in both of our basic specifications. Moreover,
the impact of a single permanent liberalization reform in the full sample is
more than twice as large as the corresponding e↵ect of a gradual financial
deregulation (see column (1) in Table V.1). If we additionally control for
the influence of the simultaneous democratization and transition of socialist
countries, the isolated e↵ect of financial liberalization becomes weaker and
even insignificant when only closed countries are used as a control group. The
influence of the variable pollib ·finlibp, in turn, remains positively significant
throughout all specifications, implying that if financial liberalization is sup-
ported by democratization, these reforms have a stronger positive e↵ect on
25As Angrist and Pischke (2009) point out, when using clustered data, a su ciently
large number of cluster and time series observations are required in order to obtain the
asymptotic covariance matrix (see p. 294). They additionally stress that ”...the question
of how best to approach the serial correlation problem is currently under study, and a
consensus has not yet emerged“ (p. 318).
26As in Section 3, we do not include inequality in our baseline specification because of
a lack of data on this measure.
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institutional quality. By contrast, the coe cient of the interaction dummy
soc ·finlibp is negatively significant, indicating that financial deregulation in
former socialist states has even resulted in a deteriorated institutional qual-
ity. Note that almost all of these countries are Eastern European countries
and former Soviet republics, respectively. These findings, hence, confirm the
view that although the former or current transition countries have experi-
enced rapid economic prosperity, they have benefited less from liberalization
in terms of better institutions. The marginal e↵ect of the financial liberal-
ization reform is significantly positive. Including inequality as an additional
control variable eliminates the positive e↵ect of the financial reform com-
pletely. While the e↵ect of pollib · finlibp remains positively significant, the
coe cient of soc ·finlibp in column (6) becomes positive too. However, these
findings are biased due to the sample selection since for almost all countries
with socialist legal origin we do not have the inequality data, and therefore
these countries are not considered in the corresponding estimations.
Turning to the impact of other covariates, we generally get a familiar
picture: sound and democratic political regimes as well as higher income
level and degree of trade openness are associated with better institutional
quality, whereas macroeconomic instability in terms of high inflation and
large oil and gas exports tend to lead to a worsening of institutions.
Investigating the influence of the temporary financial reforms, i.e., using
finlibt as an independent variable, confirms our general findings from above.
Table V.11, which is constructed in a similar way to Table V.10, presents the
corresponding results. We find a positive e↵ect of the liberalization reform
on the institutional performance in the baseline estimation. This e↵ect di-
minishes and becomes statistically insignificant once we additionally include
the interaction dummies pollib · finlibt and soc · finlibt. Again, economic
opening in combination with political liberalization improves institutional
quality, while having socialist legal origin results in a negative impact of
financial opening on institutional performance.
What is the e↵ect of the financial liberalization on each of the institutional
dimensions? As in Section 3, we estimate equation (2), gradually replacing
iqit with each of the institutional sub-components. Table V.12 reports the
estimation results with “investment profile” as a dependent variable. In
the first two columns, we use financially always open as well as financially
always closed countries as a non-treated group, while in columns (3) and
(4), only always closed countries serve as a control group. The subsequent
four columns present the regression results in the same pattern with the
temporary treatment. Accordingly, the next three tables are constructed in
a similar way for “law and order” (Table V.13), “bureaucratic quality” (Table
V.14), and “corruption” (Table V.15).
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In the previous section, we found that the positive influence of the fi-
nancial liberalization on the institutional performance is the consequence of
its benign e↵ect on the investment environment and – quantitatively less
stronger e↵ect – on ”bureaucratic quality”. Employing the di↵erence-in-
di↵erence methodology, liberalization reform again has its strongest e↵ect
on the investment environment. Here the results remain even robust within
clustered regressions throughout all specifications. Moreover, the quantita-
tive e↵ect is much higher than the influence of kaopen on this institutional
dimension (see Table V.2). Simultaneous political liberalization has no ad-
ditional e↵ect on iprof , while the coe cient of soc · finlibj j 2 p, t is signif-
icantly negative. However, the marginal e↵ect of the permanent as well as
temporary financial reform on the investment environment remains signifi-
cantly positive. We can draw nearly identical conclusions for the impact of
liberalization reforms on the administrative institutions. Interestingly and
in contrast to our findings from the previous section, liberalization reform
negatively influences the quality of the legal system if we consider only fi-
nancially always closed countries as a control group (i.e., basically excluding
high income countries). Even including both interaction terms results in a
negatively significant marginal e↵ect of the reform in this case. Finally, finan-
cial deregulation negatively a↵ects the corruption index, while its influence
in combination with political liberalization on this institutional dimension
is positive. (Remember, in the previous section, we obtained a negative but
insignificant influence of kaopen on “corruption” in almost all specifications.)
A possible explanation for these results might be as follows: As suggested
by Bartolini and Drazen (1997), financial opening is interpreted by investors
as a signal for better protection of property rights, which results in a reduc-
tion of the perceived investment risks. Furthermore, bearing in mind that
the measure of financial openness captures inward as well as outward trans-
actions, liberalization implies a potential risk for capital outflows. Structural
policies targeting an improvement of investment environment might then be
implemented to compensate for this e↵ect. The positive e↵ect of the financial
liberalization on the “bureaucratic quality” supports this argument. Higher
values for this institutional dimension imply that administrative authorities
have a higher degree of autonomy from political pressure and are able to
e↵ectively provide the necessary services. This also helps in establishing a
better climate for business activities. In this context, the finding that dereg-
ulation reforms in socialist countries have resulted in deterioration of these
institutional dimensions can be interpreted as a lack of confidence that new
democratic governments can provide deep going structural reforms within an
appropriate period. Since socialist institutions could not meet the require-
ments for arms-length operations, rising challenges make them even worse.
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However, the non-existent and even negative influence of financial lib-
eralization on “law and order” in some of the specifications is somewhat
contra-intuitive: one might have also expected a positive impact on the in-
dependency and strength of the judiciary system. Yet, we also found an un-
expected negative relationship between this institutional sub-component and
investment profile. Although this finding might also be seen as an indication
for a further consistency of our results, it is hard to find a plausible expla-
nation for this relationship. Additionally, financial liberalization tends to
stimulate corruption. This is less surprising, as one might think of increased
rent-seeking activities as a consequence of economic openness. Remember,
the corruption measure employed in our analysis does not simply capture il-
legal financial payments to authorities but also personal ties between private
and state interests. Increased opportunities resulting from financial openness
might open the door to increased nepotism and patronage. By contrast, if
economic liberalization is supported by simultaneous democratization, these
institutional malfunctions can be prevented, as our findings suggest. Analyz-
ing the e↵ects of trade liberalization, Tavares (2007) provides similar results
and arguments: According to his findings, trade liberalization raises corrup-
tion, whereas if trade opening is followed by democratization, the corruption
level decreases.27
4.3 An Alternative Specification of the Liberalization
Reform
The results presented so far have been based on the assumption that the
variable finlib in equation (2) takes the value of 1 if a country’s kaopen
indicator becomes positive, given it was negative in the previous year. Now
we test our previous findings by using an alternative specification of the
liberalization reform and defining a treatment as a change in the value of
kaopen, regardless of its sign. In particular, the dummy finlib is now defined
as follows:
finlibc =
(
1 if kaopenit   kaopenit 1     and kaopenit+k   kaopenit 1 + 
0 else,
27In contrast, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) find that the isolated e↵ects of trade as well
as of political liberalization on the corruption level are negative, and if countries undergo
both processes, these e↵ects are stronger. Both works use the data provided by Wacziarg
and Welch (2003) on de jure trade liberalization. However, as already mentioned (see
footnote 10), this data is only available until 2000. Since most of the financial liberalization
reforms are concentrated in the mid/late of 1990s, additionally controlling for the e↵ect
of the trade liberalization with the data provided by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) left us
with insu cient numbers of observation in the post treatment period.
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where k 2 {1, 2, ..., T   t}, and T denotes the last year in the sample period.
The index “c” indicates that a liberalization reform now refers to a change
in the value of kaopen. That is, according to our definition, a liberalization
reform occurs if kaopeni increases at least by   at time t, and there is not
a reversal in all subsequent years until the end of the sample. We choose
  = 0.86, which approximately corresponds to the average within-country
standard deviation of the kaopen variable in our sample (see Table V.18).28
Any increase in kaopen that occurs in the last two years of the sample period
is not treated as a reform. To illustrate the conception of the treatment
dummy on an example, consider the case of Botswana: in 1987, the country’s
kaopen value rises from -1.148 to 0.097, i.e., by more than 0.86. However,
until 1996 this value falls to - 1.84, jumps to -0.79 in the next year and
has been continuously increasing since then. Therefore, for Botswana, the
variable finlibc takes the value of 1 from 1997 to 2005, and 0 from 1984 to
1996.
Tables V.16 and V.17 present our estimation results. In contrast to the
results from section 4.2, there is not a positive e↵ect of the liberalization
reform on the aggregate institutional quality. However, as previously, the
coe cient of the interaction term pollib · finlibc is positively significant.29
When looking at the influence of the reform on each institutional dimension,
we find a familiar picture. We observe a positive and significant e↵ect of the
reform on the investment environment and a negative e↵ect on the corruption
level. Yet, in the latter case, there is a again a positive influence of finan-
cial liberalization if it is accompanied with political liberalization, although
the marginal e↵ect of finlibc remains negatively significant. Furthermore,
we cannot observe any e↵ect of the reform on “law and order” and on the
“bureaucratic quality”.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to estimate the causal e↵ect of de jure financial
liberalization on institutional quality. We used annual data of the so-called
kaopen index, which measures the degree of financial openness, and an aggre-
gate institutional index, covering investment risks, level of corruption, legal
institutions as well as administrative e↵ectiveness. Having a sample of more
28Alternatively, we also set   = 0.26, which is slightly less than the smallest increase in
the value of kaopeni that we could observe within our time span. Our findings here did
not di↵er significantly from the results obtained by assuming   = 0.86. By contrast, they
were in general even statistically stronger.
29The dummy pollib indicates as previously a switch in the sign of the polity variable.
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than 110 countries and a time span from 1984–2005, we first employed fixed–
e↵ects estimation. Here, we showed that financial liberalization improves
aggregate institutional quality, the main influence resulting from a benign
impact on investment risks. Our results were robust, regardless of model
specification and sample selection. To control for a possible long lasting ef-
fect of financial liberalization on institutional performance and for potential
persistence in institutional as well as in financial openness data, we employed
the same methodology, using annually averaged data. We could confirm all
our results.
Applying fixed-e↵ects estimations, we considered financial liberalization
as a gradual process of deregulation of controls on foreign capital movements.
In the next section, we considered financial liberalization as a single reform,
and estimated its average causal e↵ect by comparing the institutional perfor-
mance in countries which administered liberalization reforms (treated group)
with the same indicator in countries without this experience (control group).
In general, we could confirm our findings derived from the fixed-e↵ects esti-
mations, obtaining even stronger quantitative impacts: Promoting financial
liberalization leads to a better institutional quality. Additionally, we could
show that these positive e↵ects are even larger if financial integration is ac-
companied by political liberalization. By contrast, the consequence of finan-
cial integration in countries with a socialist legal origin was a deterioration
of institutional quality. Again, the positive influence of the deregulation re-
form proved to be mainly due to its benign impact on the investment risks.
However, we could also detect a negative impact of financial integration on
the corruption index. We suggested that financial opening is interpreted by
investors as a signal to provide better protection of property rights by local
governments, which results in a lower perception of expropriation risks. On
the contrary, our findings verify predictions, according to which economic
liberalization might provide a ground for rent-seeking activities, thereby in-
creasing the level of corruption.
Our work on the e↵ect of liberalization reform o↵ers some scope for ex-
tensions and improvement. Although historically in most of the cases, po-
litical liberalization and transition of former socialist states have gone along
with economic liberalization, there might be more precise tools to detect
those reform processes which might have accompanied financial deregulation
and thereby influenced structural development. With relative comprehen-
sive data, one could, for example, explicitly control for the parallel e↵ects of
trade liberalization. In this context, a further possibility might be to take
into account the e↵ects of participation on IMF programs which generally
commit the participating countries to implement comprehensive structural
reform. At a more disaggregate level, considering specific political programs,
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such as an anti corruption campaign or liberalization of civil rights, may also
throw more light on this issue.
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Appendix A: Estimation Results
Fixed-E↵ects Estimations
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Table V.2: Financial Openness and Institutional Dimensions: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
kaopen 0.338*** 0.325*** 0.219** 0.006 0.085 0.061* 0.056*
(3.80) (3.53) (2.09) (0.10) (1.31) (1.75) (1.73)
demacc 0.217* 0.247** 0.099 0.172*** 0.217*** 0.182*** 0.186***
(1.86) (2.14) (0.86) (2.90) (2.97) (4.52) (3.75)
govstab 0.429*** 0.466*** 0.580*** 0.098*** 0.071** 0.013 0.023
(10.24) (10.93) (12.73) (3.80) (2.24) (0.69) (1.22)
gdppc(-1) 2.717*** 3.015*** 1.009 0.830* 1.417** 0.120 0.144
(3.59) (4.34) (1.51) (1.95) (2.62) (0.54) (0.55)
growth(-1) 0.092** 0.086** 0.170*** -0.016 -0.035 -0.002 -0.0134
(2.19) (2.05) (3.72) (-0.85) (-1.35) (-0.17) (-0.86)
inflat -0.099 -0.117 -0.069 -0.051 -0.063 -0.037* -0.033
(-1.24) (-1.65) (-0.80) (-0.98) (-1.05) (-1.87) (-1.57)
trade(-1) 1.142*** 0.984*** 0.128 -0.344 -0.303 0.054 0.131
(2.96) (2.66) (0.27) (-1.19) (-0.80) (0.39) (0.84)
school -0.419 -0.362 -0.360
(-0.78) (-0.66) (-0.56)
fuelex 0.214* 0.207 -0.034 -0.065 0.054 -0.083* -0.009
(1.66) (1.63) (-0.19) (-1.04) (0.56) (-1.92) (-0.13)
laword -0.411*** -0.338***
(-4.58) (-3.23)
burqua 0.192 0.248
(1.02) (1.00)
inequal(-1) 1.434** 1.297* -0.153
(2.20) (1.78) (-0.51)
school(-1) -0.008 -0.072 -0.021 0.023
(-0.02) (-0.15) (-0.08) (0.11)
N 1482 1482 892 1473 892 1473 892
Countries 113 113 92 112 91 112 91
Adj.R2 0.522 0.543 0.530 0.143 0.236 0.199 0.248
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The data sample includes all
countries. In columns (1)–(3) the dependent variable is iprof ; in columns (3) & (4) – laword ; in
columns (6) & (7) – burqua. All regressions include country as well as year dummies. By country
clustered standard errors are reported.
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Table V.3: Financial Openness and Corruption: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
kaopen -0.065 -0.039 -0.031 -0.027 -0.085** -0.076
(-1.59) (-0.84) (-0.73) (-0.63) (-2.11) (-1.62)
demacc 0.190*** 0.224*** 0.208*** 0.094* 0.116*
(3.62) (3.47) (4.34) (1.86) (1.84)
govstab 0.033 -0.004 0.021 0.012 0.002 -0.027
(1.39) (-0.18) (0.94) (0.51) (0.28) (-1.44)
gdppc(-1) -0.915*** -0.493 -0.955** -0.702* -1.143*** -0.871
(-2.73) (-0.88) (-2.26) (-1.86) (-3.37) (-1.59)
growth(-1) 0.014 0.017 0.022 0.030 0.018 0.029
(0.71) (0.80) (0.98) (1.62) (0.96) (1.39)
inflat 0.079* 0.067 0.080* 0.044 0.102** 0.092*
(1.76) (1.27) (1.74) (0.92) (2.54) (1.84)
trade(-1) -0.638*** -0.386 -0.481** -0.661*** -0.576*** -0.354*
(-3.18) (-1.58) (-2.20) (-3.04) (-3.04) (-1.68)
school(-1) -0.524* -0.342 -0.504* -0.516* -0.332
(-1.71) (-0.67) (-1.70) (-1.71) (-0.69)
fuelex -0.224** -0.046 -0.080* -0.148*** -0.184* -0.056
(-2.34) (-0.66) (-1.71) (-3.72) (-1.75) (-0.88)
inequal(-1) -0.426 -0.685
(-0.63) (-1.32)
polity 0.019
(1.12)
bl school(-1) -0.140
(-1.50)
laword 0.229*** 0.236***
(4.94) (3.96)
burqua 0.307*** 0.304***
(3.87) (3.47)
N 1473 892 1419 1534 1473 892
Countries 112 91 108 92 112 91
Adj.R2 0.227 0.121 0.184 0.197 0.327 0.244
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The data sample
includes all countries. The dependent variable is corrupt. All regressions include
country as well as year dummies. By country clustered standard errors are reported.
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Table V.5: Financial Openness and Institutions: Developing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
kaopen 0.121*** 0.413*** 0.028 0.140** -0.041
(2.77) (3.70) (0.33) (2.36) (-0.83)
demacc 0.148*** 0.282** 0.090 0.140*** 0.071
(3.47) (2.42) (1.18) (2.79) (1.25)
govstab 0.090*** 0.308*** 0.166*** 0.007 -0.005
(4.00) (5.56) (5.06) (0.22) (-0.16)
gdppc(-1) 0.067 1.450** 0.525 -0.115 -0.869*
(0.32) (2.09) (1.23) (-0.35) (-1.99)
growth(-1) 0.035* 0.100** 0.028 0.020 0.011
(1.92) (2.00) (1.03) (0.91) (0.44)
inflat -0.024 -0.193** -0.041 -0.009 0.067
(-0.81) (-2.24) (-0.70) (-0.39) (1.56)
trade(-1) 0.068 0.286 0.175 0.155 -0.356
(0.36) (0.60) (0.55) (0.80) (-1.34)
school(-1) -0.216 -0.293 -0.044 -0.663*
(-0.84) (-0.64) (-0.12) (-1.76)
fuelex -0.112* 0.038 -0.203** -0.089 -0.039
(-1.98) (0.21) (-2.06) (-1.12) (-0.62)
laword -0.038 0.206***
(-0.35) (3.49)
burqua 0.165 0.351***
(0.78) (3.54)
school 0.714
(1.21)
N 661 666 661 661 661
Countries 61 62 61 61 61
Adj.R2 0.355 0.499 0.230 0.140 0.258
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
data sample includes low income countries. In column (1) the dependent
variable is institute; in column (2) – iprof ; in column (3) – laword ; in
column (4) – burqua; in column (5) – corrupt. All regressions include
country as well as year dummies. By country clustered standard errors
are reported.
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Table V.6: Financial Openness and Institutions: Excluding Former Socialist
Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
kaopen 0.080** 0.344*** 0.010 0.072 -0.026
(2.36) (3.61) (0.14) (1.44) (-0.63)
demacc 0.193*** 0.316*** 0.110 0.220*** 0.065
(5.11) (2.89) (1.48) (3.80) (1.47)
govstab 0.095*** 0.317*** 0.144*** 0.025 0.007
(4.70) (5.99) (4.85) (0.86) (0.24)
gdppc(-1) 0.178 1.865*** 0.101 0.278 -0.943**
(0.83) (2.80) (0.17) (0.82) (-2.36)
growth(-1) 0.023 0.062 0.026 -0.002 0.028
(1.52) (1.39) (1.11) (-0.08) (1.41)
inflat -0.043 -0.167** -0.085 -0.037 0.075
(-1.53) (-2.18) (-1.53) (-1.41) (1.60)
trade(-1) 0.006 0.050 0.077 0.136 -0.364
(0.04) (0.12) (0.22) (0.80) (-1.61)
school(-1) -0.265 -0.172 -0.222 -0.849**
(-1.16) (-0.37) (-0.72) (-2.45)
fuelex -0.092* 0.119 -0.175* -0.073 -0.061
(-1.80) (0.82) (-1.68) (-1.00) (-1.03)
laword -0.100 0.211***
(-1.04) (4.67)
burqua 0.292 0.293***
(1.51) (3.33)
school 1.105**
(2.06)
N 788 791 788 788 788
Countries 66 67 66 66 66
Adj.R2 0.390 0.541 0.181 0.205 0.288
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
data sample includes middle and low income countries excluding former
socialist countries. In column (1) the dependent variable is institute; in
column (2) – iprof ; in column (3) – laword ; in column (4) – burqua;
in column (5) – corrupt. All regressions include country as well as year
dummies. By country clustered standard errors are reported.
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Table V.7: Financial Openness and Institutional Quality: Average Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
kaopen 0.065** 0.073** 0.058 0.090** 0.110*** 0.088* 0.116**
(2.12) (2.28) (1.57) (2.40) (2.72) (1.88) (2.32)
demacc 0.196*** 0.205*** 0.222*** 0.186*** 0.209*** 0.219*** 0.145***
(5.72) (6.67) (6.66) (4.22) (4.94) (5.12) (2.68)
govstab 0.103*** 0.113*** 0.0925*** 0.100*** 0.115*** 0.100*** 0.100***
(6.17) (6.38) (5.34) (4.67) (4.84) (4.64) (3.77)
gdppc(-1) 0.321* 0.467* 0.350 0.160 0.371 0.187 -0.077
(1.72) (1.92) (1.56) (0.65) (1.11) (0.69) (-0.26)
growth(-1) 0.017 0.015 0.048 0.008 -0.000 0.042 0.043
(0.57) (0.47) (1.49) (0.21) (-0.01) (1.01) (1.00)
inflat -0.004 0.001 -0.010 -0.017 -0.027 -0.020 -0.020
(-0.10) (0.03) (-0.18) (-0.33) (-0.58) (-0.31) (-0.31)
trade(-1) -0.241 -0.287 -0.320* -0.279 -0.316 -0.343* -0.220
(-1.33) (-1.57) (-1.86) (-1.30) (-1.46) (-1.70) (-0.72)
school(-1) -0.259 -0.211 -0.262 -0.261 -0.209
(-1.23) (-0.77) (-1.04) (-0.70) (-0.77)
fuelex -0.103*** -0.0339 -0.098** -0.094 -0.052 -0.097 -0.126**
(-2.70) (-0.41) (-2.15) (-1.61) (-0.53) (-1.61) (-2.03)
inequal(-1) -0.442 -0.767*
(-1.16) (-1.90)
bl school(-1) -0.005 -0.070
(-0.08) (-0.83)
N 434 352 408 295 224 269 216
Countries 114 98 93 84 69 64 62
Adj.R2 0.387 0.430 0.400 0.350 0.410 0.377 0.334
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is institute.
The data sample consists of four- year averages (1986-90;...;2002-2005) while the initial period (1984-
85) covers only two years. Columns (1)–(3) include the full sample, columns (4)-(6) include middle
and low income countries, column (7) low income countries only. All regressions include country as
well as year dummies. By country clustered standard errors are reported.
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Table V.8: Financial Openness and Institutional Dimensions: Average Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
kaopen 0.294** 0.330** 0.0528 0.0444 0.107** 0.108** -0.094* -0.067
(2.56) (2.53) (0.87) (0.71) (2.39) (2.27) (-1.89) (-1.41)
demacc 0.313** 0.219 0.195*** 0.206*** 0.057 0.058
(2.39) (1.50) (3.37) (3.06) (0.94) (0.98)
govstab 0.530*** 0.548*** 0.164*** 0.171*** -0.006 0.011 0.004 0.001
(10.55) (10.05) (5.37) (4.60) (-0.24) (0.32) (0.12) (0.05)
laword -0.402*** -0.458*** 0.194*** 0.221***
(-4.12) (-4.12) (3.76) (4.67)
burqua 0.186 0.230 0.355*** 0.356***
(1.01) (1.14) (4.16) (3.71)
gdppc(-1) 2.132*** 2.162*** 0.791** 1.262*** 0.293 0.379 -1.016*** -0.839**
(3.08) (2.84) (2.19) (3.11) (0.86) (0.79) (-2.79) (-2.17)
growth(-1) 0.278*** 0.240*** -0.050 -0.052 0.012 0.004 -0.077* -0.055
(4.16) (3.09) (-0.88) (-0.80) (0.36) (0.10) (-1.72) (-1.29)
inflat -0.279* -0.084 -0.026 -0.027 -0.018 -0.023 0.118 0.126*
(-1.72) (-0.51) (-0.30) (-0.25) (-0.39) (-0.42) (1.57) (1.84)
trade(-1) 0.908* 1.144* -0.813*** -0.926*** 0.173 0.166 -0.716** -0.739***
(1.70) (1.96) (-2.95) (-3.02) (0.76) (0.54) (-2.41) (-3.47)
school -0.370 -0.151
(-0.59) (-0.23)
fuelex 0.472*** 0.514* -0.152 -0.125 -0.146* -0.063 -0.146 -0.049
(2.93) (1.96) (-1.65) (-1.11) (-1.78) (-0.32) (-1.00) (-0.43)
inequal(-1) 1.690 -0.773 -0.547 -0.686
(1.18) (-1.01) (-1.14) (-1.35)
school(-1) -0.542 -0.290 -0.242 -0.349 -0.542 -0.830*
(-1.31) (-0.57) (-0.82) (-0.90) (-1.59) (-1.82)
polity 0.022 0.033
(1.07) (1.32)
N 435 352 434 352 416 337 434 352
Countries 113 99 114 98 110 94 114 98
Adj.R2 0.629 0.649 0.188 0.198 0.0973 0.103 0.391 0.417
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The data sample consists of four- year
averages (1986-90;...; 2002-2005), while the initial period (1984-85) covers only two years and includes all
countries. In columns (1) & (2) the dependent variable is iprof ; in columns (3) & (4) – laword ; in columns
(5) & (6) – burqua; in columns (7) & (8) – corrupt. All regressions include country as well as year dummies.
By country clustered standard errors are reported.
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Table V.9: Financial Openness and Institutional Dimensions: Average Data
Middle and Low Income Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
kaopen 0.313** 0.038 0.085 -0.020 0.283** 0.054 0.152** -0.027
(2.49) (0.55) (1.58) (-0.39) (2.17) (0.63) (2.25) (-0.41)
demacc 0.409*** 0.117* 0.211*** -0.009 0.328** 0.138 0.131** 0.015
(3.29) (1.76) (3.24) (-0.14) (2.65) (1.67) (2.25) (0.20)
govstab 0.374*** 0.206*** -0.014 -0.015 0.379*** 0.240*** -0.033 -0.046
(6.72) (6.30) (-0.48) (-0.42) (6.35) (6.35) (-0.94) (-1.03)
laword -0.198* 0.233*** -0.045 0.246***
(-1.76) (5.04) (-0.37) (4.35)
burqua 0.213 0.372*** 0.293 0.347***
(1.19) (4.22) (1.44) (3.62)
gdppc(-1) 1.104* 0.009 0.483 -1.031*** 0.297 0.306 -0.003 -0.819*
(1.76) (0.02) (1.04) (-2.68) (0.52) (0.68) (-0.01) (-1.91)
growth(-1) 0.275*** -0.054 0.008 -0.056 0.280*** -0.033 0.066 -0.059
(4.03) (-0.78) (0.18) (-1.21) (3.28) (-0.44) (1.37) (-1.06)
inflat -0.386** -0.075 0.007 0.155* -0.423*** -0.017 0.018 0.106
(-2.46) (-0.87) (0.14) (1.86) (-3.50) (-0.17) (0.35) (1.07)
trade(-1) 0.044 -0.874*** 0.195 -0.514 -1.017** -0.608 0.206 -0.110
(0.08) (-2.98) (0.85) (-1.53) (-2.30) (-1.57) (0.64) (-0.24)
school 0.951 1.043*
(1.50) (1.69)
fuelex 0.388 -0.266*** -0.141 0.059 0.686*** -0.352*** -0.205** 0.073
(1.63) (-2.85) (-1.47) (0.65) (2.84) (-3.59) (-2.28) (0.75)
school(-1) -0.306 -0.181 -0.653* -0.611 0.112 -0.727*
(-0.65) (-0.53) (-1.67) (-1.16) (0.34) (-1.70)
N 294 295 295 295 216 216 216 216
Countries 83 84 84 84 62 62 62 62
Adj.R2 0.646 0.218 0.172 0.402 0.657 0.291 0.129 0.311
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The data sample consists of four-
year averages (1986-90;...; 2002-2005), while initial period (1984-85) covers only two years and includes all
countries. Columns (1) – (4) include middle and low income countries, while (5)–(8) low income countries
only. In columns (1) & (5) the dependent variable is iprof ; in columns (2) & (6) – laword, in columns (3) &
(7) – burqua, and in columns (4) & (8) – corrupt. All regressions include country as well as year dummies.
By country clustered standard errors are reported.
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Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence Estimations
Table V.10: Permanent Liberalization Reform and Institutional Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
finlib p 0.121 0.108 0.013 0.117 0.082 -0.193
(2.68)*** (2.19)** (0.23) (2.02)** (1.20) (-2.38)**
(1.09) (0.92) (0.13) (0.80) (0.46) (-1.28)
ME of finlib p 0.099 0.059 0.100 -0.093
(2.23)** (1.19) (1.73)* (-1.39)
(0.92) (0.70) (0.68) (-0.77)
polity 0.027 0.025
(4.78)*** (4.10)***
(3.30)*** (2.85)***
govstab 0.127 0.129 0.144 0.126 0.127 0.139
(12.19)*** (12.17)*** (10.74)*** (10.29)*** (10.23)*** (8.69)***
(6.21)*** (6.24)*** (6.19)*** (5.75)*** (5.79)*** (5.39)***
gdppc 0.547 0.603 0.772 0.450 0.514 0.550
(4.58)*** (4.96)*** (4.17)*** (3.43)*** (3.88)*** (2.50)**
(2.06)** (2.25)** (2.36)** (1.47) (1.73)* (1.43)
growth 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.015
(1.45) (1.26) (1.36) (1.34) (1.11) (1.05)
(1.19) (1.05) (1.01) (1.09) (0.91) (0.76)
inflat -0.034 -0.026 0.001 -0.060 -0.052 -0.018
(-2.54)** (-1.94)* (0.07) (-3.73)*** (-3.25)*** (-0.99)
(-1.44) (-1.08) (0.05) (-2.13)** (-1.99)** (-0.77)
trade 0.146 0.172 -0.014 0.208 0.236 0.124
(1.67)* (1.90)* (-0.09) (2.30)** (2.54)** (0.86)
(0.80) (0.84) (-0.05) (1.27) (1.25) (0.52)
school 0.068 0.111 0.120 0.104 0.149 0.042
(0.61) (0.98) (0.76) (0.83) (1.15) (0.19)
(0.26) (0.42) (0.40) (0.36) (0.50) (0.11)
fuelex -0.043 -0.038 -0.017 -0.031 -0.029 0.003
(-2.03)** (-1.75)* (-0.37) (-1.01) (-0.98) (0.05)
(-1.23) (-1.11) (-0.21) (-0.58) (-0.59) (0.04)
pollib·finlib p 0.185 0.286 0.223 0.334
(1.90)* (2.55)** (2.20)** (2.82)***
(0.80) (1.41) (0.99) (1.89)*
soc·finlib p -0.384 -0.019 -0.295 0.358
(-3.24)*** (-0.12) (-2.36)** (2.55)**
(-1.43) (-0.13) (-1.10) (1.91)*
inequal 0.083 -0.005
(0.43) (-0.02)
(0.29) (-0.02)
N 1465 1465 825 1101 1101 595
Countries 108 108 84 85 85 65
Adj.R2 0.914 0.912 0.935 0.868 0.866 0.912
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The dependent variable is institute. In columns (1)-(3) the control group consists of always
open and always closed countries; columns (4)-(6): always closed only. ME stands for marginal
e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year dummies interacted with regional
dummies and socialist legal origin. 115
Table V.11: Temporary Liberalization Reform and Institutional Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
finlib t 0.098 0.077 0.017 0.085 0.043 -0.195
(2.15)** (1.56) (0.32) (1.45) (0.65) (-2.42)**
(0.95) (0.72) (0.18) (0.63) (0.28) (-1.29)
ME of finlib t 0.076 0.062 0.072 -0.100
(1.67)* (1.25) (1.23) (-1.44)
(0.75) (0.74) (0.54) (-0.79)
polity 0.027 0.026
(4.79)*** (4.09)***
(3.28)*** (2.82)***
govstab 0.127 0.129 0.143 0.126 0.127 0.141
(12.14)*** (12.13)*** (10.75)*** (10.25)*** (10.21)*** (8.87)***
(6.16)*** (6.20)*** (6.18)*** (5.69)*** (5.74)*** (5.49)***
gdppc 0.548 0.614 0.772 0.446 0.522 0.537
(4.57)*** (5.05)*** (4.18)*** (3.38)*** (3.93)*** (2.44)**
(2.03)** (2.23)** (2.37)** (1.43) (1.71)* (1.40)
growth 0.015 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.014
(1.47) (1.25) (1.37) (1.38) (1.11) (0.96)
(1.20) (1.03) (1.01) (1.11) (0.90) (0.69)
inflat -0.033 -0.025 0.002 -0.059 -0.051 -0.027
(-2.43)** (-1.84)* (0.11) (-3.60)*** (-3.15)*** (-1.45)
(-1.36) (-1.03) (0.07) (-2.03)** (-1.95)* (-1.20)
trade 0.146 0.170 -0.016 0.207 0.233 0.141
(1.67)* (1.87)* (-0.11) (2.30)** (2.52)** (0.98)
(0.80) (0.84) (-0.06) (1.27) (1.25) (0.61)
school 0.071 0.112 0.120 0.102 0.144 0.039
(0.63) (0.98) (0.76) (0.81) (1.12) (0.18)
(0.27) (0.42) (0.40) (0.35) (0.48) (0.10)
fuelex -0.046 -0.040 -0.017 -0.036 -0.032 0.011
(-2.15)** (-1.86)* (-0.37) (-1.16) (-1.08) (0.24)
(-1.32) (-1.19) (-0.21) (-0.67) (-0.65) (0.16)
pollib·finlib t 0.210 0.285 0.250 0.304
(2.19)** (2.62)*** (2.56)** (2.74)***
(0.90) (1.47) (1.15) (1.89)*
soc·finlib t -0.368 -0.023 -0.273 0.362
(-3.04)*** (-0.15) (-2.13)** (2.55)**
(-1.34) (-0.17) (-1.01) (1.87)*
inequal 0.084 -0.000
(0.44) (-0.00)
(0.29) (-0.00)
N 1465 1465 825 1101 1101 595
Countries 108 108 84 85 85 65
Adj.R2 0.914 0.912 0.935 0.867 0.865 0.912
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The dependent variable is institute. In columns (1)-(3) the control group consists of always
open and always closed countries; columns (4)-(6): always closed only. ME stands for marginal
e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year dummies interacted with regional
dummies and socialist legal origin.
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Table V.12: Liberalization Reform and Investment Profile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
finlib p 0.585 0.739 0.825 1.001
(4.84)*** (5.19)*** (5.54)*** (5.41)***
(2.75)*** (3.26)*** (3.33)*** (3.75)***
ME of finlib p 0.561 0.821
(4.61)*** (5.36)***
(2.77)*** (3.48)***
polity 0.025 0.023 0.025 0.023
(1.68)* (1.33) (1.72)* (1.35)
(1.04) (0.86) (1.06) (0.87)
govstab 0.290 0.289 0.268 0.265 0.288 0.287 0.265 0.263
(9.82)*** (9.86)*** (7.93)*** (7.89)*** (9.76)*** (9.78)*** (7.84)*** (7.78)***
(6.39)*** (6.42)*** (5.33)*** (5.31)*** (6.30)*** (6.33)*** (5.21)*** (5.19)***
laword 0.028 0.023 0.008 0.009 0.0186 0.0100 -0.007 -0.010
(0.48) (0.38) (0.12) (0.13) (0.31) (0.17) (-0.10) (-0.15)
(0.30) (0.24) (0.08) (0.09) (0.20) (0.11) (-0.07) (-0.10)
burqua 0.529 0.547 0.484 0.494 0.543 0.565 0.505 0.518
(5.84)*** (6.02)*** (5.02)*** (5.13)*** (5.99)*** (6.18)*** (5.26)*** (5.37)***
(3.15)*** (3.22)*** (2.92)*** (3.00)*** (3.16)*** (3.22)*** (2.99)*** (3.05)***
gdppc 0.686 0.589 0.913 0.823 0.691 0.621 0.908 0.854
(1.85)* (1.54) (2.25)** (1.98)** (1.86)* (1.62) (2.25)** (2.07)**
(1.03) (0.87) (1.19) (1.08) (1.03) (0.89) (1.18) (1.10)
growth 0.089 0.090 0.078 0.079 0.089 0.090 0.080 0.080
(2.75)*** (2.76)*** (2.19)** (2.20)** (2.77)*** (2.77)*** (2.26)** (2.24)**
(2.11)** (2.13)** (1.87)* (1.89)* (2.12)** (2.11)** (1.93)* (1.92)*
inflat -0.023 -0.019 -0.076 -0.076 -0.015 -0.008 -0.062 -0.058
(-0.58) (-0.47) (-1.72)* (-1.77)* (-0.37) (-0.20) (-1.41) (-1.35)
(-0.39) (-0.32) (-1.18) (-1.23) (-0.25) (-0.13) (-0.98) (-0.95)
trade 0.088 0.146 0.411 0.469 0.083 0.134 0.407 0.457
(0.32) (0.52) (1.37) (1.55) (0.30) (0.48) (1.35) (1.51)
(0.18) (0.29) (0.81) (0.91) (0.17) (0.26) (0.79) (0.87)
school -0.081 -0.024 0.423 0.503 -0.066 -0.006 0.445 0.522
(-0.28) (-0.08) (1.35) (1.59) (-0.23) (-0.02) (1.42) (1.65)*
(-0.16) (-0.05) (0.71) (0.84) (-0.13) (-0.01) (0.74) (0.86)
fuelex 0.013 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.008 0.018 0.013 0.011
(0.15) (0.28) (0.30) (0.26) (0.09) (0.21) (0.15) (0.12)
(0.08) (0.15) (0.21) (0.19) (0.05) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)
pollib·finlib p -0.079 -0.097
(-0.34) (-0.40)
(-0.18) (-0.22)
soc·finlib p -1.208 -1.098
(-3.42)*** (-2.84)***
(-2.04)** (-1.77)*
continued on the next page
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable
is iprof. In columns (1),(2),(5),(6) the control group consists of always open and always closed countries; in columns
(3),(4),(7),(8): always closed only. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year
dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
finlib t 0.561 0.687 0.795 0.929
(4.52)*** (4.77)*** (5.25)*** (5.12)***
(2.68)*** (3.02)*** (3.38)*** (3.69)***
ME of finlib t 0.526 0.777
(4.23)*** (5.07)***
(2.60)*** (3.45)***
pollib·finlib t -0.006 0.005
(-0.03) (0.02)
(-0.01) (0.01)
soc·finlib t -1.200 -1.092
(-3.38)*** (-2.81)***
(-2.01)** (-1.75)*
N 1465 1465 1101 1101 1465 1465 1101 1101
Countries 108 108 85 85 108 108 85 85
Adj.R2 0.805 0.806 0.789 0.790 0.805 0.806 0.789 0.790
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable
is iprof. In columns (1),(2),(5),(6) the control group consists of always open and always closed countries; in columns
(3),(4),(7),(8): always closed only. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year
dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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Table V.13: Liberalization Reform and Law and Order
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
finlib p -0.085 -0.113 -0.270 -0.377
(-1.14) (-1.30) (-2.86)*** (-3.35)***
(-0.51) (-0.62) (-1.25) (-1.45)
ME of finlib p -0.099 -0.289
(-1.35) (-3.12)***
(-0.62) (-1.36)
polity -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.010
(-0.09) (-0.87) (-0.08) (-0.90)
(-0.05) (-0.52) (-0.05) (-0.54)
govstab 0.108 0.106 0.108 0.108 0.107 0.106 0.108 0.108
(6.52)*** (6.50)*** (5.43)*** (5.45)*** (6.53)*** (6.50)*** (5.46)*** (5.47)***
(3.49)*** (3.49)*** (3.01)*** (3.00)*** (3.53)*** (3.50)*** (3.06)*** (3.04)***
gdppc 1.155 1.199 0.907 1.004 1.153 1.170 0.917 0.978
(5.29)*** (5.40)*** (3.76)*** (4.13)*** (5.28)*** (5.29)*** (3.79)*** (4.01)***
(2.35)** (2.50)** (1.74)* (1.97)* (2.36)** (2.45)** (1.77)* (1.93)*
growth -0.024 -0.026 -0.020 -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 -0.021 -0.024
(-1.53) (-1.64) (-1.10) (-1.26) (-1.53) (-1.60) (-1.15) (-1.27)
(-1.16) (-1.25) (-0.86) (-0.98) (-1.16) (-1.22) (-0.90) (-0.99)
inflat -0.097 -0.095 -0.129 -0.123 -0.095 -0.094 -0.131 -0.129
(-4.18)*** (-4.18)*** (-4.54)*** (-4.43)*** (-4.10)*** (-4.12)*** (-4.58)*** (-4.56)***
(-2.08)** (-2.12)** (-2.27)** (-2.38)** (-2.07)** (-2.09)** (-2.33)** (-2.43)**
trade 0.421 0.405 0.498 0.455 0.417 0.407 0.499 0.465
(2.84)*** (2.72)*** (3.22)*** (2.93)*** (2.79)*** (2.73)*** (3.21)*** (2.98)***
(1.30) (1.24) (1.66) (1.44) (1.27) (1.24) (1.63) (1.46)
school 0.247 0.242 0.199 0.160 0.248 0.246 0.204 0.171
(1.36) (1.34) (0.93) (0.75) (1.37) (1.36) (0.95) (0.80)
(0.68) (0.67) (0.48) (0.38) (0.69) (0.68) (0.49) (0.40)
fuelex -0.083 -0.079 -0.070 -0.059 -0.077 -0.073 -0.059 -0.049
(-2.32)** (-2.19)** (-1.22) (-1.02) (-2.16)** (-2.03)** (-1.03) (-0.86)
(-1.48) (-1.44) (-0.75) (-0.64) (-1.35) (-1.32) (-0.63) (-0.54)
pollib·finlib p 0.170 0.269
(1.12) (1.69)*
(0.46) (0.72)
soc·finlib p -0.183 0.116
(-0.99) (0.60)
(-0.45) (0.28)
continued on the next page
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable
is laword. In columns (1),(2),(5),(6) the control group consists of always open and always closed countries; in columns
(3),(4),(7),(8): always closed only. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year
dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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continued from the previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
finlib t -0.018 -0.019 -0.190 -0.247
(-0.24) (-0.22) (-1.96)** (-2.17)**
(-0.11) (-0.10) (-0.86) (-0.93)
ME of finlib t -0.027 -0.195
(-0.36) (-2.05)**
(-0.17) (-0.90)
pollib·finlib t 0.107 0.172
(0.72) (1.11)
(0.29) (0.47)
soc·finlib t -0.239 0.048
(-1.31) (0.25)
(-0.60) (0.12)
N 1465 1465 1101 1101 1465 1465 1101 1101
Countries 108 108 85 85 108 108 85 85
Adj.R2 0.867 0.868 0.826 0.827 0.867 0.867 0.825 0.825
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable
is laword. In columns (1),(2),(5),(6) the control group consists of always open and always closed countries; in columns
(3),(4),(7),(8): always closed only. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year
dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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Table V.14: Liberalization Reform and Bureaucratic Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
finlib p 0.210 0.194 0.268 0.258
(4.01)*** (3.87)*** (4.06)*** (3.82)***
(1.59) (1.39) (1.67)* (1.39)
ME of finlib p 0.189 0.254
(3.91)*** (4.02)***
(1.48) (1.60)
polity 0.038 0.036 0.038 0.036
(5.18)*** (4.50)*** (5.20)*** (4.52)***
(2.90)*** (2.58)** (2.92)*** (2.59)**
govstab 0.072 0.076 0.068 0.070 0.072 0.075 0.067 0.069
(5.69)*** (5.83)*** (4.42)*** (4.44)*** (5.66)*** (5.81)*** (4.37)*** (4.41)***
(3.21)*** (3.10)*** (2.75)*** (2.66)*** (3.17)*** (3.07)*** (2.68)*** (2.61)**
gdppc 0.399 0.462 0.365 0.415 0.401 0.485 0.357 0.433
(2.81)*** (3.41)*** (2.24)** (2.64)*** (2.80)*** (3.55)*** (2.17)** (2.73)***
(1.29) (1.56) (1.01) (1.22) (1.26) (1.57) (0.96) (1.22)
growth 0.012 0.010 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.010 0.019 0.016
(0.96) (0.83) (1.29) (1.12) (0.98) (0.80) (1.35) (1.13)
(0.79) (0.71) (1.04) (0.93) (0.81) (0.68) (1.10) (0.93)
inflat -0.038 -0.028 -0.057 -0.050 -0.037 -0.027 -0.055 -0.046
(-2.61)*** (-1.86)* (-3.52)*** (-2.94)*** (-2.48)** (-1.75)* (-3.26)*** (-2.65)***
(-1.45) (-0.97) (-2.46)** (-2.10)** (-1.36) (-0.92) (-2.19)** (-1.88)*
trade 0.106 0.150 0.232 0.283 0.108 0.146 0.231 0.277
(1.09) (1.46) (2.25)** (2.61)*** (1.11) (1.43) (2.24)** (2.55)**
(0.46) (0.58) (1.05) (1.13) (0.47) (0.57) (1.04) (1.10)
school 0.118 0.178 0.209 0.280 0.122 0.178 0.207 0.272
(0.85) (1.28) (1.30) (1.74)* (0.88) (1.28) (1.28) (1.69)*
(0.34) (0.49) (0.53) (0.67) (0.35) (0.48) (0.51) (0.64)
fuelex -0.038 -0.033 -0.051 -0.053 -0.043 -0.038 -0.060 -0.059
(-1.23) (-1.12) (-1.11) (-1.23) (-1.40) (-1.29) (-1.31) (-1.38)
(-0.76) (-0.69) (-0.68) (-0.74) (-0.87) (-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.84)
pollib·finlib p 0.165 0.192
(1.36) (1.50)
(0.55) (0.65)
soc·finlib p -0.315 -0.392
(-2.66)*** (-3.01)***
(-1.18) (-1.46)
continued on the next page
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable
is burqua. In columns (1),(2),(5),(6) the control group consists of always open and always closed countries; in columns
(3),(4),(7),(8): always closed only. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year
dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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continued from the previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
finlib t 0.158 0.121 0.205 0.170
(2.91)*** (2.20)** (3.01)*** (2.39)**
(1.23) (0.89) (1.33) (1.00)
ME of finlib t 0.134 0.190
(2.56)** (2.85)***
(1.06) (1.25)
pollib·finlib t 0.221 0.257
(1.80)* (2.02)**
(0.72) (0.88)
soc·finlib t -0.275 -0.346
(-2.26)** (-2.57)**
(-1.00) (-1.25)
N 1465 1465 1101 1101 1465 1465 1101 1101
Countries 108 108 85 85 108 108 85 85
Adj.R2 0.882 0.877 0.822 0.817 0.881 0.877 0.821 0.816
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable
is burqua. In columns (1),(2),(5),(6) the control group consists of always open and always closed countries; in columns
(3),(4),(7),(8): always closed only. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year
dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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Table V.15: Liberalization Reform and Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
finlib p -0.117 -0.187 -0.151 -0.247
(-1.79)* (-2.39)** (-1.96)** (-2.62)***
(-0.89) (-1.21) (-0.88) (-1.19)
ME of finlib p -0.143 -0.178
(-2.16)** (-2.27)**
(-1.09) (-1.04)
polity 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031
(2.76)*** (3.28)*** (2.69)*** (3.22)***
(1.54) (1.92)* (1.50) (1.89)*
govstab 0.097 0.098 0.114 0.116 0.097 0.099 0.114 0.117
(5.91)*** (5.91)*** (6.02)*** (6.04)*** (5.95)*** (5.96)*** (6.08)*** (6.13)***
(3.97)*** (4.01)*** (4.13)*** (4.16)*** (4.00)*** (4.06)*** (4.19)*** (4.25)***
laword 0.173 0.166 0.158 0.144 0.174 0.169 0.156 0.144
(5.30)*** (5.11)*** (4.31)*** (3.93)*** (5.35)*** (5.21)*** (4.30)*** (3.98)***
(2.59)** (2.53)** (2.13)** (1.98)* (2.61)** (2.58)** (2.11)** (2.00)**
burqua 0.186 0.208 0.200 0.229 0.187 0.206 0.203 0.229
(4.31)*** (4.88)*** (4.21)*** (4.86)*** (4.34)*** (4.84)*** (4.34)*** (4.91)***
(2.55)** (2.77)*** (2.42)** (2.69)*** (2.58)** (2.75)*** (2.50)** (2.73)***
gdppc -0.304 -0.209 -0.420 -0.327 -0.303 -0.195 -0.425 -0.314
(-1.61) (-1.07) (-2.07)** (-1.53) (-1.60) (-1.01) (-2.09)** (-1.47)
(-0.66) (-0.44) (-0.93) (-0.69) (-0.66) (-0.41) (-0.94) (-0.66)
growth 0.019 0.016 0.010 0.007 0.019 0.015 0.010 0.005
(1.41) (1.17) (0.64) (0.41) (1.38) (1.12) (0.61) (0.33)
(0.96) (0.78) (0.45) (0.28) (0.94) (0.75) (0.43) (0.23)
inflat 0.065 0.073 0.061 0.070 0.061 0.068 0.055 0.063
(2.86)*** (3.25)*** (2.21)** (2.54)** (2.72)*** (3.10)*** (2.03)** (2.36)**
(1.34) (1.48) (1.04) (1.17) (1.31) (1.47) (0.99) (1.14)
trade -0.167 -0.157 -0.405 -0.374 -0.161 -0.155 -0.401 -0.375
(-1.41) (-1.32) (-3.04)*** (-2.80)*** (-1.36) (-1.30) (-3.03)*** (-2.82)***
(-0.67) (-0.62) (-1.52) (-1.36) (-0.65) (-0.61) (-1.51) (-1.38)
school -0.211 -0.183 -0.433 -0.393 -0.216 -0.193 -0.453 -0.420
(-1.39) (-1.18) (-2.60)*** (-2.28)** (-1.42) (-1.25) (-2.72)*** (-2.44)**
(-0.67) (-0.58) (-1.41) (-1.23) (-0.69) (-0.61) (-1.48) (-1.32)
fuelex -0.007 -0.003 0.043 0.043 -0.011 -0.006 0.037 0.041
(-0.26) (-0.11) (1.03) (0.98) (-0.38) (-0.21) (0.89) (0.93)
(-0.16) (-0.07) (0.68) (0.68) (-0.24) (-0.14) (0.57) (0.64)
pollib·finlib p 0.253 0.255
(2.16)** (2.04)**
(1.29) (1.13)
soc·finlib p -0.092 0.009
(-0.53) (0.05)
(-0.29) (0.02)
continued on the next page
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable
is corrupt. In columns (1),(2),(5),(6) the control group consists of always open and always closed countries; in columns
(3),(4),(7),(8): always closed only. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year
dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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continued from the previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
finlib t -0.175 -0.252 -0.241 -0.348
(-2.79)*** (-3.39)*** (-3.28)*** (-3.94)***
(-1.46) (-1.77)* (-1.63) (-1.95)*
ME of finlib t -0.195 -0.258
(3.10)*** (-3.49)***
(-1.65)* (-1.77)*
pollib·finlib t 0.280 0.292
(2.40)** (2.36)**
(1.37) (1.27)
soc·finlib t -0.044 0.087
(-0.25) (0.44)
(-0.14) (0.23)
N 1465 1465 1101 1101 1465 1465 1101 1101
Countries 108 108 85 85 108 108 85 85
Adj.R2 0.864 0.863 0.802 0.800 0.864 0.864 0.804 0.802
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable
is corrupt. In columns (1),(2),(5),(6) the control group consists of always open and always closed countries; in columns
(3),(4),(7),(8): always closed only. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as well as year
dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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Table V.16: Alternatively Specified Liberalization Reform and Institutional
Quality, Investment Profile, and Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
finlib c 0.038 -0.037 0.274 0.321 0.078 -0.212
(0.96) (-0.76) (2.48)** (2.30)** (-1.31) (-2.95)***
(0.40) (-0.30) (1.45) (1.28) (-0.62) (-1.41)
ME of finlib c 0.011 0.268 -0.111
(0.28) (2.36)** (-1.88)*
(0.11) (1.37) (-0.92)
polity 0.027 0.024 0.023
(4.71)*** (1.58) (2.79)***
(3.24)*** (0.95) (1.55)
govstab 0.128 0.131 0.288 0.289 0.097 0.100
(12.12)*** (12.26)*** (9.61)*** (9.70)*** (5.93)*** (6.03)***
(6.08)*** (6.14)*** (6.12)*** (6.19)*** (3.97)*** (4.14)***
laword 0.014 0.011 0.175 0.167
(0.24) (0.18) (5.38)*** (5.14)***
(0.15) (0.11) (2.61)** (2.53)**
burqua 0.569 0.594 0.179 0.198
(6.24)*** (6.49)*** (4.19)*** (4.68)***
(3.27)*** (3.37)*** (2.49)** (2.70)***
gdppc 0.550 0.602 0.695 0.666 -0.305 -0.214
(4.52)*** (4.82)*** (1.83)* (1.71)* (-1.61) (-1.11)
(1.98)* (2.07)** (0.98) (0.90) (-0.66) (-0.47)
growth 0.015 0.013 0.089 0.090 0.019 0.015
(1.46) (1.25) (2.75)*** (2.75)*** (1.39) (1.10)
(1.18) (1.03) (2.12)** (2.12)** (0.95) (0.75)
inflat -0.037 -0.026 -0.035 -0.030 0.067 0.079
(-2.71)*** (-1.93)* (-0.86) (-0.75) (2.97)*** (3.50)***
(-1.49) (-1.07) (-0.58) (-0.52) (1.40) (1.62)
trade 0.155 0.173 0.132 0.179 -0.176 -0.181
(1.77)* (1.91)* (0.47) (0.63) (-1.48) (-1.50)
(0.85) (0.85) (0.26) (0.34) (-0.70) (-0.17)
school 0.076 0.122 -0.025 0.018 -0.227 -0.195
(0.67) (1.04) (-0.08) (0.06) (-1.49) (-1.26)
(0.29) (0.45) (-0.05) (0.03) (-0.72) (-0.61)
fuelex -0.051 -0.054 -0.019 -0.016 -0.002 -0.008
(-2.42)** (-2.60)*** (-0.22) (-0.20) (-0.09) (-0.26)
(-1.49) (-1.63) (-0.12) (-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.17)
continued on the next page
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In columns (1) & (2) the dependent variable is institute; in columns (3) & (4) – iprof ; in columns
(5) & (6) – corrupt. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as
well as year dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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continued from the previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pollib·finlib c 0.215 -0.063 0.320
(2.84)*** (-0.32) (3.24)***
(1.20) (-0.16) (1.97)*
soc·finlib c -0.002 -0.290 0.218
(-0.02) (-0.93) (1.46)
(-0.01) (-0.56) (0.93)
N 1465 1465 1465 1465 1465 1465
Countries 108 108 108 108 108 108
Adj.R2 0.913 0.912 0.803 0.802 0.864 0.864
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In columns (1) & (2) the dependent variable is institute; in columns (3 )& (4) – iprof ; in columns
(5) & (6) – corrupt. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country dummies as
well as year dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist legal origin.
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Table V.17: Alternatively Specified Liberalization Reform and Law and Or-
der, and Bureaucratic Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
finlib c -0.037 -0.106 0.069 0.014
(-0.56 (-1.32) (1.50) (0.27)
(-0.27) (–0.66) (0.61) (0.10)
ME of finlib c -0.052 0.042
(-0.80) (0.92)
(-0.39) (0.35)
polity -0.001 0.038
(-0.09) (5.12)***
(-0.05) (2.88)***
govstab 0.108 0.108 0.072 0.077
(6.53)*** (6.58)*** (5.66)*** (5.89)***
(3.52)*** (3.56)*** (3.10)*** (3.03)***
gdppc 1.154 1.190 0.403 0.449
(5.27)*** (5.40)*** (2.77)*** (3.17)***
(2.36)** (2.47)** (1.22) (1.31)
growth -0.024 -0.026 0.012 0.011
(-1.54) (-1.67)* (0.98) (0.86)
(-1.17) (-1.27) (0.80) (0.72)
inflat -0.095 -0.091 -0.043 -0.031
(-4.11)*** (-4.05)*** (-2.87)*** (-1.99)**
(-2.01)** (-2.05)** (-1.55) (-1.04)
trade 0.415 0.392 0.122 0.162
(2.78)*** (2.63)*** (1.25) (1.60)
(1.25) (1.17) (0.53) (0.64)
school 0.240 0.238 0.132 0.197
(1.32) (1.32) (0.94) (1.39)
(0.66) (0.67) (0.37) (0.53)
fuelex -0.078 -0.081 -0.051 -0.054
(-2.19)** (-2.23)** (-1.67)* (-1.83)*
(-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.02) (-1.08)
pollib·finlib c 0.184 0.179
(1.49) (1.93)*
(0.74) (0.77)
soc·finlib c 0.092 -0.094
(0.62) (-1.04)
(0.35) (-0.47)
N 1465 1465 1465 1465
Countries 108 108 108 108
Adj.R2 0.867 0.868 0.880 0.876
t statistics in parentheses (above: robust; below: clustered) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. In columns (1) & (2) the dependent variable is laword ; in columns
(3) & (4) – burqua. ME stands for marginal e↵ect. All regressions include country
dummies as well as year dummies interacted with regional dummies and socialist
legal origin.
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics
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Figure V.2: Development of Financial Openness
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Table V.18: Summary Statistics: All Countries
Overall Between-country Within-country No. of Obs.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Min Max (No. of Cntr.)
institute 3.342 1.240 1.120 0.502 0.188 6 2656 (129)
iprof 6.814 2.428 1.553 1.896 0 12 2656 (129)
corrupt 3.137 1.407 1.195 0.729 0 6 2656 (129)
laword 3.628 1.536 1.291 0.806 0 6 2656 (129)
burqual 2.130 1.229 1.104 0 .520 0 4 2656 (129)
govstab 7.416 2.329 1.143 2.070 0.667 12 2656 (129)
demacc 3.673 1.637 1.400 0.856 0 6 2656 (129)
polity 2.533 7.091 6.260 3.391 -10 10 2508 (123)
kaopen 0.137 1.590 1.358 0.864 -1.844 2.478 2559 (128)
gdppc 8.541 1.369 1.334 0.193 4.764 11.379 2623 (128)
growth 0.656 1.481 0.640 1.360 -4.183 4.497 2618 (128)
inflat 2.025 1.388 0.973 1.996 -4.615 10.076 2385 (122)
trade 4.095 0.670 0.619 0.246 0.034 6.063 2623 (128)
school 4.032 0.726 0.715 0.181 1.118 5.086 1993 (125)
fuelex 1.777 1.395 1.372 0.530 0 4.612 2011 (123)
primex 1.346 0.912 0.913 0.338 0.002 4.552 2043 (124)
bl school 5.645 2.878 2.857 0.633 0.370 12.250 1991 (100)
inequal 3.718 0.165 0.153 0.083 3.250 4.164 1340 (111)
Here and in all the following tables, only countries are considered for which institutional data are available.
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Table V.19: Summary Statistics: Middle and Low Income Countries
Overall Between-country Within-country No. of Obs.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Min Max (No. of Cntr.)
institute 2.809 0.910 0.754 0.538 0.188 5.5 1925 (95)
iprof 6.208 2.224 1.370 1.816 0 12 1925 (95)
corrupt 2.642 1.078 0.801 0.730 0 6 1925 (95)
laword 3.043 1.257 0.972 0.841 0 6 1925 (95)
burqual 1.632 0.989 0.808 0.584 0 4 1925 (95)
govstab 7.093 2.401 1.120 2.186 0.667 12 1925 (95)
demacc 3.204 1.422 1.127 0.921 0 6 1925 (95)
polity 1.150 6.658 5.542 3.880 -10 10 1885 (94)
kaopen -0.363 1.369 1.112 0.895 -1.844 2.478 1862 (95)
gdppc 7.918 1.066 1.050 0.201 4.764 10.170 1898 (94)
growth 0.540 1.596 0.695 1.473 -4.183 4.497 1896 (94)
inflat 2.321 1.479 0.998 1.112 -4.615 10.076 1676 (89)
trade 4.031 0.655 0.598 0.263 0.034 5.898 1898 (94)
school 3.769 0.739 0.718 0.208 1.118 4.696 1354 (93)
fuelex 1.862 1.466 1.453 0.493 0 4.612 1356 (90)
primex 1.481 0.955 0.943 0.376 0.002 4.552 1384 (91)
bl school 4.380 2.237 2.336 0.612 0.370 10.520 1383 (70)
inequal 3.779 0.144 0.126 0.096 3.250 4.164 848 (78)
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Table V.20: Correlation between Institutions and Financial Openness
institute iprof corrupt laword burqua kaopen
institute 1.000
iprof 0.665 1.000
corrupt 0.796 0.262 1.000
laword 0.868 0.480 0.636 1.000
burqua 0.906 0.517 0.669 0.687 1.000
kaopen 0.507 0.454 0.303 0.467 0.435 1.000
institute 1.000
iprof 0.666 1.000
corrupt 0.648 0.131 1.000
laword 0.765 0.401 0.396 1.000
burqua 0.820 0.431 0.429 0.431 1.000
kaopen 0.220 0.371 -0.026 0.166 0.134 1.000
Above: all countries; below: middle and low income countries
Table V.21: Correlation between ICRG and WGI Indicators
icrg icrg icrg icrg wgi wgi wgi wgi
iprof laword burqua corrupt gove↵ rulelaw regqua corrupt
icrg iprof 1.000
icrg laword 0.422 1.000
icrg burqua 0.557 0.623 1.000
icrg corrupt 0.376 0.641 0.663 1.000
wgi gove↵ 0.655 0.706 0.858 0.720 1.000
wgi rulelaw 0.643 0.774 0.813 0.722 0.957 1.000
wgi regqua 0.712 0.633 0.780 0.659 0.918 0.909 1.000
wgi corrupt 0.619 0.718 0.793 0.768 0.951 0.952 0.882 1.000
icrg iprof 1.000
icrg laword 0.246 1.000
icrg burqua 0.435 0.300 1.000
icrg corrupt 0.202 0.386 0.352 1.000
wgi gove↵ 0.601 0.408 0.691 0.403 1.000
wgi rulelaw 0.574 0.565 0.584 0.445 0.892 1.000
wgi regqua 0.649 0.338 0.570 0.393 0.853 0.830 1.000
wgi corrupt 0.542 0.417 0.524 0.516 0.864 0.881 0.779 1.000
WGI indicators are also perceptive measures of di↵erent institutions, capturing following features:
gove↵: the quality of public and civil services and the degree of their independence from political pressures;
regqua: the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations;
rulelaw: in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts;
corrupt: the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and
grand forms of corruption. See Kaufmann et al. (2010).
Above: all countries; below: middle and low income countries
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Table V.22: Countries Which Experienced Financial Liberalization
Country Year of financial
liberalization
Denmark 1988
France 1994
Italy 1990
Norway 1993
Greece 1998
Iceland 1994
Ireland 1992
Portugal 1993
Spain 1993
Argentina* 1993
Bolivia 1990
Chile* 2001
Costa Rica 1995
El Salvador 1996
Guatemala 1991
Haiti 1997
Honduras* 1993
Mexico 1993
Nicaragua 1996
Paraguay 1997
Peru 1992
Venezuela, RB* 1996
Guyana 1996
Jamaica 1992
Trinidad and Tobago 1993
Islamic Rep. Iran 2002
Israel 1999
Jordan 1995
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1996
Sri Lanka 1992
Philippines 1992
Botswana* 1987/1998
Gambia, The 1991
Kenya 1996
Liberia 1998
Uganda 1997
Zambia 1996
Czech Republic 2000
Hungary 2001
Slovenia 2000
Poland 2002
Romania 2002
A country is classified as financially liberalized if its kaopen index becomes and
remains negative for at least three years. *Argentina, Chile, Honduras, and Venezuela
experienced a reform reversal at some point of time and have remained closed since
then. By contrast, after the first liberalization reform in 1987, Botswana closed its
financial account in 1993 and then opened it again in 1998.
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Table V.23: Countries Which Remained either Always Financially Open or
Always Financially Closed
always open United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Panama, Uruguay, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Canada,Japan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong (China), In-
donesia, Singapore, Armenia, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
always closed Malta, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Bahamas,
Suriname, Cyprus, Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Rep. Korea,
Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, Algeria, Cameroon, Rep. Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Papua New Guinea, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Albania,
Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Moldova, Russian Federation, China, Ukraine, Slovak Republic
Table V.24: Former Socialist Countries
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
Table V.25: List of Countries Classified according to Income Class
High Income Class United States,United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, The Bahamas,
Bahrain, Cyprus, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong (China),
Rep. Korea, Singapore, Slovenia
Middle Income Class Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, RB
Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Lebanon, Oman, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Russian
Federation, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland
Low Income Class Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Peru, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Islamic Rep. Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syrian
Arab Republic, Arab Rep. Egypt, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Alge-
ria, Morocco, Tunisia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Albania, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Bulgaria, China, Ukraine, Romania, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Bangladesh, Myan-
mar, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Cameroon, Rep. Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Ethiopia,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, So-
malia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Papua New Guinea,
Moldova
The classification is done according to the World Bank Atlas method, which distinguishes, based on a
country’s GNI per capita, between four income groups: low income, $1,005 or less; lower middle income,
$1,006 - $3,975; upper middle income, $3,976 - $12,275; and high income, $12,276 or more. We grouped
together low income and lower middle income countries.
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Table V.26: Variable Description
Variable Description & Source
bl school Initial value of the average years of school attendance of the total population aged
over 25 years. Source: Barro and Lee (2001)
burqua Measurement of the strength and quality of the bureaucracy. High points (maximum
4) are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to
govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In
the low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be autonomous from political pressure
and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that
lack the cushioning e↵ect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change
in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day
administrative functions. Source: Political Risk Services Group (2008)
corrupt Assessment of corruption within the political system. The most common form of
corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands
for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange
controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Although this measure takes
such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corrup-
tion in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ’favor-for-favors’,
secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. Max-
imum points of 6 indicate the lowest corruption level. Source: Political Risk Services
Group (2008)
demacc Democratic Accountability is a measure of how responsive a government is to its
people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that the
government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a
non-democratic one. The points in this component are awarded on the basis of the
type of governance enjoyed by the country in question. Following types of regimes are
distinguished: Alternating Democracy, Dominated Democracy, De Facto One-Party
State, De Jure One-Party State and Autarchy. A maximum score of 6 indicates the
highest level of democratic accountability. Source: Political Risk Services Group
(2008)
finlib Dummy variable which indicates the implementation of a financial liberalization re-
form. It takes the value of 1 in the years after the treatment (i.e., after the reform)
and 0 otherwise, i.e., in the treated countries before the reform and in the control
countries during the entire time span. Three di↵erent types of a liberalization reform
are distinguished:
• finlib p: takes the value of 1 if a country’s kaopen indicator becomes positive
at time t given it was negative in t  1 and remains positive until the end of
the sample period.
• finlib t: takes the value of 1 if a country’s kaopen indicator becomes positive
at time t given it was negative in t  1 and remains positive for at least three
years after the reform.
• finlib c: takes the value of 1 if a country’s kaopen indicator increases by at
least 0.86 at time t and remains always larger than the value of kaopen in
t  1 plus 0.86 in all subsequent years until the end of the sample period.
Source: Own calculation. Data on kaopen stems from Chinn and Ito (2008).
fuelex Fuel exports as % of merchandise exports. Fuels comprise mineral fuels, lubricants
and related materials. World Bank sta↵ estimates from the Commodity Trade Statis-
tics Database maintained by the United Nations Statistics Division. Source: World
Bank (2011)
continued on the next page
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gdppc PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices. Source:
Heston et al. (2011)
govstab Government Stability is an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out
its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in o ce. The risk rating assigned is
the sum of three sub-components (Government Unity, Legislative Strength, Popular
Support), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points.
A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High
Risk. Source: Political Risk Services Group (2008)
growth Growth rate of PPP Converted GDP Chain Per Capita. Source: Heston et al. (2011)
inequal Estimated household income inequality, derived from the econometric relationship
between industrial payments inequality, other conditioning variables, and the World
Bank’s Deininger & Squire data set. Source: Galbraith and Kum (2005)
inflat Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, reflects the annual percentage
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services
that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres
formula is generally used. Source: World Bank (2011)
iprof Investment Profile is an assessment of factors a↵ecting the risk to investment that are
not covered by other political, economic, and financial risk components. The risk rat-
ing assigned is the sum of three sub-components (Contract Viability/Expropriation,
Profits Repatriation, Payment Delays), each with a maximum score of four points
and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and
a score of 0 points to Very High Risk. Source: Political Risk Services Group (2008)
kaopen Index measuring a country’s degree of financial openness. kaopen is based
on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on
cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These variables are:
• variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rates;
• variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions;
• variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions;
• variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds.
The binary variables are transformed into a single index (kaopen) by using the prin-
cipal component method. The index is scaled in the range between -2.5 and 2.5 with
higher values standing for larger degrees of financial openness. Source: Chinn and
Ito (2008)
laword Law and Order are assessed separately. The Law component is an assessment of the
strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an
assessment of popular observance of the law. Both sub-component comprise zero (low
quality) to three points (high quality). Source: Political Risk Services Group (2008)
continued on the next page
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polity Measurement of a country’s political regime. The “Polity score” is the dif-
ference between the DEMOC score and the AUTOC score, with a scale rang-
ing from +10 (strongly democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic). DEMOC
measures the degree of institutionalized democracy conceived as three elements:
1. Presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express
e↵ective preferences about alternative policies
2. Existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the
executive
3. The guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts
of political participation
AUTOC is derived from codings of competitiveness of political participation, the reg-
ulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment,
and constraints on the chief executive. Source: Marshall et al. (2010)
pollib·finlib j Interaction term, in which the dummy pollib takes the value of 1 if a country’s polity
indicator becomes positive at time t, given it was negative at t   1 and remains
positive until the end of the sample period; j 2 c, p, t. Source: Own calculation. The
polity data stems from Marshall et al. (2010).
primex Agricultural raw materials exports as % of merchandise exports. Agricultural raw
materials comprise crude materials except fuels. World Bank sta↵ estimates from the
Commodity Trade Statistics Database maintained by the United Nations Statistics
Division. Source: World Bank (2011)
school Secondary gross school enrollment. Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enroll-
ment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that o cially corresponds
to the level of education shown. Secondary education completes the provision of basic
education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for
lifelong learning and human development, by o↵ering more subject- or skill-oriented
instruction using more specialized teachers. Source: World Bank (2011)
soc·finlib j Interaction term, in which the dummy soc indicates whether a country has socialist
legal origin and j 2 c, p, t. Source: Own calculation. The data on the countries’
judiciary system stems from La-Porta et al. (1999).
trade Exports plus Imports divided by real GDP at 2005 constant prices, Source: Heston
et al. (2011)
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